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Following World War II, Yellowstone administrators began to receive increasing 
pressure from local interests to plow park roads in winter. This pressure culminated in a 
congressional hearing on the matter in Jackson Hole in 1967, with virtually all who gave 
or sent statements supporting the plowing of the Park’s roads. Yellowstone 
administrators did not believe that plowing the Park roads was in the best interest of the 
Park or its visitors, and formally opted instead to allow visitors to tour the Park in 
winter via oversnow vehicles. Superintendent Jack Anderson adopted this policy in 1968, 
and decided to groom the snow vehicle roads and open the Old Faithful Snowlodge for 
visitor convenience. Following that meeting, he pursued a personal agenda of promoting 
snowmobile use of Yellowstone because he personally liked snowmobiles, and failed to 
consider adequately their negative impacts upon the Park. His successor, John Townsley, 
continued Anderson’s policies for the same reasons. Bob Barbee, superintendent after 
Townsley, continued the same policies again, while casting the first doubts regarding the 
program. The park’s current superintendent, Mike Finley, is taking the first hard look at 
the snowmobile program, examining its effects on the Yellowstone environment and 
considering major changes and limitations on the use of snowmobiles in the snow- 
covered park. As such, he is the first superintendent to consider seriously the possible 
adverse effects of snowmobiles on the Park, the potential increase for winter use of the 
Park, and the policies of other national parks toward snowmobiles. However, he has yet 
to make any significant changes.
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IN TR O D U CTIO N
This paper will examine the development of the National Park Service’s policy 
toward snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park from 1940 to the present. While 
administrators wished to enable the visitor to experience the spectacular beauty of the 
Park in winter and satisfy public pressure to open the Park in winter, they did not 
adequately consider the effects of snowmobiles on park resources, the future impacts of 
winter visitation, the policies of other national parks, or applicable laws such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Yellowstone National Park 
Yellowstone National Park, the world’s first national park, lies in the northwest 
corner of Wyoming, and extends into Montana and Idaho. Established in 1872 by 
President Ulysses S. Grant, Yellowstone occupies a special place in the hearts of 
Americans and individuals all over the world. Yellowstone’s best-known feature is Old 
Faithful, probably the most famous geyser in the world. Old Faithful is one of over 
10,000 geysers, hot springs, mud pots, and fumaroles in the Park. The park has more of 
such thermal features than the rest of the world combined.^
Yellowstone is known for much more than simply geysers, however; in fact, it holds 
so many other unique natural phenomena that early explorers christened it 
“Wonderland” in the late 1800’s. These wonders include the spectacular Lower Falls of
' T. Scon Bryan, The Geysers of Yellowstone, (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1991), 17.
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the Yellowstone, a 308-foot waterfall at the head of the Grand Canyon of the 
Yellowstone, a striking canyon of yellow, orange, pink, and red rocks. In the southern 
part of the Park is Yellowstone Lake, a very large, cold, and high-elevation lake at the 
foot of the dramatic Absaroka Mountains. The park’s superb mountain scenery 
impressively complements its unique thermal features."
In addition to its scenery, Yellowstone is home to one of the largest assortments of 
wildlife remaining in N orth America. The only herd of wild bison {Bison bison) which 
has survived continuously since ancient times in the United States still ranges through 
the Park. Yellowstone is home to 30,000 elk {Ceruus elaphus), part of the largest herd of 
elk in the world. It is one of only two places in the 48 contiguous states that harbors both 
the threatened grizzly bear {Ursus horribilis) and also the gray wolf {Canis lupus). 
Yellowstone Lake harbors the largest remaining population of cutthroat trout {Salmo 
clarki) in the U.S. In addition to these animals, the Park has five other species of 
ungulates, some forty other mammals in total, over 225 recorded species of birds, a few 
reptiles and amphibians, and at least 1500 different plant species, including a thermally- 
adapted endemic plant known as Ross’s bent-grass {Agrostis rossiae). The abundant flora 
and fauna are clearly some of Yellowstone’s most significant resources.^
Yellowstone’s geographic and wildlife resources combine to make it one of the
 ̂ Rick Reese, Greater Yellowstone, The National Park & Adjacent Wildlands, (Helena: American & World Geographic 
Publishing, 1991), 23.
 ̂Reese, Greater Yellowstoney p. 31.
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wildest places left in the United States outside of Alaska. In addition to the resources just 
described, Yellowstone has other notable signs of wildness. The Yellowstone River, the 
longest undammed river in the nation, courses through the Park for about one hundred 
miles. The Thorofare Ranger Station in the southeast corner of the Park is one of the 
most remote places in the 48 contiguous states, located over 25 miles by trail from the 
closest road in any direction. The 1988 wildfires, which burned almost 800,000 acres in 
Yellowstone, provided clear evidence that nature, and wildness, reign in Yellowstone by 
completely defeating one of the largest fire-fighting efforts of the U.S. government. 
Yellowstone’s most precious resource is its wildness, a somewhat intangible resource that 
is increasingly threatened in our consumptive and overdeveloped society.'*
Perhaps this wildness is what draws people to Yellowstone. An average of three 
million visitors per year travel through Yellowstone, making it one of the most popular 
national parks in the U.S. Nearly all of these visitors travel over 500 miles to get to the 
Park, further attesting to its popularity.^
And perhaps Yellowstone’s wildness is most visible and most tangible in the winter. 
Certainly the weather is wild, bringing some of the coldest temperatures in the 48 
contiguous states to Yellowstone—ranging as low as -50° F. in most winters—and an 
average of 200-300” of snow per winter to accompany the intense cold. Yellowstone 
receives these cold temperatures and large amounts of snow because most of it is a high
Michael Milstein, Yellowstone: 12} Years of America's Best Idea (Billings: Billings Gazette, 1996), 14-24,93. 
Personal communication with Anita Varley, July, 1991, Yellowstone National Park, WY.
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plateau, averaging about 8000 feet above sea level. Nearly surrounded by mountain 
ranges, the Park’s normative season is winter, lasting from late October well into May in 
most years.^
The cold temperatures and significant snowpack combine to create impressive sights. 
First, the winter conditions force most of the Park’s wildlife to migrate to the lower 
elevations both in and out of the Park, where they spend the winter. Because most of the 
Park’s winter roads are at the same relatively low elevations, the wildlife are much more 
visible in the winter than they are in summer. Many thermal features are near the road in 
the Old Faithful/Firehole River valley area; bison and elk congregate around them in 
winter to conserve body heat. The proximity of the thermal features to the road and 
clustering action of the wildlife in winter make them still more visible in the Old 
Faithful/Firehole River valley area.
Second, the contrast of the heat from the thermal features with the cold winter air 
creates a winter fantasyland at times. In such cold temperatures, vapor from the thermal 
features condenses on all nearby objects, rendering them white-frosted winter 
masterpieces. Since some rivers receive millions of gallons of hot or boiling water from 
the Park’s thermal features, they do not freeze, even in the coldest weather. On cold 
nights, rising condensation from the comparatively warm rivers clings to all nearby 
objects, turning the river corridors into frosty winter wonderlands. Water-dependent
 ̂ Yellowstone National Park Commentary Handbook (Transportation Department, AmFac Parks & Resorts, 
Yellowstone National Park, WY, 1995), 150-52.
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birds such as trumpeter swans and bald eagles are drawn to these open rivers, further 
enhancing the wildlife viewing. Also, since many of the roads parallel the rivers and 
geyser areas, the combination of the wildlife viewing and the winter scenery make for an 
outstanding natural experience.^
Finally, the wildness of Yellowstone may be more perceptible in winter because 
there are not as many visitors—a mere 4-5% of Yellowstone’s three million annual 
visitors come to the Park in winter.^
Yellowstone is a very moving place. Most Yellowstone veterans agree that 
wildness—which often creates subtle feelings of fear and awe—is its most precious 
resource. One may always experience wildness in the Park, but some feel its presence 
most strongly in winter. Perhaps Yellowstone’s administrators so readily accommodated 
the snowmobile in the park to enable visitors to experience this wildness.
Brief History of Winter Use in Yellowstone 
Winter visitation has a surprisingly long history in Yellowstone. One of the first 
significant winter visits after the Park was established was that of Henry Schwatka and 
F.J. Haynes in 1887. They and a number of their assistants undertook a three-week ski 
tour through the Park during one of the coldest and snowiest winters in U.S. history. 
Haynes was a noted photographer of the West at this time and became the park’s more-
Jeff Henry, Yellowstone Winter Guide (Niwot; Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 87-89.
* “Seasonal Visitation Statistics,” flyer available from the Visitor Services Office, NPS, YNP, WY.
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or-less official photographer. On this winter trip he becarhe the first to photograph Old 
Faithful in the winter.^
In 1949 the first winter visitors on motorized vehicles entered Yellowstone’s frozen 
interior. Because these early over-snow vehicles were unreliable and often difficult to 
steer safely, visitation in the early 1950’s was quite sporadic. It began to pick up in the 
late 1950’s when two men in West Yellowstone, Montana, purchased the first 
“snowcoaches,” large, enclosed vehicles on tracks and skis that were more comfortable, 
reliable, and controllable than the earlier over-snow vehicles. They brought the first 
snowcoach tours into the Park in 1955;^  ̂ other operators continue such tours today. I 
conducted such tours during three recent winters in Yellowstone.
Bombardier began to manufacture private, one- or two-person snowmobiles in 
1959.^  ̂ Beginning in 1963, visitors began entering the Park on private snowmobiles in 
addition to those touring via snow coach .T he  developments of these two forms of 
winter locomotion, and the apparent willingness of the NPS to accommodate them in 
Yellowstone, made possible the formal opening of Yellowstone to winter motorized 
visitation in the late 1960’s.
 ̂ Paul Schullery, Yellowstone’s Ski Pioneers: Peril & Heroism on the Winter Trail (Worland: High Plains Publishing 
Company, 1995), 39-43.
Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1949, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 5.
" Robert S. Halliday, “Yellowstone in Winter,” Parade, March 13, 1955, p. 11.
Malcolm F. Baldwin, The off-road vehicle and environmental quality (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation
Foundation, 1970), 7
Superintendent’s Monthly Report for January, 1963, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
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In 1971 the National Park Service (NPS) began grooming the snowmobile routes to 
provide smoother roads for visitors. Snowmobiles and snowcoaches (collectively known 
as snowmachines) tend to displace the snow over which they travel. Where many 
snowmachines move the snow in this way, moguls, or bumps of snow, result, making 
travel bumpy and unpleasant. Hence, the NPS began grooming the roads to facilitate 
more comfortable winter travel. During the winter of 1971-72, Yellowstone 
administrators directed the Yellowstone Park Company (“YPCo”) to open the Old 
Faithful Snowlodge for its first winter season. With that, visitors could stay overnight in 
the Old Faithful area, as well as obtain food and gasoline there. Both the grooming and 
the lodging services continue today.
Motorized visitation in the Park has escalated rapidly since it began (with some short 
periods of decline). This increase was facilitated by the smooth roads and the ability of 
visitors to stay overnight at Old Faithful. Manufacturer improvements in snowmobile 
reliability and comfort additionally facilitated the increase in visitation. The present 
park situation bears little resemblance to the original, 1970’s-era snow-covered 
Yellowstone.
Staff Meeting Minutes for Feb. 2, 1971, IN Box A-37, File A40: “Conferences and Meetings, 1971” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY p. 3.
“Yellowstone Snowtime Adventures,” promotional brochure for Old Faithful Snowlodge for its first season, 1971-72, 
located at Chief Executive’s Office, AmFac Parks & Resorts, Mammoth Hot Springs, YNP, WY.
Robert Barbee, interview by author, telephone interview. Anchorage, AK, Jan. 14,1998.
Present Park Situation 
Today Yellowstone is open for winter visitation from mid-December through early 
March. The Yellowstone maintenance staff plows only 55 miles of road in the northern 
part of the Park for automobile travel, from Gardiner to the Northeast Entrance. The 
staff packs and grooms 184 miles of the remaining park roads for snowmachine travel. 
Grooming occurs every night or every other night, depending on volume of travel, and 
costs around $1 million per winter (with salaries, supplies, and electricity included).**
Yellowstone now leads the National Park system in numbers of entering 
snowmobiles per winter. In a typical winter today, from 60,000*  ̂to as many as 91,000'° 
snowmobiles enter the Park. Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota is the next busiest 
winter park, with 30,000 snowmobile visits per winter.'* Fewer than 10% of 
Yellowstone’s winter visitors now enter via snowcoach."^ From West Yellowstone, as 
many as 1,400 snowmobiles enter on the busiest winter days. That figure, when 
combined with visitors entering the Park from its three other entrances, gives a total of
National Park Service, Environmental Assessment: Temporary Closure of a Winter Road, Yellowstone National Park 
(Yellowstone: NPS, Nov., 1997), 19.
'* National Park Service, “Overview of Maintenance Trends” (Unpublished Report, Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, 
1997), 1.
National Park Service, Environmental Assessment:, p. 20.
D. J. Schubert, “Adverse Effects of Trail Grooming and Snowmobile Use on Winter Use Management in the Greater 
Yellowstone Area with a Special Emphasis on Yellowstone National Park” (Unpublished report submitted to NPS, 
Yellowstone, February 1997), 14.
Personal communication with Barbara J. West, Jan. 17,1997, Voyageurs National Park, MN.
National Park Service, Environmental Assessment:, p. 19.
as many as 2,000 snowmobiles entering the Park on a given winter day/^
Over 75% of Park winter visitors travel to Old Faithful during their stay. About 
50% also travel to the Canyon area to view the Lower Falls and Grand Canyon of the 
Yellowstone.'^ A typical tour for a visitor entering from West Yellowstone is to travel 
the 14 miles to and from the “Lower Loop” (the Park’s main roads are configured in a 
“Figure 8,” with an “Upper” and a “Lower” Loop), and then travel the entire 96-mile 
Lower Loop in a day, stopping at Old Faithful, the Canyon, and a few other points of 
interest. Most will spend less than eight hours on this 130-mile tour.^^
Visitors now find two hotels open in winter in Yellowstone, the Mammoth Hot 
Springs Hotel and the Old Faithful Snowlodge. The National Park Service (NPS) 
operates a visitor center at both of these places. Additionally, there are six warming huts 
open in the Park, as well as four gas stations.'^
Yellowstone today allows more snowmobiles than all other national parks combined 
(see Chapter 2). The upward trend in snowmobile visitation to Yellowstone shows no 
signs of slowing down, especially since the NPS has no restrictions on the numbers of 
snowmobiles currently entering the Park. Clearly, Yellowstone’s policy of total 
snowmobile acceptance is extreme for the National Park Service, especially considering
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi- 
Agency Assessment ([n.p.]: Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee, April, 1.997), 17.
Margaret Littlejohn, Visitor Services Project, Yellowstone National Park Visitor Study, Report 75 (Moscow; University 
of Idaho, 1996), 17.
National Park Service, Environmental Assessment:, p. 23.
Ibid., pp. 20 and 26.
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the impacts of snowmobiles upon the Park.
Impacts of Snowmobiles 
Snowmobiles have many negative effects on the Park and its resources: air
pollution, noise pollution, visitor conflicts, crowding, and wildlife displacement. 
Following is an overview of these problems in Yellowstone.
First, snowmobiles create excessive air pollution in the Park. Snowmobiles are 
powered by one of the most polluting engines made: the two-cycle engine.^^ They need 
such an engine because it is lighter and more powerful than conventional four-cycle 
engines used in automobiles, and hence capable of traveling through very soft snow. The 
two-cycle engine mixes oil with gas for combustion, a process that creates many times the 
air pollution of a typical four-cycle engine.^* Yellowstone’s administrators began 
monitoring such air pollution at the West Entrance in 1994. They found that the 
emissions from snowmobiles exceeded Clean Air Act and Montana state carbon 
monoxide standards at times.^^ Snowmobiles also drop pollutants into the snow over 
which they travel, and their air pollutants may settle onto nearby snow. Consequently,
Scott McMillion, “Snowmobiles ‘extremely dirty,’” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Jan. 9,1994.
The Fund for Animals, in Fund for Animals et al., v. Bmce Babbitt et al. Case Number 1;97CV01126, May 20, 1997, 
p. 18, claims that snowmobiles produce as much as 224 times the carbon monoxide of the typical automobile, and 
1,000 times the hydrocarbons. However, there is little data to support such figures. Perhaps Adams’ estimate of 54 
times the hydrocarbons is more realistic (John Adams, “Snowmobile Emissions,” report submitted to University of 
Montana, 12/14/96) (Adams gives no comparison of carbon monoxide emissions). Regardless, snowmobiles are 
commonly known to emit extremely high levels of CO, nitrous oxide, and hydrocarbons (Scott McMillion, 
“Snowmobiles ‘extremely dirty,”’ Bozeman Daily Chronicle  ̂Jan. 9, 1994).
“Ambient Air Quality Study Results, West Entrance Station, Yellowstone National Park, Winter 1995,” brochure 
available from NPS, YNP, WY.
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they may cause significant ground and water pollution as well, though this has not been 
studied very well in Yellowstone or elsewhere. Snowmobiles, then, pollute both the air 
and (possibly) the water of one of the most pristine places in the country.^° While 
snowcoaches have negative impacts as well, their impacts are far smaller than those of 
snowmobiles. This is partly because there are only 45 snowcoaches at most in the Park 
per day, but also because snowcoaches use a conventional four-cycle engine.
Second, snowmobiles are notoriously noisy. Again, this is mainly a result of their 
two-cycle engines. Visitors have consistently complained about snowmobile noise in 
Yellowstone since the 1960’s.̂  ̂During the winter I spent at Old Faithful (1993-94), there 
was no place within a 10-mile radius of a snowmobile road that was free of the high- 
pitched whine of snowmobiles during daylight hours. One of the NPS management 
guidelines in Yellowstone is to provide opportunities to experience the natural quiet in 
the Park.^" Very few persons can ski more than 10 miles into Yellowstone’s backcountry 
to find that natural quiet—hence, arguably the NPS is not meeting its own management 
standard.
Third, the excessive numbers of snowmobiles in the Park create conflicts between 
park users. For example, the noise and air pollution just described detract from the quiet.
E.S. Adams, “Effects of lead and hydrocarbons from snowmobile exhaust on brook trout,” Transactions of the 
American Fisheries Society 2:363-373  ̂ 1975.
In my research at the Yellowstone Archives at Mammoth Hot Springs, Wyoming, I consistently came across 
complaints regarding snowmobile noise from the 1960’s through the 1990’s.
United States Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Winter Use Plan/Environmental Assessment 
(Denver: Denver Service Center, 1990), 33.
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peaceful experience many visitors and skiers seek. Over 300 visitors from 1993 to 1995 
wrote complaints to the NPS about snowmobile emissions and noise, and such 
complaints commonly continue to d a y C le a r ly , a conflict exists among different users 
of the Park.
Fourth, crowding is becoming an increasing problem. This may seem strange in 
view of the fact that there are far fewer visitors in winter than in summer, but is 
understandable in light of the fact that there are far fewer facilities open in the Park in 
winter than in summer. Additionally, most of the support facilities, such as sewage 
treatment centers and gasoline stations, cannot be serviced in winter since the roads are 
closed to wheeled vehicles, and near capacity by winter’s end. For example, the 
Yellowstone Park Service Stations (YPSS) fills its fuel tanks at the Park’s interior service 
stations in fall, and cannot refill them until spring. In recent winters, the large numbers 
of snowmobiles refueling at those stations ran some of the service station tanks dry by 
winter’s end.^^ This is one reason that YPSS recently increased the volume of its tanks at 
Old Faithful.
Finally, impacts on wildlife are still another significant resource problem associated 
with snowmobiles. Since the 1960’s, Park employees have seen snowmobilers directly 
harass wildlife by chasing or otherwise bothering park animals. More serious is the fact
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi- 
Agency Assessment, p. 9.
Ibid., pp. 11-12. t
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that since 1980 the Park’s bison have learned to use the snowmobile routes to travel from 
one grazing site to another. As they have learned this, some of them began to explore 
further afield, discovering that the snowmobile routes lead to easier grazing outside the 
Park. Some bison, then, use the roads to travel to better grazing and, by so doing, may 
save energy and survive winter in higher numbers. The groomed roads may have allowed 
bison to completely alter their natural movements and increase their population size to a 
level that is higher than normal, which is about 1,400 to 2,000 animals.^^
In severe winters such as the winter of 1996-97, over half the Park’s bison may leave 
the Park, some via its groomed roads. Since they carry brucellosis, a disease that if 
transmitted to cattle (the possibility of this transmission is itself questionable^^) causes 
them to abort their fetuses, the state of Montana kills any bison that leave the Park. 
During the extreme winter of 1996-97, the state shot 1,084 bison, which is about one 
third of the Park’s herd. Another 300 bison died of natural causes inside the Park. All 
told the bison suffered a 40% population crash that wmter.^^ The NPS’s own guidelines 
state that it must preserve and protect park resources “in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them undisturbed for future generations.”^̂  Obviously, the bison resource is
Mary Meagher, “Winter Recreation-induced Changes in Bison Numbers and Distribution in Yellowstone National 
Park,” (Unpublished report submitted to the NPS, YNP, WY), 1993, pp. 28-33. While Meagher believes that 
groomed roads have enabled bison numbers to increase, other scientists are not as sure. Consequently, the 
relationship between bison and groomed roads is the topic of several research projects in the Park this winter.
“Babbitt calls for study of bison’s brucellosis threat,” Missoulian, March 1997.
“Latest Yellowstone bison count much lower than fall,” The Missoulian, Missoula, MT, March 20,1997.
U.S.C.A. 16 § 1: National Park Service: Service Created, August 25, 1916.
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disturbed already, since bison populations and movements have altered due to the 
snowmobile roads.
Clearly, snowmobiles have many deleterious effects on the Park and its resources. 
My personal experiences with these problems in Yellowstone directly bias me against 
snowmobiles. I have good reasons for disliking them: they are noisy and polluting, they 
displace park wildlife, and they ruin the quiet, tranquil experience that I, and many other 
park users, desire in winter. I additionally dislike snowmobiles because I perceive that 
some of their effects are infractions of guidelines that the National Park Service should 
follow in administering Yellowstone.
Purpose of this Paper 
Yellowstone National Park is a world-renowned place respected by citizens and 
other park managers worldwide. Winter is a fascinating season in Yellowstone and has 
become a popular time to visit. The development of the snowmobile combined with the 
NPS’s actions of grooming park roads and opening Old Faithful Snowlodge have made it 
possible for large numbers of visitors to experience Yellowstone in winter. Snowmobiles 
cause many adverse impacts upon the Park. Yellowstone’s administrators, however, have 
until recently welcomed snowmobiles without hesitation, despite evident knowledge of 
those known or potential impacts and federal law requiring them to assess such impacts 
before permitting snowmobiles. In contrast, managers in other national parks have had 
the foresight to prevent such impacts from occurring in their parks by complying with
15
law and preventing snowmobile use. Yellowstone stands out from other national parks 
in totally accepting snowmobiles and their concomitant impacts. As such an anomaly, 
Yellowstone’s extreme policy toward snowmobiles bears investigation.
For this paper, then, I propose to investigate the following:
1) Why did Yellowstone administrators open the Park to motorized winter 
visitation, and who were the responsible officials?
2) Did Yellowstone administrators ever consider the adverse environmental 
impacts or long-term effects of snowmobiles and winter use on park resources as they 
were required to do by law, or the possibility of winter use becoming as heavy as it is 
today? If they did, what were their conclusions? And if not, what was their rationale 
for not doing so?
3) Has the NPS in Yellowstone ever considered the policies of other national 
parks such as Glacier toward snowmobiles, or the example it provides to other 
national parks? Why or why not?
CH A PTER 1; PUBLIC PRESSURE TO  PLOW PARK ROADS RESULTS IN  A
SNOWMOBILE POLICY: 1940-1971
Everywhere was the pervading quiet and peace of nature as man [sic] first 
found it. We dreamed that we were the first humans to set foot upon this 
spot... The feeling of being alone was never before so strong within me.
Lon Garrison, 1964.'
The period of time from 1940-1967 saw constantly increasing pressure applied to the 
Yellowstone’s administrators from regional constituents to open Yellowstone’s roads to 
automobile traffic year-round. This pressure began just after World War II and 
culminated in a congressional hearing in Jackson, Wyoming, in 1967. Responding to the 
pressure, administrators gave serious consideration at least three different times to the 
feasibility of opening Park roads in winter to autornobiles, each time concluding that it 
was not feasible. But, by 1968, they had instead compromised by opening the Park to 
snowmobiles for a variety of reasons. Between 1968 and 1971 Yellowstone’s 
administrators formalized the Park’s winter program by providing groomed roads, and 
lodging at Old Faithful. This chapter will chronicle the efforts of the surrounding 
communities to open the Park in winter and the response of the Park administrators.
’ W. Scott Chapman, Yellowstone Back Country (Yellowstone: Yellowstone Library and Museum Association, 1971), 
Foreword, discussing summer in Yellowstone. The quote arguably applies even more strongly to the park in winter.
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Legislative and Historical Background 
Yellowstone National Park was created by act of Congress in 1872: “The tract of 
land lying near the headwaters of the Yellowstone River ... is reserved and withdrawn 
from settlement, occupancy, or sale under the laws of the United States, and dedicated 
and set apart as a public park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the 
people.” The act stated that the park’s administrators must provide for “the preservation 
from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders, 
within the Park, and their retention in their natural condition.^
Since Yellowstone was the first national park in the U.S. (and the world, for that 
matter). Congress had little guidance in the field of park preservation. Consequently, the 
legislation authorizing Yellowstone was somewhat vague on how the Park should be 
managed, stating only that the Park is “set apart as a public park or pleasuring ground for 
the benefit and enjoyment of the people.”  ̂ Despite that vagueness, early park 
administrators thought they had a very clear sense of what activities were, and were not, 
acceptable within a national park. For example, the U.S. Army exerted tremendous 
effort from 1886-1918 within Yellowstone to patrol the geyser basins and keep tourists
 ̂ U.S.C.A. 16 § 21-22. Establishment of Yellowstone National Park. Note that, had snowmobiles been developed in 
1900 rather than the 1960’s, the first part of the Park’s enabling legislation would clearly have provided for their use 
within Yellowstone, since it was a “pleasuring ground.” Richard West Sellars discusses the “pleasuring ground” 
management of the early parks in Chapter 1 of Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), 16-22.
 ̂ Alfred Runte chronicles the early history of the national parks in National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1979).
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from damaging Yellowstone’s fragile thermal features. Additionally, the Army regularly
patrolled the interior of Yellowstone in winter, keeping a special eye out for persons
attempting to poach the Park’s snowbound animals.^
By 1915, Congress had established several other national parks, including Sequoia,
General Grant (now Kings Canyon), Yosemite, Mount Rainier, and Glacier. While the
Army did an adequate job in protecting some of these parks,^ Congress recognized by
the early 1900’s that it needed an administrator exclusively devoted to managing national
park areas. So, in 1916 Congress created the National Park Service (NPS):
There is created in the Department of the Interior a service to be called the National 
Park Service, which ...shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known 
as national parks, monuments, and reservations hereinafter specified, ... which 
purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild 
life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner ar i by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.^
Inherent within this mandate is a dichotomy: the National Park Service must
preserve the significant features of the Park while at the same time provide for the
enjoyment of those features, without impairing them. In other words, the NPS must
facilitate the use of the Parks without impairing them—a fine line to walk when there are
three million visitors per year touring a park such as Yellowstone. The NPS has always
struggled with this dual mandate, but especially since World War II, after which
' Paul SchuUery, Yellowstone's Ski Pioneers, pp. 98-115.
' Duane Hampton, How the U.S. Cavalry Saved the National Parks (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1971), 
164-65.
’ U.S.C.A. 16 § 1: National Park Service: Service Created, August 25, 1916.
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visitation has consistently surged upwards.
Until 1970, when Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, the acts 
creating Yellowstone National Park and the National Park Service (the “Organic Acts”) 
were the only guidance that Congress gave the NPS to administer its national parks.* To 
give itself further guidance, the NPS may promulgate regulations both within individual 
parks, and also on a system-wide basis. For example, Yellowstone administrators issued 
the first snowmobile regulations for their park in the 1960’s.̂
Once World War II ended and the GFs arrived home, the country settled into what 
future historians may recognize as America’s “golden age.” Jobs in the military-industrial 
complex of America were plentiful and wages were good, so Americans enjoyed an 
unprecedented standard of living. More and more Americans owned cars and had the 
financial means and free time to travel. Consequently, visitation in the national parks 
began to increase.
Helping to stimulate tourism in winter was the return to America of the 
Mountain Division, the Army’s very successful and prestigious division of skiing troops. 
Upon returning, several of the 10*̂  Mountain Division members founded the country’s 
first ski resorts, such as Alta in Utah and Sun Valley in Idaho. By founding these resorts, 
the Division members stimulated the interest of Americans in skiing and in winter
 ̂William C. Everhart, The National Park Service (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 80.
* 42 U.S.C.A. §4321 et seq.. Pub. L. 91-190 (1970).
’ “Regulations Governing Winter Activities,” appended to Jack K. Anderson to Regional Director, December 8, 1970, 
IN Box L-33, File L34: “Recreation Activities,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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recreation. Likewise, the Winter Olympic Games after the war undoubtedly stimulated
the interest of Americans in winter vacations as well 10
Round One: Pressure to Open Yellowstone to Winter Visitation Begins. 
Yellowstone is a good example of the post-war increase in visitation, as Table 1 
illustrates.
Table 1. Visitation to Yellowstone, selected years from 1920 to 1992. 
Year Total Visitation
11
1910 19,575
1920 79,777
1930 227,901
1940 526,437
1943 64,144
1946 814,907
1948 1,013,531
1950 1,109,926
1960 1,443,288
1965 2,095,509
1970 2,297,290
1980 2,000,273
1990 2,823,572
1992 3,144,405
Even before World War II, local merchants were beginning to see the benefits of 
increased tourism to their financial returns. It did not require too much imagination to
James Jurale, “History of Winter Use in Yellowstone National Park,” (Master’s thesis submitted to the University of 
Wyoming, Dec., 1986), 102-112.
Yellowstone National Park Travel Tablê  Handout available from NPS, YNP, WY.
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realize that, if Yellowstone kept its roads open all year, the merchants could see year- 
round returns. Hence, Senator Joseph O ’Mahoney (D-WY) began the first round of 
pressure to open Yellowstone’s roads in winter in 1940 by urging the NPS to consider 
plowing. Arno Cammerer, Director of the NPS, responded to him by denying his 
request, stating the NPS’s reasons against plowing:
1) Severe cold, sudden storms and the rapid changes in temperature make the Park 
dangerous in winter;
2) Drifting snow would make the roads treacherous; and
3) “It would require excessive outlays for equipment and manpower to keep these roads 
safe for travel.”^̂
Between Cammerer’s response and the advent of the World War, pressure to open 
Yellowstone’s roads disappeared for the next seven years.
With surging visitation after World War II, the Big Horn Basin Clubs, a federation 
of all commercial clubs of the Park region in Wyoming, renewed the effort to open 
Yellowstone’s roads in w inter.R esponding to the pressure, the U.S. Bureau of Public 
Roads (now Federal Highways) conducted a study to determine if opening the roads in 
winter was feasible. Citing the following reasons, the Bureau concluded that opening the 
Park’s roads in winter was not feasible:
1) The standards of many of the existing highways were rather low, and not well-suited 
to plowing;
2) The buildings in the Park’s interior were not winterized; and
3) Plowing would be too hazardous.^"*
Arno Cammerer, to Joseph O ’Mahoney, Feb. 8, 1940, IN Box L-46, File “868 Winter Sports,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
“Seek Year-Round Opening of Yellowstone Fliways,” Cody Enterprise, Cody, Wyoming, March 17,1948.
Lemuel Garrison, to Regional Director, Oct. 11, 1957, IN Box D-24, File D30, Book #2: “Snow Removal, July 1957
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To arrive at its conclusion, the Bureau derived estimates of the cost of acquiring the 
necessary plowing equipment and of regularly plowing, estimates that the Big Horn 
Basin Club criticized as “padded.” In fact, contractor V. F. Haberthier of Cody went on 
record as offering to sign a five-year contract with Yellowstone administrators to plow 
the Park’s roads for less than half of their cost estimate. The club went on to request a 
formal investigation to see whether the Bureau’s objections to winter travel were valid.
The government never did such an investigation, and Yellowstone’s administrators 
stuck to the over-all conclusion reached by the Bureau: “the proposal to attempt winter 
snow removal on the Yellowstone Park Highway System ... is economically unsound.”^̂  
Thus ended consideration of plowing the roads of Yellowstone for eight more years.
First Motorized Snowcoaches Enter Yellowstone
Meanwhile, with plenty of free time in the long winter of the Northern Rockies, 
local entrepreneurs tinkered with some spare vehicle parts and developed the first 
vehicles capable of traveling over snow-covered roads, the “snowplanes.” A snowplane 
was a noisy contraption of a cab in which two people could ride, set on three skis (only 
one in front, for steering), with a large propeller mounted on the rear. Akin to an airboat 
used in the Everglades, the snowplane “blew” around on snow-covered roads without
through March, 1958,” Regional Archive Depository of the National Archives, Kansas City, MO.
“Yellowstone Plan Gains; contractor Backs Year-Round Idea,” Denver Post, March 12, 1949, and “Charge Park 
Service Costs Padded,” Cody Enterprise, March 16,1949.
Conrad Wirth to Milward Simpson, March 12, 1957 IN Box D-24, File D30, Book #1: “Snow Removal Oct. 1952 
through June 1957,” Regional Archive Depository of the National Archives, Kansas City, MO.
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ever taking off.
The first definitely known use of such a machine in Yellowstone was in 1942, by 
Glenn Simmons of the Reclamation Service, who traveled from the South Entrance to 
Old Faithful and on to West Yellowstone. National Park Service Rangers made the next 
recorded trip in 1943 from the South Entrance, with an eye toward purchasing one of the 
machines for government use.^* By the late 1940’s they had indeed purchased two 
snowplanes,'^ and had begun using them for winter patrols in the Park interior. On one 
such mission in 1946, Ranger Bob Murphy discovered a large group of bison that had 
broken through the ice of the Yellowstone River just north of Yellowstone Lake. 
Already dead and frozen when he found them on February 14, Murphy and his 
coworkers had no choice but to leave the carcasses in the river for the winter, dragging 
them out in spring for a mass burial. At that time they counted a total of 39 carcasses.^°
Yellowstone’s administrators escorted two parties of photographers into the Park 
via snowplane to photograph the snowbound Old Faithful area in February, 1947.^' 
Tourism possibilities quickly became obvious, and in December, the Jackson area owners 
of the snowplanes that the photographers used discussed with Grand Teton National
Walt Stuart, “Interview with Walt Stuart by Leslie Quinn, 1994,” interview by Leslie Quinn, November, 1994, IN 
Drawer 8, Tape #96-8, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
Bob Murphy, “Snoplanes and Frozen Buffalo,” Report in the Vertical Files, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, 1994,
p. 1.
Roger J. Siglin to Brenda Black, Nov. 15, 1977 IN Box L-35, File L: “Land and Water Use 75, 76, 77,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
Bob Murphy, “Snoplanes and Frozen Buffalo” (Unpublished paper in the Vertical Files, YNP Research Library, 
YNP, WY), p. 4.
Superintendent's Monthly Report for Febrtutryy 1947y YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 2.
24
Park Superintendent John McLaughlin (who became Yellowstone’s next superintendent) 
the possibility of making regularly scheduled trips by snowplanes into the Old Faithful 
area to enable visitors to experience the Park in winter. Because it was not his decision to 
make, McLaughlin demurred, and then wrote Yellowstone to give them a “heads up” on 
the matter. He expressed his opinion that Yellowstone should deny them permission, 
because they hoped to use some government buildings for overnight accommodations. 
He also portended the future by advising Yellowstone’s administrators that the 
snowplane owners would not readily accept “no” for an answer."'
The possibility of such regularly scheduled trips touched off a minor panic in 
Yellowstone, as evidenced by the flurry of letters following Yellowstone’s receipt of 
McLaughlin’s letter. First, Acting Superintendent of Yellowstone Fred Johnston wrote 
the Regional Director requesting advice in the matter, “since we believe the problem to 
be of a policy nature requiring a decision by higher authority than can be given by us.” 
However, he went on to state that “under present conditions, i.e., extreme isolation of 
this section of the Park in winter, we do not feel that the type of use ... is desirable” 
because the numerous dangers involved made such an undertaking very risky.^^ Regional 
Director Lawrence Merriam responded a mere six days later that “it seems to us that no 
permit should be issued [for regularly scheduled trips, but] we are hardly in a position to
John S. McLaughlin to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, Dec. 17, 1947 IN Box A-247, File 857-10: 
"Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Fred Johnston to Regional Director, Dec. 24, 1947, IN Box A-247, File 857-10: “Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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prevent individual trips by snow plane into the Park” (emphasis added). If such 
individual trips materialized, Merriam suggested the travelers register with the rangers at 
the South Entrance, and that the rangers fully inform them of the risks they were 
taking.^"* Johnston formally adopted Merriam’s policy just three days later.'^
It seems odd that Regional Director Merriam and Acting Superintendent Johnston 
felt helpless to prevent such individual trips into the Park, since Johnston and 
Superintendent Edmund Rogers exercised full authority over the Park in all other 
matters. For example, in the next two years Johnston or Rogers denied permission to 
five different parties to take extended ski trips into the Park, and also would not allow 
automobiles on the snow-covered roads in the interior of Yellowstone.^^ For whatever 
reason, though, Rogers, Johnston and Merriam felt powerless to control individual 
motorized trips, a helplessness that their successors would express many times in the 
future.
It seems additionally odd that Rogers and Johnston permitted such motorized use 
given the recognition by Superintendent Rogers in 1948 that “the passage of several 
snowmobiles over the roads would pack the snow so that later freezing would leave a
Lawrence Merriam to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, Dec. 30, 1947, IN Box A-247, File 857-10: 
“Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Fred Johnston to Chief Ranger LaNoue, Jan. 2, 1948, IN Box A-247, file 857-10: “Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY. I am the first to record the information regarding these events in 1947, because Box A-247 
was previously unavailable to Yellowstone researchers.
Edmund Rogers (Superintendent), OR Fred Johnston (Acting Superintendent) to the following: Sykes, Jim, Feb. 17, 
1949; C.W. Egbert, Dec. 22, 1949; Carroll Wheeler, Nov. 28, 1950; Herbert Richert, Dec. 12, 1950; and Henry 
Buchtel, March 30, 1951; ALL IN Box A-247, File 857-10: “Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
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very hard layer of ice which would seriously impede the progress of our plows when 
they open the road. This would add materially to the cost of our snow removal 
operations. While they recognized this problem with snowmachine use on its roads, 
they did not do anything to prevent the problem from occurring. By the 1960’s this 
would become a major problem, requiring the purchase of ever stronger rotary plow 
equipment for the spring plowing operation (interestingly, administrators in Glacier had 
the same concern regarding snowmobiles there in the mid-1970’s, and eliminated them 
from there in part because of this reason (see Chapter 2)).
The decision to allow private snowmachines is, then, the earliest example of 
Yellowstone’s efforts to accommodate them, disregarding the potential financial and 
environmental costs to the Park.
The first “purely pleasure” trips by snowplanes occurred two years later, from 
January to March, 1949. A total of 35 people traveling in 19 snowplanes made the trip to 
Old Faithful or West Thumb from West Yellowstone (snowplane trips from West 
Yellowstone probably began earlier than those from the South because visitors traveling 
from West had thirty fewer miles to travel to Old Faithful—one way—than visitors 
entering from the south did). The Superintendent of the Park reported that “it appears 
that this mode of travel is becoming more popular.” *̂
Edmund Rogers to Caroline Madden, March 11, 1948, IN Box A-247, File 857-10; “Winter Visitors to Park Interior,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Superintendent’s Monthly Report, January 1949, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 5.
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And indeed it was. As Table 2 illustrates, motorized visitation to Yellowstone in 
winter occurred regularly throughout the 1950’s. Notice the surge in visitation in the 
winter of 1954-55, reflecting the fact that two West Yellowstone entrepreneurs began to 
use a snowcoach for winter tours of Yellowstone that winter. A snowcoach, 
manufactured by Bombardier of Quebec, Canada, was a van-sized vehicle capable of 
carrying up to 12 people in its heated interior. In 1952, Harold Young and Bill Nicholls, 
the two West Yellowstone motel operators, realized that the winter wonderland of 
Yellowstone could be a “good tourist gimmick.” The two men applied to the NPS to 
obtain a permit to lead charter snowcoach trips into the Park. Yellowstone’s 
administrators refused permission for three years, mainly out of safety concerns, worried 
that the snowcoaches would get stuck. They finally relented in January 1955, as long as 
Young and Nicholls would not advertise their service.^  ̂ The reason for the secrecy is 
unclear. Young and Nicholls began their snowcoach tours that winter, and continued to 
operate such tours for ten years, finally relinquishing their permit to operate to the 
Yellowstone Park Company in 1966.^°
Robert S. Halliday, “Yellowstone in Winter,” AiraJe, March 13,1955, p. 11. 
Superintendent’s Monthly Report for December 1966, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 2.
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Table 2. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1948-57?^
YEAR Number of Number of Total Visitation,
Snowmachines Visitors on Dec.-March
_______________________  Snowmachines of each winter_____
1948-49 >32 >61 3888
1949-50 77 162 8077
1950-51 3 (very mild 8 8180
winter)
1951-52 35 >56 8198
1952-53 ? >59 3314'
1953-54 > 9  171 4913
1954-55 >100 631 4995
1955-56 138 580 3242
1956-5 7__________>76_____________ 533_____________ 3223______
Note: Total visitation includes visitors entering the North Entrance by car.
There is no record of whether Yellowstone’s administrators consulted the Organic 
Acts or thought of the potential for significant increases in motorized winter visitation. If 
they did consider these things, they probably felt it was in harmony with the Act and did 
not think visitation would ever get as busy as it is today.
By 1957 the problem that Superintendent Rogers foresaw—that snowmachines 
would compact the snow, making plowing more difficult in spring—was becoming 
apparent. However, Yellowstone’s administrators, in a move that presaged their future 
willingness to accommodate motorized winter vehicles at all costs, found a way to plow 
the roads despite the compacted snow and ice: “By using a combination of the V-plow 
and graders with ice blades and discs, it was possible” to get the roads open by their
Compiled from the Superintendent’s Monthly Reports from 1948 to 1957, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
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normal opening dates. " Additionally, the snowmachines damaged the road surface in 
thermally warmed areas—areas unique to Yellowstone in which the ground or road itself 
is warm, and consequently bare in winter. By the early 1970’s, Park administrators 
discovered that wood chips laid on the road in such thermally warmed areas would both 
protect the road and also enable snowmachines to travel across such bare areas. They still 
use wood chips in this manner.
Leading up to 1957, then, Yellowstone administrators had seen some pressure to 
open the Park roads to automobiles but instead opened them to snowplanes and 
snowcoaches. This pressure and attendant response were microcosms of what would 
happen the next year.
Round Two: Pressure to Open the Park to Automobiles Increases 
In 1956, the National Park Service launched the “MISSION 66”^̂  program, which 
unwittingly began the second round of pressure to plow Yellowstone’s roads. 
Recognizing that the post-war prosperity and increasing urbanization of America were 
bringing more visitors to the National Park System than the system was able at that time 
to handle, the NPS directors created MISSION 66, an ambitious ten-year program to 
“develop and staff these priceless possessions of the American people [so] as to permit 
their wisest possible use: maximum enjoyment for those who use them.” Construction
Superintendent’s Monthly Report for Aprily 1957, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 10. 
“MISSION 66” was almost always capitalized, as indicated, in the literature of the time.
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of visitor facilities was to be an important part of the program: “Modern roads, well 
planned trails, utilities, camp and picnic grounds, and many kinds of structures needed 
for public use or administration, to meet the requirements of an expected 80 m illion  
[nationwide] visitors in 1966, are necessary. ... Outmoded and inadequate facilities will be 
replaced with physical improvements adequate for expected demands.” "̂* The Secretary 
of the Interior wrote the President that “MISSION 66 covers all the anticipated needs of 
the Parks [and] plots a comprehensive and well-balanced schedule of improvement.”^̂
This program of development affected virtually all national park system sites, and 
focused on the larger parks such as Yellowstone. In Yellowstone the efforts focused on 
road improvements, housing improvements, and the construction of Canyon Village, 
with a modern-looking lodge surrounded by 500 cabins available for overnight guest 
use.̂ ^
In addition to its development program, MISSION 66 recognized another way to 
provide for increased numbers of visitors: extending the length of the Park’s tourist 
season. Initially MISSION 66 only encouraged a longer summer season—from May to 
October, rather than June to September.^^ It did not take too long, however, for park
“What is Mission 66?," pamphlet (no page number given) DM Box W-141, File A98: “Conservation and Presentation
of Areas for Public Enjoyment: Mission 66,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Douglas McLay to The President, Feb. 1, 1956, IN Box YPC-91, File “NPS-1956 General Correspondence,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
USDI-NPS (author), “MISSION 66 for Yellowstone National Park,” IN Vertical Files, File “MISSION 66,” YNP 
Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 5.
W.G. Games: “A Look Back to Look Ahead,” talk given at the. MISSION 66 Frontiers Conference, April 24, 1961
IN Box YPC-91, File “NPS-1956—General Correspondence,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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planners to recognize that opening the Park in winter would provide another means to 
provide for increased numbers of visitors. Consequently, in the MISSION 66 Report for 
Yellowstone, park planners stated that “oversnow use has already been introduced ... and 
today’s thinking includes the encouragement of this type of use in preference to [the 
plowed] opening of the roads.” *̂ Here, then, was MISSION 66’s proposal: encourage 
winter use, thereby allowing more people to visit Yellowstone and also take some of the 
pressure off the Park during the summer. Additionally, MISSION 66 preferred oversnow 
use over plowing the roads, pushing the Park to continue allowing snowmachines rather 
than plowing.
In apparent adherence to the directive of MISSION 66, Conrad Wirth, the National 
Park Service Director in 1957, issued a “Memorandum to all Field Offices and the 
Washington Office,” stating:
It is recognized that important recreational benefits are available during the winter 
months in the Parks of the NPS having a heavy fall of snow. ... It is further 
recognized that the use of such parks for healthful, out-of-door recreation during the 
winter months is a very desirable way to make scenic and other natural values of the 
System available for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.
It is, therefore, the policy of the National Park Service to encourage winter use 
programs. The objective will be the maximum benefits possible to the largest number 
of people.^’
In true MISSION 66 form, Wirth encouraged visitor use of the Parks. Further, 
W irth also felt that closing the roads in winter was “not taking full advantage of the
Yellowstone National Park, NPS, USDI, “MISSION 66: A Look Ahead,” p. 73 of Booklet IN Box D-20, Folder 4; 
“1956: Final MISSION 66 Report for Yellowstone,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
”  Conrad Wirth to Washington Office and All Field Offices, Jan. 25, 1957, IN Box YPC-91, File “NPS-1957,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
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investment” the NPS had in them; hence, opening the roads would more fully utilize 
that investment/^
The Director may have been responding to the same pressure Yellowstone began to 
once again feel, for Lemuel Garrison, Yellowstone’s Superintendent, wrote that “because 
of the pressure which has been put on the NPS and the Park to get the roads open earlier 
in the spring, ...we are advancing the snow plowing operations [for spring, 1957].”"̂  ̂ The 
“Highway 89” Association—a group of businesses located along U.S. Highway 89, which 
passes through Yellowstone—was the source of the pressure; they not only desired an 
earlier spring opening of Yellowstone’s roads, but also wished to see U.S. 89 plowed all 
winter from Livingston to Jackson, through Yellowstone.^" Also joining the fray was the 
Wyoming Highway Commission and Wyoming Governor Milward Simpson, who also 
urged Yellowstone’s administrators to keep the Park’s roads open all winter.
The pressure worked. Senator O ’Mahoney got into the action again, stating that the 
NPS “would make another survey soon to decide whether it was feasible to keep the 
Yellowstone roads open all w i n t e r . B y  July Yellowstone’s administrators had formed 
the “Snow Survey Committee” to study the matter. On the committee were
“Summary Minutes, 37'*' Meeting of the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Buildings and Monuments,” 
October 7-10, 1957, p. 21, IN Box A-238, File Alfrl9: “Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Buildings and 
Monuments, 1957,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Lemuel Garrison to Huntley Child, Feb. 25,1957, IN Box YPC-91, File “NPS-1957,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
HC, Jr. [Huntley Child, Jr.] to JQN [John Q. Nichols], Feb. 27, 1957, IN Box YPC-91, File “NPS-1957,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
■•5 “Wyoming Urges All Entrances to Park Open Simultaneously,” Great Falls Tribune, Great Falls, MX, March 12, 
1957.
Ibid.
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representatives of the National Park Service; Colorado, California and regional highway 
departments; the Bureau of Public Roads; the American Automobile Association; and 
Yellowstone Park Company personnel. The NPS stated that “Eight years have elapsed 
since the Bureau of Public Roads’ study of 1949, and in the interim improvements in 
snow removal equipment and methods have been such as to indicate the need of 
evaluating their applicability to Yellowstone.” The group toured Yellowstone’s road 
system both that summer and the following winter, discussing at length the feasibility of 
opening Yellowstone’s roads in w i n t e r . T h e  group examined all aspects of the winter 
situation in Yellowstone, including the climate, topography, safety factors, travel trends, 
road conditions, and costs.”*̂
The following spring, the group made its recommendation: year round operation 
“is deemed feasible but not practical.” The committee cited as reasons Yellowstone’s poor 
road standards, the extremely low projections of winter traffic use, Yellowstone’s remote 
location, and its generally severe winter weather.”*̂ After all, conditions in Yellowstone’s 
interior had not changed that much in just eight years.
The committee’s report evidently settled the matter for another seven years, since I
Warren. Hamilton to John Q. Nichols, July 9, 1957, IN Box YPC-91, Füe “National Park Service—1957,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
NPS, USDI, “Information for the Snow Survey Committee Concerning Possibilities of Keeping Park Open for 
General Public Use the Year Round,” IN Box D42, File “Snow Removal (Roads), 1932-1959,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
NPS, USDI, “Report of the Snow Survey Committee, Yellowstone National Park, May 1958,” pp. 5-6, IN Box A- 
165, File A4055: “Conferences and Meetings-1969: Tri-State Comm. And Master Planners,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
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can find no record of any significant pressure on the NPS until 1964; more on that later 
in this chapter. In the meantime, MISSION 66’s encouragement of oversnow vehicle 
visitation would begin to take effect, as more and more winter visitors continued to trek 
into the Park.
First Private Snowmobiles Enter Yellowstone 
Visitation in the Park via snowcoach from West Yellowstone steadily increased from 
1957 to 1966, as Table 3 illustrates; by the 1963-64 season over 1,000 visitors had taken 
such a tour. In January 1963, Yellowstone’s administrators permitted the first private 
snowmobiles to enter the Park: three Polaris Snow Travelers."^  ̂ One year later. Acting 
Superintendent Luis Gastellum noted that “six Polaris Snow Travelers with 14 people 
visited the Old Faithful area. Polaris is a toboggan with tracks and [is] motor driven-[a] 
powered oversnow sled—which many people are buying.
These sleds were the first snowmobiles allowed to enter Yellowstone. Their 
operators registered to enter Yellowstone just as the snowcoach operators did—by 
stopping at the self-registration station at the West Entrance, which was not staffed in 
winter.^° Hence, the Park administrators lumped these smaller machines in with the 
larger snowcoaches, essentially considering them to be the winter equivalent of the 
automobile.
Superintendent's Monthly Report for January 1963̂  YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 2. 
Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Report for January 1964, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 1. 
Superintendent's Monthly Report for March 1967, p. 2, and photographs following page 9.
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51Table 3. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1957-67.
YEAR Trips (may include Visitors traveling on Total Visitation, Dec.
more than one snowmachine March
1957-58 ? >85 2442
1958-59 >34 >345 2679
1959-60 > 7 >265 2552
1960-61 77 508 4363
1961-62 52 >85 4268
1962-63 ? >98 2999
1963-64 >70 1067 5571
1964-65 ?100 1326 6382
1965-66 400 2662 9741
1966-67 1893 5218 12431
The 1964 Yellowstone Master Plan also stated: “Winter Use of the Park should be 
encouraged by extending the operation of oversnow equipment from the West Entrance 
and soliciting additional operators from [the] other e n t r a n c e s . T o  say that the Park’s 
administrators encouraged such visitation is obvious.
In the Monthly Report for November, 1964, Superintendent McLaughlin wrote that 
snowcoach operator Harold Young “has made arrangements with the Northern Pacific 
Railway company to have two tours a week out of Chicago,” in which groups of visitors 
traveled from Chicago to Yellowstone via rail, and then took Young’s snowcoaches into
Compiled from Superintendent’s Monthly Reports, 1957-67, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
NPS, Yellowstone Master Plan Final Draft, April 1964, p. 100, INBoxP-67, YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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the Park for a tour/^ Young’s agreement with the Northern Pacific illustrated that the 
winter tourism possibilities were now realities.
Later that winter, NBC television filmed “Winter Comes to Yellowstone,” part of 
the Wild Kingdom series narrated by Marlin Perkins of the St. Louis Zoo. Wild Kingdom 
was a popular wildlife show of the time, viewed by an average of 17 million viewers 
weekly.^"* “Winter Comes to Yellowstone” featured comparisons of various features as 
seen in summer and in winter, and the activities of winter rangers.^^ Aired on March 14, 
1965, it probably contributed to the dramatic increase in visitation in Yellowstone the 
next year (see Table 3).
A snowmobile demonstration that occurred in March 1965, certainly contributed to 
the increase in winter visitation as well. Monte Wight, a snowmobile dealer of Pinedale, 
Wyoming, requested and received permission to take 27 Ski-Doos—a brand of 
snowmobile—on a two-day trip through the Park. Wight and his companions traveled 
from West Yellowstone to Old Faithful the first day and on to Moran, Wyoming (south 
of the South Entrance) on the second day. With no overnight accommodations open at 
Old Faithful at that time, Wight’s party returned via snowcoach to West Yellowstone to 
spend the night, leaving their snowmobiles at Old Faithful. Returning to Old Faithful 
via snowcoach the next day, the members fired up their machines and continued on to
Ibid., p. 3.
Superintendent's Monthly Report for January 1965, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 3.
Staff Meeting Minutes for November 19, 1964, IN Box A-152, File A40: “Conferences and Meetings, Yellowstone 
Staff Meetings, 1964,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY, p. 4.
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Moran (south of the south entrance) that evening.^^ In so doing, Wight demonstrated to 
all the touring possibilities of snowmobiles.
Superintendent McLaughlin’s remarks concerning the trip are worth noting. In his
1965 Annual Report, he says:
It seems inevitable [that] mechanized over-the-snow travel may replace skis and 
snowshoes. ...Undoubtedly more Park travel during the winter months by this type 
of machine can be expected and should be encouraged. This type of recreation is 
increasing rapidly in this particular section of the country and its influence has spread 
to Yellowstone National Park. The machines are now relatively inexpensive and 
maintenance requirements simple. Much of the terrain of the Park and its features are 
compatible and attractive to this mode of winter travel (emphasis added).
Here again is the seeming sense of helplessness as McLaughlin states “it seems 
inevitable...” Also obvious is the fact that McLaughlin liked such machines, and wanted 
to encourage their use in the Park. He also foresaw that their use in the future would 
increase. Whether explicitly intended or not, McLaughlin here contributed materially .to 
the park’s evolving attitude toward snowmobiles.
McLaughlin was correct in his prediction: the popularity of the snowmobile
exploded. In another portent of things to come, he soon found himself scrambling for 
regulations to control the activities of visitors on such machines in the Park, and wrote 
the Regional Director of the NPS requesting that the same laws that summer vehicle 
operators followed be applied to the snowmobile operators. Furthermore, McLaughlin 
asked the Regional Director if “other Service areas are experiencing this type of winter
* Superintendent's Annual Report for 1964,YNV Research Library, YNP, WY, pp, 22-23. 
Ibid., p. 23.
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use and associated problems of control.” It is unclear whether the Regional Director
responded.
At this time, snowmobiles were largely a novelty, having been only recently 
developed. Furthermore, snowmobiles were considerably less expensive than the larger 
snowcoaches—hence, more affordable to the individual. Imagine how attractive they 
would have been to the earlier residents of this area, who had longed for years to access 
the interior of Yellowstone. If Yellowstone would not plow its roads, then perhaps the 
residents could travel into the snowbound park on such machines, which, after all, the 
NPS encouraged. Moreover, perhaps they could rent the unusual machines to winter 
tourists—and profit by doing so. If this realization was not obvious to the local residents 
already, it would soon be so.
Can we fault McLaughlin for his promotion of such machines? Probably not. After 
all, the Director of the NPS, Conrad Wirth, had, just seven years earlier, made it the 
policy of the NPS to encourage winter use. When Wirth issued his policy, he had no idea 
such machines would become available in a few years. Hence, McLaughlin may have felt 
he was adhering to W irth’s directive. Moreover, McLaughlin probably also felt he was 
adhering to the NPS Organic Act, since snowmobiles would allow the visitor to enjoy 
the Park’s features without impairing them (presumably). Finally, here at last was a way 
to make Yellowstone’s spectacular interior accessible to the world in winter.
John S. McLaughlin to Regional Director, Midwest Region, March 31, 1966, IN Box A-32, File A88: “Oversnow 
Vehicle Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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Round Three: Pressure to Plow Park Roads Culminates in a Snowmobile Policy
Pressure to open the Park’s roads to automobiles resurfaced in 1964, and culminated 
in a congressional hearing on the matter in Jackson Hole in 1967. Congressmen from the 
surrounding states reignited the debate in January 1964 by inquiring again into the year 
round opening of the Park’s roads; again, their motive was to boost the sluggish winter 
economy in their respective states.^  ̂So, representatives of Livingston, Cody, and Cooke 
City arranged a meeting between local and Yellowstone officials in Livingston the 
following month to discuss the feasibility of opening the roads in winter. This meeting’s 
outcome was unclear, although it is clear that, following the meeting, the Park County 
News of Livingston sent a letter to the Montana Congressional Delegation in February, 
1964, promoting the opening of the roads in Yellowstone.^^ At the next staff meeting in 
Yellowstone, assistant superintendent Luis Gastellum, who attended the Livingston 
meeting, stated “In 1958 we issued a report stating we would be able to have winter travel 
in five or ten years, but we have not followed through on our development. ... Since 
winter travel is inevitable, the Service should begin planning for it now.”^̂  Again, the 
seeming helplessness of Park administrators in controlling or restraining winter use is 
evident.
“Projected Costs (1964) for Winter Snow Operations,” pamphlet found IN “Grooming/Winter Preparations Cost,” 
IN Snowmobile Briefing Book, Volume 7, black binder in YNP Research Library, YNP, WY (no page number).
“Why N ot Open Park For Winter Activity For All The People?,"' Park County News, Livingston, MT, Feb. 6, 1964.
Staff Meeting Minutes for February 13, 1964, IN Box A-152, File A40: “Conferences and Meetings—Yellowstone 
Staff Meetings, 1964,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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The congressmens’ inquiry and Gastellum’s statement touched off a debate among 
park staff regarding whether the Park should be open to snowmobiles at all—with no 
mention of whether the Park’s roads should be plowed. It appears that, for the first time, 
the Park staff had second thoughts about whether snowmobile visitation was appropriate 
to Yellowstone. For example, in a staff meeting on January 28, 1966, park officials 
discussed the possible future use of oversnow vehicles and decided that they needed to 
formulate a policy for this type of use by the next year.^' Evidently, that decision got the 
members of the staff thinking more seriously about such use, since the topic came up 
again at the next meeting on February 25, 1966. According to the meeting minutes, 
“there was some discussion regarding closing down snowmobile operations and whether 
it would be advisable to stop travel through the Park by any type of oversnow vehicle.”^̂  
This is the only evidence I found prior to 1990 (in the writing of the Winter Use Plan), 
indicating that the Park administrators expressed second thoughts about allowing 
snowmachines into the Park.
Further complicating the debate was the radical proposal put forth in April 1966 by 
the Yellowstone Park Company, the Park’s chief concessionaire, to plow the road from 
Mammoth to Madison, operate snowcoaches from there to Old Faithful and West 
Yellowstone, and to open the “Old Faithful Motor Hotel” for winter visitation.^'^
Staff Meeting Minutes for January 28, 1966 IN Box A-172, File A40: “Yellowstone Staff Meeting Minutes 1966,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Staff Meeting Minutes for February 25, 1966, IN Box A-172, File A40: “Yellowstone Staff Meeting Minutes 1966,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
^ Ronald Beaumont to John McLaughlin, April 5, 1966, IN Box C-4, File C-38: “Concessionaire Contracts and
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Superintendent McLaughlin wisely decided that “the ramifications of these proposals
need to be discussed pretty thoroughly prior to any preliminary approval on my part.”^̂
The proposal evidently did not succeed, because the YPCo. did not open any facility at
Old Faithful until 1971.
At this point the debate became public, for the local Congressmen again stepped into
the action, holding a public meeting in Livingston (the second meeting to take place in
Livingston) about the opening of the Park’s roads in winter. McLaughlin reported in the
June Superintendent’s Report that
there has been a considerable flurry of publicity on keeping the Yellowstone roads 
open year around. This matter was reviewed [last month] around Livingston and 
[has] spread quickly to other communities. Since close political contests are in 
prospect in all three surrounding states for various important offices, the time was 
ripe to reopen this perennial subject. Candidates and prospective candidates were 
almost unanimous in their support of local opinion in favor of keeping the Park open 
all year despite the high costs and doubtful feasibility of the proposal.
In response to the public pressure, Park officials embarked on round three of cost
estimates, visitor use estimates, and statements of policy. But this time these
governmental ramblings did not mollify the locals. Instead, pressure intensified,
eventually drawing Director of the National Park Service George Hartzog into the fray.
Hartzog formed the Tri-State Commission, a group of high-level National Park Service
Permits,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
John McLaughlin, to Art Bazata, April 12, 1966, IN Box C-4, File C-38: “Concessionaire Contracts and Permits,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
^ Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Reporty June 1966, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 19.
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officials and regional representatives, to study the matter.^^ The group met five times in 
the next year, with the Wyoming delegates particularly agitating for year-round opening 
of the Park roads. Hartzog and the Park administrators recognized that most of 
Yellowstone’s use was concentrated in the three summer months; that dispersing that 
summer visitation peak had not happened so far, despite the longer summer season; and 
that it would be nice if they could disperse it somehow, although they did not want to 
deprive the summer program of its already-deficient spending.^^
By March 1967, it was clear that the Tri-State Commission meetings were going to 
culminate in a congressional hearing on the “Winter Operations of Roads in Yellowstone 
National Park.”^̂  The hearing was held in Jackson, Wyoming on August 12, 1967, and 
was chaired by U.S. Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming. George Hartzog, Director of the 
National Park Service, began the hearing by stating the position of his bureau; First, the 
form of transportation in winter in Yellowstone should be that which is most 
appropriate to the Park and which improves the quality of park experience for the 
citizens. Second, over-snow visitation was, unless shown otherwise, the appropriate 
means of visiting the Park in the winter. Hartzog stated that it should be encouraged, 
since oversnow vehicles travel on top of the snow, rather than in a plowed trench such as
George Hartzog to Tim Babcock, Governor of Montana, Aug. 19, 1966 IN Box A-165, File A4055: “Conferences 
and Meetings—1969: Tri-State Comm. And Master Planners,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
H.L. Bill to Director, Sept. 1, 1966, IN Box A-165, File A4055: “Conferences and Meetings—1969: Tri-State Comm. 
And Master Planners,” YNP Archives, YNP, WT.
Staff Meeting Minutes for March 9, 1967, IN Box A-226, File A40: “Staff Meeting Minutes, 1967—Yellowstone,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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automobiles would travel through.
Director Hartzog’s position was supported by the Izaak Walton League and the 
Lander Snow-drifters (an early snowmobiling group) for the same reasons: namely, that 
over-snow vehicles offered the best means of viewing the Park’s attractions. Hamilton 
Stores and the Yellowstone Park Company agreed with Hartzog, but for different 
reasons, mostly economic: it would cost too much for them to open facilities in the 
Park’s interior in the winter, since their buildings were not winterized. Finally, Mary 
Back (a Wyoming conservationist) and the National Wildlife Federation also opposed the 
opening of the Park’s roads as too costly to American taxpayers for the small benefits 
they would receive in return.
The Wildlife Management Institute of Washington, D C. was essentially the only 
group to oppose the plowing of roads for environmental or wildlife reasons. This group 
mentioned in particular that “winter is the extreme period of physiological stress for 
wildlife, and both the direct and indirect harassment of the animals by humans could be 
harmful.” *̂ It would take another thirty years for the truth of their statement to be fully 
realized (see Chapters 4 and 5), but because that truth was not obvious then, their 
testimony was ignored.
In contrast, and as expected, nearly every Chamber of Commerce in Wyoming and
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
AppropriationSy United States Senatê  on Winter Operation of Roads in Yellowstone National Parky Ninetieth Congress, 
Second Session, 1968, pp. 6-9.
Ibid, p. 94.
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the Yellowstone region supported the plowing of roads in winter. Chambers as far away 
as Salt Lake City, Utah, and Amarillo,. Texas (both on U.S. Highways that pass through 
Yellowstone) sent statements or representatives to support the plowing of the Park’s 
roads. Their motive was obvious: the stimulation of the then-slow winter economy. 
Interestingly, West Yellowstone’s Chamber was the only one to even hesitate in 
supporting the opening of park roads, as snowmobile and snowcoach income was already 
significant to its town merchants. The chamber, however, changed its mind at the last 
minute and supported the opening of park roads.^^
Clearly, pressure to open the roads was intense and coming from all directions. 
Considering that, it is surprising that Yellowstone did not begin to plow the roads.
But, Hartzog’s mind was apparently made up before he ever began the meetings; 
after all, Yellowstone’s administrators had maintained their position for at least the last 
ten years. By October 1967, he informed Yellowstone’s administrators that there would 
be no additional opening of Yellowstone’s roads in the winter, nor even a longer summer 
season (April-November, rather than May-October).^^ Rather, the Park would remain 
open to snowmobiles.
In the next four years, Yellowstone administrators would create their snowmobile 
policy. It would consist of three main prongs: 1) keeping Yellowstone’s interior roads
Ibid.
Staff Meeting Minutes for Oct. 19, 1967, IN Box A-226, File A40: “Staff Meeting Minutes 1967—Yellowstone,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
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open to snowmobiles and snowcoaches, rather than automobiles; 2) grooming those 
roads on a regular basis to make them comfortable for travel; and 3) opening the Old 
Faithful Snowlodge for overnight use in winter. The remainder of this chapter will 
discuss the development of these three prongs of the policy, as well as the efforts of park 
administrators to develop regulations covering them and their efforts to promote the 
new winter program.
The First Step: Allow Snowmachines, not Automobiles 
Around the time of the congressional hearing, Jack Anderson arrived from Grand 
Teton National Park, where he was superintendent, to assume the superintendency of 
Yellowstone. Anderson adhered to Hartzog’s position on the winter use of Yellowstone, 
as confirmed at an all-day meeting with all of his leading staff members on March 17 or 
18, 1968.̂ "̂  This was the crucial meeting at which Yellowstone’s administrators 
formalized their winter use policy.
As he later wrote regarding their decision to permit snowmachines instead of 
automobiles, Anderson and his staff evaluated their three options: plowing the roads, 
closing the Park to all but skiers and snowshoers, or developing an oversnow-visitation 
program. In considering the plowing of the Park’s roads, he and his staff felt that this 
would not enhance the Park visit, since it would result in three problems, all a result of
Date is March 17, 1968 in Robert Murphy to Chief, Division of Resources Management & Visitor Protection, March 
28, 1968, and March 18, 1968 in “Winter Oversnow Vehicle Operations” Minutes, both IN Box L-42, File L3427: 
“Recreation Activities 1969—Winter Sports (Oversnow Vehicle Use),” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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creating snow “canyons”—roads with very high snow berms on both sides: 1) the
canyons would be difficult for the automobile visitor to see out of; 2) they might become 
serious obstacles to migrating wildlife; and 3) they might trap snow in the windier, open 
valleys of the Park, creating traffic hazards. As well, they felt that plowing Yellowstone’s 
roads would serve only the economic interests of the surrounding communities by giving 
them easier access to each other in winter.^^ For these reasons, they decided not to plow 
Yellowstone’s interior roads.
Anderson and his staff likewise felt that closing the Park to all but snowshoers and 
skiers could not be justified since only a few very hardy skiers could really penetrate such 
a large park:^^ “Less than 1/10 of 1% of the people have the capability to go out in the 
Park in the wintertime, using only skis and snowshoes.”^̂  Closing the Park entirely was, 
then, not an option for Anderson, given the intense pressure he and his staff were feeling 
to open Yellowstone to automobiles. Since one of the two main mandates of the NPS is 
to provide for the enjoyment of the Park, Anderson and his staff probably felt that 
closing the Park to all motorized use would not comply with this mandate.
That left the third option, developing an over-snow program. “Public pressure to 
open the Park gave us little choice—we had to do something,” wrote Anderson later.^*
Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden and 
Alan Mebane, June 12,1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3: YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
Robert Haraden (Acting Superintendent), to Lee Wood, March 31, 1972, IN Box N-118, File “Historical Backcountry 
Correspondence,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1,1977 IN “Current Stuff” Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 1, YNP Research library, p. 9.
Jack Anderson to Raymond Euston, July 20, 1972, IN Box N-118, File “Historical Backcountry Correspondence,”
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He struck a compromise, then, between the two options: plowing was inappropriate and 
too expensive, and skiing-only was too exclusive. Hence, snowmobiling offered a middle 
ground, a way to allow winter use without the expense of plowing (the cost of grooming 
park roads was evidently not considered). It was a solution not too expensive—at that 
time—for the NPS, and also not too exclusive. Most importantly at that time, it was a 
way to get those interests who were demanding that he plow the roads off his back. So, 
Anderson and his staff committed themselves to developing a winter program for 
oversnow vehicles.
As finally formalized, Yellowstone’s snowmobile policy came to be thus:
1) Snowmobiling, per se, has no place in any natural area of the National Park 
System;
2) A snowmobile utilized for controlled access to a natural area is as appropriate in 
the winter as a conventional motor vehicle is in the summer;
3) Snowmobiles will be allowed to enter Yellowstone National Park if confined to 
the snow-covered road system which, during the summer months, accommodates 
conventional motor vehicles; and
4) The purpose of allowing oversnow vehicles to enter Yellowstone is to provide an 
opportunity for winter visitors to see, and enjoy, the many wonderful natural 
features and wildlife that are present in the Park.^^
At the tirne Anderson and his staff made this decision, the only legislation they had 
to follow was the NPS and Yellowstone Organic Acts, which charged them to provide 
for the enjoyment of the Park in such a way that the Park’s resources would not be 
impaired for future generations. They were clearly providing for the enjoyment of the
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Harold J. Estey (Acting Superintendent) to Robert B. Ranck, Dec. 20, 1974, IN Box W-129, File W42: “Special 
Regulations, 1973-75,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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Park’s winter resources by opening its roads to oversnow vehicles. Likewise, as far as 
they knew at the time, snowmobile use of the Park would not impair its resources. 
Finally, public pressure to open the roads was intense. As explained above, by facilitating 
visitation while minimizing the adverse effects that Anderson thought plowing would 
have on the Park’s wildlife and visitors, he was acting in the best interest of the national 
park and National Park Service.
The Next Step: Grooming the Roads 
As mentioned in the introduction, snowmachines tend to create moguls, or bumps, 
in the road after several machines have traveled the same stretch. Being malleable, snow 
is easily displaced by the physical action of pushing against it for propulsion of the 
snowmachines. Hence, after a number of snowmobiles have traveled the same stretch of 
road, it can become a field of moguls, and can thus present some very difficult, 
uncomfortable travel conditions. These conditions are what Yellowstone’s 
administrators wished to remedy when they began grooming Yellowstone’s snow roads.
The road-grooming program had its roots in the activities of park concessionaires, 
who did it before park administrators. When snowcoaches first started touring 
Yellowstone in the 1950’s, they frequently got stuck in the soft, deep snow of the Park’s 
unplowed, unpacked, and ungroomed roads. To remedy that, tour operators would 
sometimes drive a snowplane ahead of them to break trail for the much heavier 
snowcoaches. To further flatten the trail, the snowcoach drivers would pull behind them
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some sort of “drag,” a large, heavy wooden contraption that, through its sheer weight 
and force of friction, would smooth the moguls that had formed/^ In this way the early 
tour operators would “groom” the road for their use/^ By the 1960’s the Yellowstone 
Park Company (YPCo.) used its own snowcoaches in the same manner, going out with 
an empty coach early in the day following a storm to pack the trail for the passenger- 
carrying coaches to follow later in the day/"
As late as 1968, the YPCo. was still using its drag to groom the roads. The company 
would groom them after new snowfalls, and whenever sufficient moguls had formed to 
make travel unpleasant. The drag was made of 2 X 12’s, was around fifteen feet long, and 
often required two snowcoaches chained together to pull, especially in new snow.^^
At the policy meeting in March 1968, the NPS officers discussed the fact that this 
drag tore up the asphalt road surface, especially over the thermally bare spots in the 
roads. Consequently, they recommended to the YPCo. that they investigate the use of a 
“roller-type device ... similar to those used on ski areas to smooth ski runs.”^̂  This was 
basically a piece of a galvanized steel culvert pulled behind a grooming machine.
Bob Jones (former Reservations Manager for YPCo.), interview by author, telephone conversation, Moab, Utah, 
Nov. 17, 1997.
** Walt Stuart, “Interview with Walt Stuart by Leslie Quinn, 1994,” interview by Leshe Quiim, November, 1994, IN  
Drawer 8, Tape #96-8, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY. Stuart also mentions driving the snowplanes on 
Yellowstone Lake as fast as 130-140 m.p.h,, and chasing coyotes on Hebgen Lake with them.
Harold Estey (Chief Park Ranger), to Administrative Officer, Oct. 16, 1969, IN Box A-32, File A88; “Oversnow 
Vehicle Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Bob Jones (former Reservations Manager for YPCo.), interview by author, telephone conversation, Moab, Utah, 
Nov. 17, 1997.
“Winter Oversnow Vehicle Operations”—Minutes of March 18, 1968 meeting IN Box N-115, File L3427: “Winter 
Sports—Oversnow Vehicle Use,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY, p. 1.
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The YPCo. never purchased such a device, because their system of road groom ing  
was adequate for their needs.*^ So, the company continued to use its drag on the roads. 
Since the coaches often traveled in the very same grooves as previous coaches, they left 
behind two parallel deep grooves (where the skis and tracks had traveled) with a large 
mound of snow between them. The drag that the YPCo. used did not eliminate these 
deep grooves and mounds,*^ a situation that made travel difficult for the smaller 
snowmobiles.^^ Furthermore, Anderson stated later that “we found we were starting to 
have injuries because ... we did not groom roads ... and the roads just used to be terrible,” 
due to the increased nurnbers of snowmobiles entering the Park.^^ Clearly, there were 
many problems with Park snow roads at that time.
Consequently, Chief Park Ranger Harold Estey, after attending the 1970 
International Snowmobile Congress in Duluth, Minnesota, wrote Anderson that 
“snowmobile routes, particularly between West Yellowstone and Old Faithful and 
between Mammoth and Old Faithful, will have to receive tread maintenance.”*̂  By 
February 1970, the NPS was considering “tailoring our snow-covered roads for winter
Bill Hape (former Assistant Chief of Maintenance for the NPS), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, 
MT, Nov 13,1997.
Bill Hape, IN Yellowstone National Park, Winter Information, 1977 (Unpublished green folder in Vertical Files, 
YNP Research Library, YNP, WY), no page number.
Jerry Memin (former Snake River District Ranger), interview by author, personal interview, Bozeman, MT, Nov. 11, 
1997.
** Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden and 
Alan Mebane, June 12, 1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3: YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
Harold Estey (Chief Park Ranger) to Superintendent, Feb. 16, 1970, IN Box A-35, File A40: “Conferences & 
Meetings 1970,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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use beginning next winter. With the type of use we are getting and the fact that we do
invite this type of use, we are certainly going to have to consider making it safe for the
visitor to come into the Park on [snow]machines.” °̂
Grooming the roads was the solution, as recorded by Anderson:
We made a determination that we should expend some funds and experiment a little 
bit with road grooming. ...Once we started that, then the whole program started to 
explode and travel increased perceptibly ...The increase in use just came 
automatically, almost simply because we had started grooming. It made the [park] 
unit safe, gave a pleasant trip, and yet it gave access into the Park. You know what 
happened after that.^^
Indeed we do. Anderson decided to groom the roads to make them safe and 
comfortable for snowmobiles. Because maintaining the road for the increasing numbers 
of snowmobilers was not the responsibility of the YPCo., the NPS took it over.^^ To do 
that. Park administrators purchased a “mobile planer,” an attachment made by the 
Thiokol Company for its over-snow equipment, and had it ready to use by February 3, 
1971.^  ̂ That winter the NPS spent 264 person days on road grooming for oversnow
^  Jack Anderson to George F. Baggley, Feb. 26, 1970, IN Box A-36, File D30: “Roads & Trails 1970,” YNP Archives, 
YNP,W Y.
Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden and 
Alan Mebane, June 12, 1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY. In developing his 
grooming program, Anderson may have conferred with the Bombardier Corporation, a snowmobile manufacturer 
in Duluth, Minnesota. The document entitled “Snoplan—A Trail Development and Maintenance Program,” by Jack 
Armstrong, the U.S. Snoplan Coordinator of Bombardier Corp. in Duluth, MN (1971) discusses the “Snoplan” 
developed by Bombardier to groom roads in Yellowstone, Minnesota, and Michigan, with the stated objective of 
providing a safe environment for snowmobilers and to lessen environmental impact, presumably by confining 
snowmobiles to the groomed roads and restricting their off-road movements. 1 have not seen a copy of the original 
document, but rather only a summary of it by former Yellowstone Planning Office Ranger Kate Scott, so 1 am 
unable to discern whether Anderson actually did confer with Bombardier.
Bob Jones (former Reservations Manager for YPCo.), interview by author, telephone conversation, Moab, Utah, 
Nov. 17, 1997.
Staff Meeting Minutes for Feb. 2, 1971, IN Box A-37, File A40; “Conferences and Meetings, 1971” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY p. 3. While numerous other sources mention 1970 as the year road grooming began (such as Linda
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travel/^ grooming the following roads: 1) South Entrance to West Thumb; 2) West 
Yellowstone to Old Faithful, and 3) West Yellowstone to Canyon and Mammoth/^ 
Hence, Yellowstone’s administrators began their grooming program by targeting the 
more heavily used roads on the west side of the Park, although the roads on the east side 
of the Park remained open to snowmobiles in an ungroomed condition.
Beginning this grooming program was something entirely new for Anderson and the 
NPS. Hence, Anderson frequently corresponded with snowmobile clubs, especially in 
the upper Midwest, for advice on the mechanics of snow grooming.^^ Chief Ranger 
Estey’s attendance at the International Snowmobile Congress in Duluth probably 
facilitated this correspondence. Perhaps this assistance from the snowmobile industry is 
the “cooperation” referred to by Anderson when he stated: “We’ve had the cooperation 
of not only the national but also the international snowmobile associations. We’ve had 
the cooperation of the industry itself and, of course, the industry recognized Yellowstone 
as the leader in winter recreation.”^̂
Paganelli, “The Historical Development of Winter Visitor Use at Yellowstone National Park,” YNP Research 
Library Vertical Files, 1980), this is the earhest mention that I could find of it. With 264 person days (53 weeks) of 
work listed as the number of days spent on grooming that winter, it is likely that the NPS began grooming in 
December, 1970. Since Paganelli does not cite her source, and because I can not find an original source with a 1970 
date on it, I chose to adhere to the Feb., 1971 date.
Gary Everhart to Director, Midwest Region, Nov. 8, 1971, IN Box A-47, File A6423: “Park Management 1971; Park 
Activity Standards,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Robert E. Sellers (Acting Chief Park Ranger) to Gene Bryan (Wyoming Travel Commission), Dec. 20, 1971, IN Box 
L-36, File L3427: “Recreation Activities: Winter Sports,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Bill Hape (former Assistant Chief of Maintenance for the. NPS), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, 
* MT, Nov. 13, 1997. There is no extant correspondence between Anderson or Hape and the snowmobile groups.
Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden, and 
Alan Mebane, June 12, 1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3: YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
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Indeed, Yellowstone quickly became the leader in NPS snowmobile recreation. As 
Anderson indicated, the number of snowmobiles entering Yellowstone jumped in the 
next two winters, thanks to his efforts to provide a comfortable, safe, family experience. 
Snowmobile visitation increased by 5,822 from the winter of 1970-71 to 1971-72 (a 48% 
increase), and again by 9,390 by the following winter (a 51% increase) (Table 4, Chapter 2 
has more detailed visitation information). Anderson looked forward to snowmobile 
visitation increasing,^* which is precisely what happened, helping to cement his 
compromise into place.
The Final Step: Opening Old Faithful Snowlodge 
Attempts by the Yellowstone Park Company to open the Snowlodge began with the 
company’s letter to Superintendent McLaughlin in 1966 to open the “Old Faithful 
M otor H o te l.M cL au g h lin  responded by requesting that the YPCo. officials meet with 
him directly to discuss the matter. Whether they ever did is unclear, but it is likely 
given the fact that at the congressional hearing in Jackson that summer, McLaughlin 
stated that if the YPCo. opened any facilities at Old Faithful for winter visitors, it would 
be the Campers Cabin building (probably the same building as the “Motor Hotel”), since 
it was partly winterized. If fully winterized, this building could provide accommodations
Dale Nuss (former Park Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview. Bridger Canyon, MT, Nov. 
II, 1997.
Ronald R. Beaumont to John S. McLaughlin, April 5, 1966 IN Box C-4, File C38; “Concessioner Contracts & 
Permits,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
John McLaughlin S. (Superintendent) to Art Bazata (General Manager, YPCo), April 12, 1966, IN Box C-4, File C38: 
“Concessioner Contracts & Permits,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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and meals for 100 people/°*
At this point, the idea was apparently shelved, for there seems to be no other 
information regarding it until 1971. In the meantime, however, it remained in the back 
of YPCo.’s mind while they opened another hotel in Yellowstone for winter visitation- 
the “Mammoth Motor Inn” (now known as the Mammoth Hot Springs Hotel). Because 
visitation was increasing, and the hotel was (and is) located on a plowed road, the 
Yellowstone Park Company opened it for the winter 1966-67 season.A dditionally , the 
YPCo. began snowcoach tours from Mammoth in 1966, so it logically needed an open 
facility in that area.^°  ̂ While it stayed open for a total of four consecutive winters, the 
hotel never made much money, probably because it was not located in the interior of 
Yellowstone, where most winter visitors were. Rather, it was located in the lower- 
elevation, northern part of the Park, where the plowed road first turned into the 
snowmobile road. Additionally, it was twenty more miles from it to Old Faithful than it 
was from the hotels in West Yellowstone to Old Faithful—hence, the hotels in West 
drew more business (this remains the situation for the Mammoth Hot Springs Hotel 
today). So, by 1970 the YPCo. had decided to close the fa c ility .T W A  Services, who
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
AppropriationSy United States Senatey on Winter Operation of Roads in Yellowstone National Parky Ninetieth Congress, 
Second Session, 1968, p. 13.
Superintendent's Monthly Narrative Report for December 1966, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 11.
Dale Nuss (former Park Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Bridger Canyon, MT, Nov. 
11, 1997.
John D. Amerman to Jack Anderson, Aug. 19, 1970, IN Box C-24, File “Concessions Bldgs,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
55
replaced the YPCo. in 1979, would reopen the hotel in 1982 (see Chapter 3).
While it was open, the “Mammoth Motor Inn” offered pay-by-the-hour snowmobile 
trips departing from Tower Junction to Tower Falls and from the Upper Terrace Drive 
to Swan Lake Flats. The YPCo. offered such tours via snowniobile rather than 
snow coach .T hese  were no more successful than the hotel was at that time.
With visitation increasing, especially to the ever-popular Old Faithful, both NPS 
and YPCo. officials began to consider opening a hotel there in winter. Around 1969, 
they began to discuss opening a lodge at Old Faithful in winter. Initially the officials 
were discussing just opening a food service facility to serve the increasing numbers of 
visitors, but eventually expanded the idea to include some simple lodging. Demand for 
some form of lodging and meal service at Old Faithful was obvious;^°^ in fact, the NPS 
reported that an increasing number of snowmobilers were using the heated restrooms at 
Old Faithful to eat and sleep in, since in the 1960’s there was no other place to do so at 
Old Faithful (or for that matter, to relieve oneself).Furtherm ore, Chief Ranger Estey, 
again just back from Duluth, stated that “minimum concessioner services consisting of 
shelter, gas and oil, and sanitary facilities ... should be available at Old Faithful.” °̂̂  By
John S. McLaughlin to Art Bazata, Oct. 17, 1966, IN Box C-4, File 038: “Concessionaire Contracts & Permits,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Bob Jones (former Reservations Manager for YPCo.), interview by author, telephone conversation, Moab, Utah, 
Nov. 17,1997.
Bill Hape (former Assistant Chief of Maintenance for the NPS), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, 
MT, Nov. 13, 1997.
108 Oversnow Vehicle Operations”—Minutes of March 18, 1968 meeting IN Box N-115, File L3427: “Winter
Sports—Oversnow Vehicle Use,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Harold Estey (Chief Park Ranger) to Superintendent, .Feb. 16, 1970, IN Box A-35, File A40: “Conferences &
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the next summer, the YPCo. was “seriously considering opening facilities at Old Faithful
1 • ' ,, 110this winter.
On December 17, 1971, the Old Faithful Snowlodge opened for its first winter 
season. Open through March 19, 1972, the Snowlodge featured “simple, pleasant and 
comfortable lodging spiced with hearty western food and beverage and nature’s grandest 
winter display. ... Single, twin and triple rooms are available^ All are convenient to 
centrally located bath facilities.”^ I t  was the Campers Cabin building with a new 
name,^^^ with 34 rooms without bath available to the public. The rooms were actually 
rooms used in summer by the employees of the Campers Cabin facility. The company 
chose this building because it was one of their newer buildings at Old Faithful, and it was 
already winterized. Although they discussed opening all or part of Old Faithful Inn, they 
did not follow through on this idea because the Inn would have needed extensive 
renovation and winterizing. Heating the Inn would have been next to impossible, with 
its 80-foot-high non-insulated ceiling.
The YPCo. offered several tour packages at the Snowlodge as well as snowshoeing.
Meetings 1970,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Staff Meeting Minutes for July 20, 1971, IN Box A-37, File A40: “Conferences & Meetings, 1971,” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY.
“Yellowstone Snowtime Adventures,” promotional brochure for Old Faithful Snowlodge for its first season, 1971- 
72, located at Chief Executive’s Office, AmFac Parks & Resorts, Mammoth Hot Springs, YNP, WY.
Yellowstone National Park, Winter Informatioriy 1977 (Unpublished green folder in Vertical Files, YNP Research 
Library, YNP, WY), no page number.
Bob Jones (former Reservations Manager for YPCo.), interview by author, telephone conversation, Moab, Utah, 
Nov. 17, 1997.
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ski touring, and snowcoach tours. The Snowlodge and its tours were clearly popular, 
as the concessionaire still offers these services today.
Promoting the Snowmobile Policy
After the crucial policy meeting in March 1968, Anderson realized he would have to
promote the new winter policy to get it to work. As he later said.
We did the best thing ... try and develop a ... viable winter program. So, we w en t... 
to ... the International [Snowmobile Industry Association], and we talked to the 
manufacturers to try and [sic] encourage them to come in to West Yellowstone and 
here. We drew some people in who had high public visibility—Lowell Thomas was 
one.̂ ^̂
Clearly, Anderson promoted his new program as best he could. It is uncertain, 
however, just what he meant by talking with the manufacturers and encouraging them to 
come in to the Park and West Yellowstone. O f the seven associates of Anderson’s that I 
interviewed, none could say conclusively what Anderson meant by this remark. It is 
safe to say, however, that he promoted the snowmobile use of Yellowstone—at a very 
critical time for the snowmobile industry. In the late 1960’s, there were more than one 
hundred snowmobile manufacturers, who were attempting to develop a market for their
“Yellowstone Snowtime Adventures,” promotional brochure for Old Faithful Snowlodge for its first season, 1971- 
72, located at Chief Executive’s Office, AmFac Parks & Resorts, Mammoth Hot Springs, YNP, WY.
Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden and 
Alan Mebane, June 12,1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3: YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3, 
1997; Bob Haraden (former Assistant Superintendent of Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, 
Bozeman, MT, Nov. 11, 1997; Harold Estey, interview by author, telephone interview, Norfolk, NE, Nov. 12, 1997; 
Terry Danforth, interview by author, personal interview, Bozeman, MT, Nov. 20, 1997; and author’s interviews 
with Hape, Nov. 13, 1997; Memin, Nov. 11, 1997; and Nuss, Nov. 11, 1997.
58
products in the west. To do that, they were subsidizing the snowmobile industry in 
West Yellowstone by assisting the fledgling snowmobile rentals by making snowmobiles 
available through low-priced leases. Anderson may have seen a mutually beneficial 
agreement with the snowmobile industry: by opening Yellowstone to snowmobile
visitation, he could get the politicians off his back while the industry could 
simultaneously achieve its objective of developing the western snowmobile market. 
Indeed, by 1972 the snowmobile manufacturers were leasing their machines to several 
West Yellowstone motel owners, who in turn rented them to winter visitors; by 1983 
the town had 71 snowmobile-related businesses, including 29 motels, where there had 
been no motels open in winter in 1966.^̂ * By encouraging the struggling snowmobile 
industry just when it needed that encouragement, Anderson got the politicians off his 
back and the snowmobile industry “took off.”
As he also mentioned, Anderson publicized the new winter policy by inviting 
reporters and by writing newspaper articles about Yellowstone in winter. For example, 
Lowell Thomas, a well-known radio commentator, visited Yellowstone in winter during 
this time period and gave several nation-wide radio addresses about his visit to the Park 
in winter. In another example, Anderson wrote an article promoting a visit to
Darcy L. Fawcett, “Colonial Status: The Search for Independence in West Yellowstone, Montana” (Professional 
Paper submitted to Montana State University), Dec. 17, 1993, p. 21.
Ibid., p. 23, 27.
Jack Anderson to Lowell Thomas, March 17, 1969, IN Box A-158, File A3821: “Public Relations 1969
(individuals),” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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Yellowstone in winter, stating “each year more folks are coming to see the Park during 
what used to be the ‘closed’ season but closed no more.”^̂ °
Anderson also promoted Yellowstone’s winter program by permitting another 
demonstration snowmobile trip, this time around the Park’s Grand Loop (with the 
exception of the road from Tower Falls to Mammoth, which was plowed for automobile 
use). A group of 28 men and women sponsored by the Big Sky Snowriders, a 
snowmobile group out of Livingston, Montana, took three days to complete the 182-mile 
ride, camping out in the Park along the way.^^  ̂Their trip was precedent setting in that it 
was the first such circumnavigation of all the Park roads in one trip. This tour provided 
the model for the Lower Loop tour that has since become very popular: driving one’s 
snowmobile to the Lower Loop and circumnavigating it in one day, a trip of at least 130 
miles. Because the road from Canyon to Tower Falls is no longer open to snowmobiles, 
due to the avalanche danger on Dunraven Pass, traveling the entire Grand Loop in 
winter is no longer possible, so the Lower Loop suffices for today’s visitors.
Finally, Park officials cooperated with the Wyoming State Highway Department in 
a survey of 24,000 summer visitors. One of the questions of the survey found that 24% of 
those visitors had taken a winter vacation in the last five years. Of that number, only 
5.9% went snowmobiling while anywhere between 20 and 69% observed wildlife, went
Jack Anderson to Fred Martin (Editor of the Park County News), Dec. 29, 1969, IN Box A-158, File A3815; “Public 
Relations 1969 (Federal, State & Local Agencies),” YNP Arcliives, YNP, WY.
“Snowriders to Tour Yellowstone’s Loop.” The Billings Gazette, Billings, MT, Jan. 25, 1967.
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sightseeing, photographed, or went skiing. ‘ Even though the survey indicated little 
interest in snowmobiling, Yellowstone’s administrators promoted it as the means of 
accomplishing the other activities in the Park’s snowbound interior. They had, after all, 
developed a policy.
Development of Regulations 
Yellowstone’s administrators had developed most of their snowmobile regulations 
before Anderson arrived. Hence, the presence of existing regulations made it that much 
easier for them to formally adopt their snowmobile policy in 1968. Regulations came 
about in the following manner.
Promotion of snowmobiling by residents of West Yellowstone meant the Park 
administrators soon had to develop regulations for their use in the Park. As already 
discussed, the first visits to Yellowstone by snowplane, snowcoach, and snowmobile all 
entered from West Yellowstone. By the late 1960’s, the town had embraced the 
snowmobile as its ticket to a year-round economy. In March 1966 West Yellowstone 
held its first “Snowmobile Roundup.” A “roundup” was a weekend gathering of 
snowmobile owners and their machines. The town organized activities of various kinds 
for the snowmobilers, including races, jumps, and rides. One of the rides was a day-trip 
into Yellowstone, with participants riding round-trip from West Yellowstone to Old
Wyoming State Highway Department, “Yellowstone National Park Travel Study 1967,” IN Box A-252, File A88: 
“Travel Studies & Statistics 1969—Campground Survey,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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Faithful and back.*^^
By the next year, the annual roundup attracted about 325 snowmobiles. While that 
number is only about one-fifth the number of snowmobile rentals available in West 
today (not including several thousand more that show up for today’s snowmobile 
roundups!), at that time administrators considered it a tremendous number. 
Consequently, when a large percentage of that 325 entered Yellowstone in one day for a 
tour to Old Faithful and back, they illustrated the problems (in an early form) that 
would eventually arise from increased numbers of snowmobile visits.
Park Ranger Pete Thompson, on patrol in the West Entrance area during the second 
roundup, observed many problems with that large a number of snowmobiles, including 
off-road travel, physical alterations to snowmobiles that increased their power and 
associated noise levels, driving at night with inoperative headlights, litter, and racing.'"”̂ 
Rangers at the next park staff meeting seconded Thompson’s concerns, stating that “the 
Park does not have enough control of these snowmobiles. More manpower and better 
regulations will have to be developed.”*"̂  Superintendent McLaughlin expressed these 
concerns to the Regional Director at the same time, stating “we do not, in all instances, 
have proper regulations to legally enforce our ground rules ... the snowmobiling activity
Pete Thompson to Chief Park Ranger through West District Ranger, March 21, 1967 IN Box A-32, File A88: 
“Oversnow Vehicle Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Ibid.
Minutes of March 23, 1967 Staff Meeting, IN Box A-226, File A40: “Staff Meeting Minutes 1967—Yellowstone,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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should be patrolled and policed more than we have been able to do.”^̂ ^
Concern for improved regulations reached the Director of the National Park 
Service. Writing for his boss, NPS Assistant Director Edward Howell sent Yellowstone a 
list of guidelines under which snowmobiles could be permitted into national parks. The 
list reflected much of what Yellowstone was doing already, indicating that the national 
policy of the NPS may have been based in large part on Yellowstone’s policy. The 
national policy included the following:
1) The use of the mechanized over-the-snow equipment is a compatible winter use 
and should be encouraged within the framework of the Code of Federal 
Regulations and the basic National Park Service Act;
2) The visitor use of over-the snow vehicles shall be confined primarily to roads 
open to the use of motor vehicles during the time of year when snow is not on 
the roads. This may include fire or administrative roads open only to government 
vehicles in the spring, summer and fall. ...
3) The established public roads ... should be adequately marked or described by a 
map available to the general public so no misunderstanding can arise as to the 
limit of road use;...
4) The individual area should develop a special permit to be issued without charge to 
the operator of oversnow equipment. ... Ordinarily this permit would be issued 
for trips of overnight or longer with self-registry boxes used for day use. The 
permit should include such items as the proposed itinerary and emergency 
supplies to be carried.*"^
The NPS in Yellowstone issued “Regulations Governing Winter Activities” shortly 
thereafter. In addition to the above guidelines probably taken from Yellowstone by the 
Director, the Yellowstone regulations also included the following:
1) A snowmobile shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good working
John S. McLaughlin to Regional Director, Western Region, March 20, 1967, IN Box A-32, File A88: “Oversnow 
Vehicle Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Assistant Director to All Regional Directors, May 26, 1967, IN Box H41, File L3427: “Recreation Activities 1967:
Winter Sports, Oversnow Vehicles,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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order to prevent excessive or unusual noise and annoying smoke. No person shall 
use a muffler cut-out, bypass, or similar device upon a snowmobile [these 
alterations increase the already high levels of noise].
2) A snowmobile shall be equipped with a forward-facing white headlight and a red 
taillight. These lights must be lighted [at appropriate times].
3) No person under the age of 16 shall operate a snowmobile unless under the direct 
supervision of a person 21 years of age or older...
4) Racing and other competitive uses are prohibited. ...
5) The maximum speed limit is 45 m.p.h.
To make it as easy as possible for the snowmobilers to learn and abide by the 
regulations, Yellowstone’s administrators developed and issued a two-sided sheet 
explaining the regulations in an easy-to-read, cartoon-like style. The cartoon, in addition 
to the above regulations, clearly told snowmobilers not to feed, tease, molest or chase 
wildlife, and to observe them from a distance.
Although these were good attempts to regulate snowmobiles and to protect park 
resources, the escalating snowmobile use would soon challenge their effectiveness. For 
example, the noise that snowmobiles emitted continued to plague park managers, and 
still does. Additionally, concerns over wildlife harassment and impacts intensified shortly 
after the regulations were issued, and continue to this day. For the time being, however, 
Yellowstone administrators thought they had adequate regulations written to protect 
park resources. The exploding use of the next few years would call that assumption into 
question—leaving open the question of whether any amount of regulations would ever
“Regulations Governing Winter Activities,” appended to Jack K. Anderson to Regional Director, December 8, 1970, 
IN Box L-33, File L34: “Recreation Activities,” YNP Arcliives, YNP, WY (no page number).
“Yellowstone National Park Snowmobile Regulations,” appended to Jack K. Anderson to Regional Director, 
December 8, 1970, IN Box L-33, File L34: “Recreation Activities,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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keep Yellowstone’s priceless resources from harm by so many snowmobiles.
Chapter Conclusion
Yellowstone’s administrators, then, allowed snowmobiles into the Park for three 
reasons;
1) to get the public off their back by allowing some form of motorized access to the 
Park in winter;
2) to adhere to the pressure from National Park Service directors and MISSION 66 by 
dispersing visitation throughout the year; and
3) to allow the public to see and experience the Park in winter.
The most immediate reason was the first one; the earliest reason, the last one. By 
1971, Superintendent Anderson had an official policy allowing snowmachines virtually 
unlimited use of Yellowstone’s roads in the winter. The existence of the necessary 
regulations made the adoption of the snowmobile program that much easier. And finally, 
Anderson cemented its policy in place by promoting it publicly, providing comfortable 
snowmobile roads, and opening a place to stay overnight within the Park.
At the time snowmobiles must have seemed relatively benign, despite their high 
level of noise. Administrators felt that snowmobiles were to winter as automobiles were 
to summer. Hence, they did not feel it necessary to examine the environmental side 
effects of the things. N or could any reasonable person likely have foreseen just how 
much snowmobile visitation would grow. Hence, we cannot significantly fault these 
people for implementing the snowmobile program. In fact, at the time, the Park’s 
managers felt that opening the Park to snowmobiles carried fewer impacts than plowing
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the roads would have. Hence, in allowing snowmobiles into Yellowstone, Anderson and 
his staff probably were motivated to act in the Park’s best interest and in the best interest 
of the NPS.
While Anderson may have been acting in the Park’s best interest at this time, he 
soon began to make some decisions that question whether he continued to act in the best 
interest of the park as regards its snowmobile policy. Between 1968 and 1975, his 
subordinates and the general public raised many concerns regarding snowmobiles that 
Anderson nearly always overruled. Anderson’s conscientious attempt to protect the Park 
disappeared, as he refused to reconsider his decision to promote snowmobile visitation. 
The next chapter shall chronicle these concerns and Anderson’s response to them.
CH A PTER 2: D EFEN D ING  THE NEW  SNOWMOBILE POLICY: 1967-77
We sometimes hear individuals say snowmobile operation in the Park 
infringes upon the intrinsic majesty of the area, or threatens the wilderness 
characteristics of the Park. Pd have to say they are wrong.
Jack Anderson, 197 //
Once Yellowstone’s administrators began grooming the roads for snowmobiles 
and began providing overnight accommodations for winter visitors at Old Faithful, 
visitation increased exponentially. The increased numbers of snowmobiles in the 
park began to illustrate many of the problems that they could bring to Yellowstone, 
and some of Yellowstone’s staff members raised concerns about these problems to 
the superintendent. Rather than investigating these concerns, Anderson seemed to 
ignore them. While he was a conscientious administrator of the park in most ways, 
Anderson personally liked snowmobiling, and evidently allowed his love of the 
activity to blind him to the problems it brought upon his park. His actions 
facilitated a dramatic increase in snowmobile visitation to Yellowstone in the years 
to come. This chapter will examine the concerns raised by Yellowstone’s rangers and 
the public, Anderson’s responses to those concerns, and the responses of other 
national park administrators toward snowmobile use in their parks.
* Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff’ Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 1, YNP Research Library, p. 5.
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Noise
It is easy to understand why snowmobile noise would be one of the most common 
complaints raised about them. Even today, the machines are amazingly loud: at a
distance of 50 feet with a full throttle, the typical snowmobile emits 70-80 decibels of 
noise on the A scale (dB(A))—equivalent to the noise put out by a freight train. 
Snowmobiles manufactured before 1970 were much worse, often emitting over 100 
dB(A) at the same distance—almost as loud as a jet taking off!" Because they are powered 
by “two-stroke,” or “two-cycle,” engines, manufacturers cannot reduce their engine noise 
below about 70 dB(A).^ As long as the two-cycle snowmobile is used in Yellowstone, 
there will be significant snowmobile noise.
Park Ranger Pete Thompson was among the first to express concern over the noise 
levels of the snowmachines in 1967. He wrote that “the noise level on these machines is 
incredible.” He noted that he could hear machines at the races at West Yellowstone from 
Seven Mile Bridge, about 5-6 air miles from West Yellowstone on March 19. Finally he 
noted that when a machine fitted with an expansion chamber, a device that allowed for 
increased combustion and concomitant noise, passed within twenty feet, its noise was 
“actually painful to the eardrum.”^
 ̂ “Noise Facts and Acoustic Terms,” from the “Current Stuff” Section of the Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 7, YNP 
Research Library, YNP, WY.
 ̂Cowl Industries Limited, A Study of the Feasibility of Reducing Snowmobile Noise (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), 
7.
 ̂ Pete Thompson to Chief Park Ranger through West District Ranger, March 21, 1967, IN Box A-32, File A88: 
“Oversnow Vehicle Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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Two years later Ranger Douglas J. Riley discussed the different ways that 
snowmobilers modified their engines to enhance power, which nearly always resulted in 
their being much louder than they already were. He further noted that the majority of 
the visiting public supported the NFS’s noise restrictions (at the time, 86 dB(A) at a 
distance of 50 feet, at or near full throttle).^ A year later Ranger James Fox noted that to 
enforce the noise restriction, some sort of monitoring device would be needed—that “it 
would be difficult (and painful) to listen to each machine individually to determine the 
maximum noise level attainable before admitting the individual.”  ̂ Park administrators 
would not heed Fox’s call for monitoring devices until the mid-1990’s (see Chapter 5).
In 1972, the NFS restricted snowmobiles entering national parks to those emitting 
less than 82 dB(A) at 50 feet, at or near full throttle.^ Eventually, with the “quieter” 
models developed after 1973, the NFS further restricted the models allowed in national 
parks to those 1973-75 models that emitted 82 decibels or less at or near full-throttle at a 
distance of 50 feet, and post-1975 models that emitted 78 decibels or less under the same 
conditions.*
As mentioned above, these restrictions still allow some very noisy machines into the
 ̂Douglas J. Riley to West Sub-District Ranger, March 17, 1969, IN Box N-115, File L3427; “Winter Sports Oversnow 
Vehicle Use,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂James E. Fox to West District Ranger, May 3, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34: “Recreation Activities—1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂ C. L. Planner (Acting Superintendent, Yellowstone) to Director, Midwest Region, June 14, 1972, IN Box N-118, File 
“Historical Backcountry Correspondence,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
* 36 CFR Chapter 1, § 2.18 (d)(1).
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Park. In fact, even today, with relatively “quiet” snowmobiles being used in the Park, I
bave personally beard them on a number of occasions and in a number of places from as
far as 10 miles from the closest road (see Table 10, Chapter 4 for a detailed listing of such
places). Sub-district Ranger Les Inafuku reports bearing them even farther away—15 or
20 miles from the nearest road.^
But did Anderson really care? While be was superintendent, Anderson wrote that “it
appears that the noise factor has little effect on the wildlife, but I think everyone pretty
well agrees that it is a very disturbing factor for those who are attempting to enjoy the
peace and quiet of the winter wilderness. After be retired from public service,
however, Anderson revealed what may be bis true feelings on the noise matter in an
interview with Derrick Crandall of the Snowmobile Safety and Certification Committee:
ski-tourers may say, ‘well, I wish I did not have to live with those machines off in the 
distance.’ All it takes is a pair of earplugs to stop that real quick... M.ost of the 
complaints we received [from skiers] were really baseless. ... It is ludicrous to bear, 
‘we want a quiet experience, away from snowmobiles,’ when the individual needs 
only to go another 100 yards to have a totally quiet experience (emphasis added).
Anderson’s statements to Crandall regarding the noise of snowmobiles reveal a
careless disregard for the concerns of the public, for the intrinsic values of a wilderness
park such as Yellowstone, and especially for one of the main motivations that bring
 ̂Les Inafuku (Subdistrict Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author. Old Faithful, WY, July 15, 1997. Inafuku heard 
snowmobiles south of the Southeast Arm of Yellowstone Lake; the nearest road is on the north and west shores of 
the lake at about 15 miles distant.
Jack Anderson to Paul McCrary, Midwest Region, Dec. 2, 1969, IN Box L-42, File L3427: “Recreation Activities 
1969—Winter Sports (Oversnow Vehicle Use),” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
^̂ Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff” Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 7, YNP Research Library, p. 6.
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people to the national parks—to escape the noise of our culture. They reveal the fact that 
he did not ski much, being a heavy man who regularly snowmobiled in the Park,*^ and 
hence that he probably had little idea that snowmobile noise traveled much farther than 
only 100 yards (in contrast, Glacier National Park administrators eliminated 
snowmobiles in the 1970’s largely because of the noise they emit (a topic to which this 
chapter will later return)).
Impacts on the Park’s Wildlife and Vegetation
O f equal concern to many rangers and visitors were the potential adverse effects of
snowmobiles on the Park’s wildlife and vegetation. Ranger Douglas Riley, again: “We
have had many complaints of snowmobilers chasing the elk and buffalo. In addition to
this, they have crushed or broken many young pine trees.” Ranger James Fox, again:
“The possible effects of unrestricted snowmobile operations upon wintering wildlife are
the following: (1) keeping wildlife from feeding areas; (2) compacting snow over forage,
making it unavailable; and (3) chasing or other direct harassment of animals.”'"* Finally,
an idea of the extent of this problem is evident from another report by Resource
Management Specialist Edmund Bucknall a year later:
Recent reports from the West Entrance have indicated an alarming trend in 
harassment of elk by snowmobiles. The combination of noise and offroad operation
Jerry Mamin (former Snake River District Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Bozeman, 
M T,Nov. II, 1997.
Douglas J. Riley to West Sub-District Ranger, March 17, 1969, IN Box N-115, File L3427; “Winter Sports Oversnow 
Vehicle Use,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
James E. Fox to West District Ranger, May 3, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34; “Recreation Activities—1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
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of these machines is causing serious disturbance all through the Madison valley 
winter range. Constant patrolling has had little effect in reducing this disturbance. ... 
Disturbance at this critical winter period might easily mean losing the delicate 
balance that regulates this herd.'^
Chief Park Ranger Harold Estey responded to Bucknall that “we must have 
documented and factual evidence to substantiate claims that a particular human use is 
destroying the ecological balance. Second and third hand reports used to support an 
emotionally derived opinion adds [sic] up to no more than an impression” (emphasis 
ad d ed ).A n d erso n  criticized the wildlife and vegetative complaints in general as 
“emotionalism” and stated that “they have never been supported by fact.”'^
But did Estey or Anderson have their own program of meaningful scientific research 
disproving these claims? According to Jack Anderson, he and his staff were indeed 
engaged in “research” into the effects of snowmobiles on the Park’s natural resources: 
“We found that animals become conditioned to noise, particularly those in the Park. ... 
[E]lk, bison, moose, even the fawns [sic], wouldn’t move away unless a machine was 
stopped and a person started walking. As long as it was a machine, there was no impact 
of any nature that we could find.” He also stated that he had two biologists looking for 
evidence of adverse vegetation impacts for three years; they never found any irnpacts^*
Resource Management Specialist to Chief Park Ranger, March 16, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34; “Recreation 
Activities 1970,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Harold Estey to Superintendent, March 31, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34: “Recreation Activities 1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff” Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 1, YNP Research Library, p. 6.
"ibid., pp. 2-3.
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and “we are carefully studying the possible detrimental influence of the smaller 
snowmachines on park resources.”
In contrast, the only research that I could find from Anderson’s time period on the 
effects of snowmobiles on park wildlife was buried in a report on elk management by 
Glen Cole published in 1983. In that report Cole said:
My field observations suggested that the elk that used areas near roads became 
habituated to snowmobiles. ... Displacements of these animals were mostly confined 
to the road plus surprisingly short distances. ... In contrast, persons walking, skiing, 
snowshoeing or driving snowmobiles off regularly traveled roads (especially toward 
animals) displaced elk from their feeding and resting areas at comparatively long 
distances.^°
Clearly, Cole’s statements are only anecdotal in nature and not a scientific study. 
Nevertheless, Anderson evidently used them as scientific fact, even while criticizing the 
complaints of others as “never supported by fact.” Additionally, Cole noted that, in 
order to prove that there were no long-term impacts, “studies will need to be carried out 
over a longer period of time,”"̂  something neither Anderson nor his next two successors 
ever did."^ Cole also found clear evidence that snowmobile use in the Park did displace 
wildlife, something Anderson neglected to mention or consider."^ Finally, outside
” Jack Anderson to Wells B. Lange, Feb. 19,1971, IN Box N-118, File “Historical Backcountry Correspondence,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
Glen Cole, “A Naturally Regulated Elk Population,” Proceedings of the Symposium on Natural Regulation of Wildlife
Populations (Vancouver, B.C., 1983), 77.
Ibid.
Glen Cole, (former research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview. International Falls, 
MN, Nov. 15,1997.
In my research at the Yellowstone National Park Archives, I could find no mention by Anderson of the effects on 
wildlife that Cole found in his research.
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research into the effects of snowmobiles on wildlife was readily available by the early 
1970's/^* yet was apparently not sought out by Anderson or Cole.
Acting superintendent Vern Hennesay probably admitted the truth in stating: “we 
have not set up a specific research study to determine possible damage to plant and 
animal life resulting from oversnow vehicles”^̂  (note that Cole’s snowmobile research 
was incidental to his larger study on natural regulation of elk). Similarly, Acting Chief 
Park Ranger Rick T. Anderson admitted to an inquiring colleague that “we can give you 
no definite information on the detrimental effect [sic] to wildlife or [sic] the off-road use 
of snowmobiles, nor can we direct you to a source of such information,” in 1971.'^
If Anderson had not adopted snowmobiling as his personal obsession,^^ he might 
have found merit in some of the complaints. Indeed, when Keith Aune of Montana State 
University in Bozeman investigated the effects of winter recreationists on Yellowstone’s 
wildlife in 1980, he found many wildlife impacts associated with snowmobiles, including 
displacement of wildlife from areas near the snowmobile trails, inhibition of wildlife 
movement across trails by snowmobile traffic, harassment of wildlife, and displacement
For example, the bibliography of Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Off-Road Recreation Vehicles, A Research 
Summary 1969-1975 (Texas A&M University System, College Station), 1976, lists 175 citations of works discussing 
the ecological effects of off-road snowmobiles dating from 1974 or before.
Vernon E. Hennesay to Hon. Joseph B. Schieffelin, July 10, 1970, IN Box L-33, File L34: “Recreation Activities," 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Rick T. Anderson (Acting Chief Park Ranger) to Richard C. Warren (Anchorage Ranger District, USFS), IN Box N- 
118, File “Historical Backcountry Correspondence,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
In my interviews with Anderson’s colleagues, all of the following mentioned Anderson’s love for the activity of 
snowmobiling: Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturalist, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, 
Belgrade, MT, May 29, 1997.; and author’s personal interviews with Meagher, Nov. 3, 1997, Nuss, Nov. 11, 1997, 
and Memin, Nov. 11, 1997.
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of wildlife by both snowmobilers and skiers.^* But, Anderson did not commission a 
study—and Aune’s was done ten years later. Instead, Anderson used anecdotal evidence 
to back up his claim that snowmobiles did not impact the Park’s wildlife or vegetation 
and failed to do more comprehensive research.
And that is unfortunate. As Ranger James Fox prophetically said, “The long-range 
environmental impact of snowmobiles is unknown. Possibly the harmful effects of snow 
machines, like those of DDT, may take many years to become m a n i f e s t .H o w  right he 
was; just ten years later bison had already learned to use the roads to move from one 
feeding area to another,^° and would grow sizably in population for the next fifteen years 
by saving energy moving around on the snowmobile trails.^^ Anderson’s failure to 
examine the potential effects of snowmobiles in his park would come back to plague 
Yellowstone’s administrators in the 1980’s and 1990’s as a major problem.
Air Pollution from Snowmobiles 
Snowmobiles, being powered by two-cycle engines which mix oil with gas for 
combustion, are “extremely, extremely dirty compared to anything else; snowmobiles 
are the worst there is,” according to Charles Emmett of the California Air Resources
Aime, Keith, “Impart of Winter Recreationists on Wildlife in a Portion of Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming” 
(Master’s Thesis, Montana State University, Bozeman), 1981, p. ix.
James E. Fox to West District Ranger, May 3, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34: “Recreation Activities—1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
John Townsley (Superintendent) to Christine Berry, Feb. 23, 1981, IN Box A-222, File A3615: “Complaints 1981: 
About Service & Personnel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Mary Meagher, Winter Recreation-induced Changes in Bison Numbers and Distribution in Yellowstone National Parky
(Unpublished report submitted to the NPS, YNP, WY), 1993, p. 2.
32 . . ^ 5
Board in 1994. This was as true in the early 1970’s as it is today. While air pollution at
the West Entrance is a major problem today, it was not as big a concern in the early
1970’s. Even so, Ranger Fox wrote:
A great deal of exhaust smoke is produced by most snowmobiles. Probably an 
automobile emitting as much smoke as many snowmobiles do would not be admitted 
to the Park in the summer. The smoke produced by a single snowmobile is not 
highly noxious; however when many machines enter the Park in a single day, a foul­
smelling blue pall of smoke hangs over the entrance for most of the morning.
He also warned that the Park administration must keep in mind the burgeoning
popularity of snowmobiling, so they should expect a concomitant increase of impacts on
the Park environment.^'^
W ith the majority of snowmobilers traveling to Old Faithful for the day, air quality
began to deteriorate there as well. Air pollution became severe enough that Dr. Vincent
J. Schaefer had to move his sensitive meteorological studies from Old Faithful to Norris
Geyser Basin, where there was cleaner air for his studies.^^
The only statement by Anderson in the historical record that I could find is that,
even though air quality at Old Faithful had worsened, “conditions have not, however,
reached uncomfortable proportions for b r e a t h i n g .H i s  remark indicates that even if
Scott McMillion, “Yellowstone in Winter,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Bozeman, MT, Jan. 9,1994.
James E. Fox to West District Ranger, May 3, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34: “Recreation Activities—1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
" Ibid.
Jack Anderson to Director, Midwest Region, April 13, 1971, IN Box L-36, File L3427: “Recreation Activities: 
Winter Sports,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
“  Ibid.
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this was a problem at the time, he was not concerned about it (after all, it is not 
uncomfortable for healthy individuals to breathe polluted air). It would become a major 
problem by the early 1990’s, when Yellowstone began to violate Clean Air Act standards 
at the West Entrance.
The National Environmental Policy Act 
By the early 1970’s, citizens of the U.S. were becoming increasingly conscious of the 
environment around them and of their effects on it. Congress was debating and passing 
several key pieces of national environmental legislation, such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act. In hindsight, it is not too 
surprising that Anderson’s staff and the public raised their concerns at the same time. 
What is surprising, though, is that Anderson seemed immune to the rising environmental 
consciousness of the public as regards snowmobiles. Anderson himself summed up his 
feelings—his emotionalism—about the environmental impacts of snowmobiles well when 
he said snowmobiling is “a great experience and a great sport, one of the cleanest types of 
recreation I know,”^̂  and “We feel that a winter experience in Yellowstone on oversnow 
equipment is much more compatible with the environment [than an experience via 
automobile].” *̂ It is likely that, since Anderson liked snowmobiling personally, he was
Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff” Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 1, YNP Research Library, pp. 11 and 5, 
respectively.
Jack Anderson to Betty Sable (Secretary, Wyoming State Snowmobile Association), May 22, 1970, IN Box A-36, File 
D30: “Roads & Trails 1970,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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letting his love of the activity blind him to its real problems.
O n January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act 
into law. Surprisingly brief, the law stipulated the following:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.^^
The law took effect immediately, and ushered in a completely new era of Federal 
environmental accountability.
The procedures for complying with NEPA were defined by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ). As defined by the CEQ, “Major Federal actions ... 
include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly 
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised 
agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedure; and legislative proposals.” °̂ The 
CEQ required that the federal government perform an Environmental Assessment (EA) 
or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the proposed action, including actions that
’ 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.. Public Law 91-190 (1970). 
' 40 CFR Chapter V, § 1500 et seq.
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are precedent setting or controversial in nature/' An EA is a brief look at the 
environmental consequences of the proposed action, and is usually done for federal 
actions that are relatively minor in nature, but still subject to NEPA, such as closing a 
five-mile road. An EIS, in comparison, is a detailed, hard look at all the possible 
environmental effects of an action, and is usually done for large projects such as the 
construction of a dam. In the preparation of the EA or EIS, NEPA requires the federal 
agency to develop and analyze the potential effects of a range of proposed alternatives, 
including a “no action” alternative.^' In that way, the federal government may compare 
the environmental effects of various proposed actions and thereby choose the alternative 
with least impact. Additionally, the government is required to accept public input as a 
part of the environmental analysis.
As applied to Yellowstone, the law probably covered two of Anderson’s actions in 
the early part of the 1970’s: his decision to groom the snowmobile roads on a regular 
basis, and his decision to permit the Yellowstone Park Company to open the Old 
Faithful Snowlodge. Both of these actions could be reasonably interpreted as “major 
federal actions” as defined by the above legislation, and hence Anderson probably should 
have prepared at least an EA, if not a full EIS, on these actions. By preparing such 
documents, the NPS in Yellowstone would have examined the environmental impacts, 
adverse and long-term environmental effects, and alternatives to the proposed actions—or
40 CFR Chapter V, § 1508.27.
40 CFR Chapter V, § 1500 et seq.
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in other words, most of the potential impacts discussed above as raised by his employees 
and the general public.
Anderson did not prepare any such document for either decision. In scouring the 
archives at Yellowstone National Park, I found absolutely no mention of any EA or EIS 
on snowmobile trail grooming or the opening of Old Faithful Snowlodge. Additionally, 
not one of the seven persons who worked with Anderson whom I interviewed could 
recall any form of EA or EIS regarding the decision to groom roads or to open the 
Snowlodge; nor could they recall any formal public hearings."*  ̂ The first environmental 
analysis of any kind—an EA—was not released until 1990, nineteen years after the NPS 
began grooming trails and opened the Snowlodge. That EA was cursory in nature (see 
Chapter 4), and made no significant changes to the trail grooming program. It was not 
until 1997 that Yellowstone’s administrators finally committed to a detailed EIS, and 
only because they were forced to do so by a lawsuit (see Chapter 5).
Why did Anderson fail to do environmental analysis on either action? There is no 
indication in the historical record whatsoever, nor could any of the persons I interviewed 
tell me definitively. An educated guess, based on the way Anderson responded to 
complaints about snowmobiles, is that he may have believed neither action was a major 
federal action, and hence did not require NEPA analysis. Indeed, the implications of
Author’s interviews with Meagher, Nov. 3, 1997; Hape, Nov. 13, 1997; Memin, Nov. 11, 1997; Haraden, Nov. 11, 
1997; Nuss, Nov. 11, 1997; Estey, Nov. 12, 1997; and Danforth, Nov. 20, 1997. Nuss, Hape and Mernin all guessed 
that Anderson held meetings in the surrounding communities of Cody, Jackson, and West Yellowstone, though none 
could say positively that he did, nor what they covered or the formality of them.
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NEPA were anything but obvious until its scope was clarified in a series of landmark 
lawsuits later in the 1970’s. Hence, Anderson probably did not realize that these two 
actions needed to conform with NEPA. Furthermore, bison biologist Mary Meagher 
states that so little information was known about snowmobiles at the time that an EA 
would have been difficult or impossible to do; and besides, Yellowstone’s administrators 
at that time bad their bands full with other ground-breaking actions such as the 
prescribed fire plan and the decision to restrict bears to natural foods.W hatever the 
reason, Anderson did not do an EA or an EIS. However, these reasons cannot 
sufficiently explain bis failure to instigate an EA, as other national parks did do 
Environmental Assessments on snowmobiling in their parks in the 1970’s, as this chapter 
details later.
Executive Order 11644 
Responding to public pressure to control the explosion of off-road vehicles (ORV’s) 
on federal lands in the 1970’s, President Nixon issued an executive order (“EG”) to create 
a unified federal policy for their use in 1972. Entitled “Use of Off-Road Vehicles on the 
Public Lands,” the EG supposedly ensured “that the use of off-road vehicles on public 
lands will be controlled and directed so as to protect the resources of those lands ... and 
to minimize conflicts among the various uses of those lands.” Under this EG, which 
carried the full force of law, agency heads were instructed to issue GRV regulations that
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3, 
1997.
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ensured that ORV trails and areas
shall be located—
(1) to minimize damage to soil, watershed, vegetation, or other resources of the 
public lands.
(2) to minimize harassment of wildlife or significant disruption of wildlife habitats.
(3) to minimize conflicts between off-road vehicle use and other existing or proposed 
recreational uses of the same or neighboring public lands,... taking into account 
noise and other factors.
(4) in areas of the National Park system ... only if the respective agency head 
determines that off-road vehicle use in such locations will not adversely affect 
their natural, aesthetic, or scenic values.^^
In addition to mentioning all of the concerns raised by Anderson’s staff and the 
public, note that the EO also specifically directs agency heads t.; minimize conflicts 
between users and to consider natural, aesthetic, and scenic values within the national 
park system.
Anderson’s response to the executive order was (by this time) predictable. On May 
7, 1974, he published his response in the Federal Register: to designate all of
Yellowstone’s interior routes as official snowmobile routes. He did state, however, that 
“we have been guided by the criteria in sections 3 and 4 of E.O 11644.”^̂
Anderson evidently did not even consider the soil, watershed, vegetation, or wildlife 
concerns of sections 1 and 2 of the EO Anderson’s manner of taking into account the 
noise criteria of section 3 was to recommend that the skiers either wear earplugs or leave 
the snowmobile areas. Finally, regarding the natural, aesthetic, and scenic criteria of
’ Executive Order 11644, February 8,1972, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321. 
’ 39FR 16151, May 7, 1974.
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Section 4 (which are clearly vague and arguable), Anderson felt that the Park and its 
nature, aesthetics, and scenery could not be seen by most people without the use of 
snowmobile in winter, so therefore they did not degrade those resources—they were a 
“necessary evil.” This is evident from the following statement by Anderson: “I think one 
of the things the snowmobile did was to finally let people see what a great experience it is 
to get out in the wintertime and really see the Park.”^̂
Anderson clearly saw things from the snowmobiler’s point of view, choosing to 
ignore what environmental impacts snowmobiles had (and have) because they enabled 
the rider to experience the Park in winter. Moreover, Anderson’s response to the EO 
indicates how powerful one superintendent can be in dictating the policies of a national 
park.
In contrast to Anderson’s policy, when a superintendent set his/her biases aside and 
took the time to listen to the public, the result was sometimes far different. The fate of 
the snowmobile in Glacier National Park in northern Montana is a good illustration of 
this.
Glacier National Park and Snowmobiles 
Glacier National Park is a spectacular mountain paradise in northern Montana. 
Created early in the twentieth century, the Park is to mountains as Yellowstone is to 
geysers. Being the closest large, old park to Yellowstone (older and much larger than
Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff” Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. 1, YNP Research Library, p. 5.
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Grand Teton just to the south of Yellowstone), managers in Glacier and Yellowstone 
look more often to each other for management guidance and comparison than to the 
managers of other parks.
Anderson issued his response :o Nixon’s Executive Order on May 7, 1974. Just over 
one month later, the Acting Regional Director of the NPS sent all superintendents 
within the Rocky Mountain Region (which includes both Yellowstone and Glacier) a 
memorandum suggesting that the Superintendent prepare an environmental assessment 
in order to comply with EO 11644."*̂  It is hard to believe that the Regional Director’s 
timing, just one month after Anderson’s May 7 response in the Federal Register, was mere 
coincidence. Most likely, the Regional Director was tacitly admonishing Yellowstone 
while also instructing other national parks on proper compliance with the EO. Despite 
the memorandum, Yellowstone did not do an EA.
By the winter of 1971, as many as 1,393 persons visited Glacier by snowmobile, but 
their numbers varied widely from year to year, as Table 4 illustrates. Snowmobiles were 
allowed on all the unplowed roads in Glacier at that time, with the exception of the 
Going-to-the-Sun Road from Lake McDonald over Logan Pass to the Jackson-Glacier 
Overlook; a total of 110 miles of roads were open to them.
Acting Regional Director to Superintendents, Rocky Mountain Region, June 21, 1974, IN “Snowmobile EA” Box,
Glacier National Park Archives, Glacier National Park (GNP), MT.
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Table 4. Snowmobile Visitation in Glacier National Park, 1967-74/’
Year Number of snowmobiles
1967 153
1968 307
1969 571
1970 979
1971 1,393
1972 877
1973 502
1974 528
In comparison, during the winter of 1972-73 a total of 877 skiers and snowshoers 
visited Glacier. That number rose to 2,998 two winters later.^°
Once the Acting Regional Director issued his memorandum in 1974, Glacier’s 
administrators, in contrast to Yellowstone’s, adhered to the memorandum, and hence, 
the EO, by performing an Environmental Assessment on snowmobiles in Glacier in 
1974-75. In the EA, Glacier’s administrators discussed many actual and potential 
problems associated with snowmobile use, many echoing the concerns of Yellowstone 
rangers as regarded snowmobiles there:
1) The longest discussion within the EA regards snowmobile impacts upon winter 
wildlife. The assessment’s authors noted that:
A) Wildlife poaching has already occurred in the Park using snowmobiles;
B) Snowmobile disturbances cause wildlife to lose body weight and increase their 
susceptibility to disease;
C) Deer used snowmobile tracks to move from one area to another;
D) Park staff observed elk both maintaining a Vz-mile buffer zone between
Glacier National Park, Environmental Assessment: Proposed Oversnow Vehicle Use at Glacier National Park, Montana., 
1975, “Snowmobile EA” Box, Glacier National Park Archives,- GNP, MT, p. 4.
’°Ibid.
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themselves and snowmobile areas and also running from snowmobiles;
E) Compaction of snow by snowmobiles displaces snow-roosting birds and small 
mammals;
F) Winter stress determines population levels for many, if not most wildlife 
species in Glacier.
1) Snowmobile noise disturbs the aesthetic experience of the snowshoer or skier.
2) Snowmobiles damage both exposed and sub-nivean (below the snow surface) 
vegetation, both through mechanical damage and through the reduction of sub- 
nivean temperatures through snow compaction (which reduces the amount of 
insulating air in the snowpack);
3) Snowmobile air emissions linger on still days and are offensive to skiers, snowshoers, 
and wildlife-,
4) Snowmobile use, while enabling the old, very young, and physically handicapped to 
visit the Park, conflicts with other park users;
5) Snowmobiles, by compacting the snow on the roads, would make spring plowing 
more difficult. Snowmobiles could also damage the road surface in areas where it is 
blown bare;
6) If snowmobile use were to greatly increase, maintenance of the snowmobile trails 
would be necessary to smooth the roller-coaster surface; and
7) The space for solitude and quiet are a valuable resource, and snowmobiles consume 
that space.^^
Once the draft EA was complete. Glacier’s administrators held two public meetings 
in November 1974 to seek public input regarding the EA. The meetings were held in 
West Glacier and Cut Bank, Montana. Eighty-seven people attended the West Glacier 
meeting; their comments generally favored closure.^" Most comments in this meeting 
regarded the effects of snowmobiles on park wildlife, vegetative damage, noise, and 
aesthetics.^^ Over fifty people attended the Cut Bank meeting, and most were generally
Ibid., pp. 9-16.
Nathaniel P. Reed (Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks) to Honorable John Melcher (U.S. House of 
Representatives), March 17,1976 IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
Glacier National Park, Environmental Assessment: Proposed Oversnow Vehicle Use at Glacier National Park, Montana., 
1975, “Snowmobile EA” Box, Glacier National Park Archives, GNP, MT, p. 18.
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in favor of continued snowmobile use/^
Glacier’s administrators then revised the EA to reflect the public input, and opened
the EA for written public comments. During this public comment period, they received
438 letters and 976 names on petitions against snowmobiling, and only 22 letters and 691
names on petitions in favor of snowmobiling.^^ Of the written comments opposing
snowmobiles, 121 mentioned wildlife impacts, 125 mentioned noise concerns, 65
mentioned skier/snowmobile conflicts, 28 mentioned air pollution, 38 mentioned
vegetation damage, and 51 mentioned aesthetics in general.^^
With public opinion seemingly overwhelmingly opposed to snowmobiles in the
Park, Superintendent Phillip Iversen eliminated snowmobiles from Glacier entirely on
October 2, 1975.^  ̂ Glacier’s Wilderness Specialist Robert Morey eloquently states the
main reason for Glacier’s decision:
If one factor was dominate [sic] in determining whether or not snowmobile use 
would be discontinued it involvefd] the identification [of] solitude and peace and 
tranquillity as resourcefs] identified with Glacier National Park during the w inter.... 
A different atmosphere prevails within this precipitous mountain country.... It is 
disruption of this resource that the use of snowmobiles causes that results in them 
[sic] being objectionable. ... Needless to say, snowmachine traffic in the [park’s] 
valleys does become a very dominate [sic] and disturbing factor to those seeking quiet 
and solitude. This was the primary element that swayed the decision in favor of not 
continuing public use of snowmobiles [emphasis added].^*
Nathaniel P. Reed (Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks) to Honorable John Melcher (U.S. House of 
Representatives), March 17, 1976 IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
“Snowmobiling in Glacier National Park,” Briefing Statement, 1985, NPS, GNP, MT.
Glacier National Park, Environmental Assessment: Proposed Oversnow Vehicle Use at Glacier National Park, Montana., 
1975, p. 19, IN “Snowmobile EA” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
“Closure of Snowmobile Routes,” Public Notice, Oct. 2, 1975, IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, 
GNP, MT.
C. Robert Morey (Wilderness Specialist), Talk given to the Montana Snowmobile Association at Lewistown,
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Another iriiportant factor cited by Iversen was that snowmobile use was declining, 
while ski and snowshoe use were rapidly increasing. Because snowmobile use is 
incompatible with skier/snowshoer use, Iversen opted in favor of the more popular ski 
and snowshoe use.^^
This was not the end of the story, though. U.S. Congressman Melcher of Montana, 
responding to snowmobile constituents upset over the closure of the Park to 
snowmobiles, demanded a reconsideration of the NFS’s decision. In his notes. Glacier 
Superintendent Phillip Iversen suggested to the Congressman’s staff that perhaps the 
snowmobile interests were “asleep at the switch,” as they had had their chance for input 
in the earlier public meetings and comment periods during the draft EA process.^° 
Iversen also expressed his concern that the anti-snowmobile public would feel that the 
NPS was indecisive and vacillating on the matter of snowmobiles. Eventually, Melcher 
and Iversen agreed to hold two further public meetings to verify that the Park had 
properly considered all information on the subject.^^
The NPS held the second round of public meetings in Kalispell, Montana, on May 
25, 1976, and in Great Falls, Montana, on May 27, 1976. Superintendent Iversen began
Montana., Feb. 14, 1976, “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
Closure of Snowmobile Routes,” Public Notice, Oct. 2, 1975, IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, 
GNP, MT.
Phillip Iversen, Superintendent’s Notes to the Files, Subject: Snowmobile Ban, March 15, 1976, “Snowmobile 
Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
“Snowmobiling in Glacier National Park,” Briefing Statement, 1985, NPS, GNP, MT.
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the meetings by noting that “in National Parks, prior to the establishment of 
snowmobile routes, the burden of proof is on the Secretary of the Interior to prove no adverse 
effects on natural, aesthetic, or scenic values [of the national parks],” (emphasis added) 
citing section 4 of EO 11644 as his authority for this burden of p r o o f . I n  making this 
assertion, Iversen directly contradicted Anderson’s policy, which was to place the burden 
of proof upon those who brought the complaint against snowmobiles.
At the meetings in Kalispell and Great Falls, Glacier officials handed out 
questionnaires and accepted written comments from citizens expressing their opinions on 
snowmobile use in Glacier. Table 5 summarizes the comments:
Introduction by Superintendent Iversen, Public Meetings on Snowmobiles, May 25, 1976, IN “Snowmobile 
Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
“Iversen Sends Recommendation On Snowmobile Policy to Denver,” Hungry Horse News, (Hungry Horse, MT), 
Aug. 5, 1976.
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Table 5. Summary of comments regarding snowmobile use in Glacier National Park, 
May/June, 1976.̂ "*̂^
In Favor of Snowmobiles 
in Glacier
Opposed to Snowmobiles 
in Glacier
Kalispell Public Meeting 101 94
Great Falls Public Meeting 94 22
Individual Letters 148 337
Received
Group Letters Received 22 12
Names on Petition 2275 2712
Received
TOTAL 2668 3248
Note: Numbers do not add to total numbers on original document from Glacier; no 
explanation is given.
Clearly, those opposed to snowmobiles outnumbered those in favor of snowmobiles
in Glacier. In his briefing statement. Superintendent Iversen stated that
Over 90% of the comments opposed to snowmobile use related that concern to 
silence, tranquillity, or in other words, aesthetics. Because aesthetics are an emotion, a 
feeling, it is impossible to quantify [sic]. However, it is a very valid concern, and the 
National Parks represent, above all other values, an emotion, a feeling, which 
Americans can obtain only in a handful of other natural scenic places.^^
Again, Iversen directly contradicted Anderson by stating that emotions and feelings
are legitimate concerns in national parks. In contrast, while Anderson derided the
emotional feelings of those who complained against his snowmobile policy, he appears to
have based Yellowstone’s pro-snowmobile policy on his own feelings regarding
^  Compiled from “Snowmobiling in Glacier National Park,” Briefing Statement, 1985, NPS, GNP, MT.
“Iversen Sends Recommendation On Snowmobile Policy to Denver,” Hungry Horse News, (Hungry Horse, MT),
Aug. 5,1976.
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snowmobiles.
So, Iversen and his staff “stuck to their guns,” and kept the Park closed to 
snowmobiles. In one final act of public faith, though, they chose to reinforce public 
confidence in their decision-making process by selecting four citizens to review the 
public input and confirm the accuracy of their analysis. They appointed two persons 
representing snowmobile interests: Richard Kullberg, President of the North Montana 
Outdoor Recreational Vehicle Association and Lee Downes, former President of the 
Flathead Snowmobilers. To complement them, they appointed two persons representing 
environmental interests: Tom Horobik, President of the Montana Wilderness
Association and Eugene Albert, representative of the National Parks and Conservation 
Association, Flathead Coalition, and Sierra Club. After reviewing the letters, tapes, 
petitions, and data gathered by the Glacier officials, the group of four confirmed their 
decision and commended them for having done an outstanding job in compiling the data 
in as fair and unbiased a manner as possible.^^
The NPS in Glacier was finally able to publish its notice of closure of all 
snowmobile routes in the Federal Register dated April 28, V ïJ lf  After nearly three 
years of work. Glacier’s administrators returned winter’s peace and tranquillity to their 
park.
Glacier and Yellowstone did communicate somewhat on their disparate policies.
“Snowmobiling in Glacier National Park,” Briefing Statement, 1985, NPS, GNP, MT.
Ibid.
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however futilely. Richard Munro of Glacier wrote Yellowstone on November 25, 1974, 
requesting any studies that the NPS there may have conducted on the effects of 
snowmobiles on their winter wildlife. Munro assumed that Yellowstone administrators 
had done an EA, and requested a copy of that as well.^  ̂ He evidently received no 
response from Yellowstone’s administrators, though—a tacit acknowledgment that they 
had not done an EA or any wildlife studies.
Later, Superintendent Iversen of Glacier discussed by telephone with Assistant 
Superintendent Haraden of Yellowstone the development of a joint statement to clarify 
the disparate policies on snowmobiles of the two parks.^^ No such statement, though, 
was ever issued. Rather, Superintendent Townsley (Haraden’s superior and Anderson’s 
successor) preferred to defer to the NFS’s Rocky Mountain Regional Office for direction 
in reconciling the conflicting snowmobile policies of the two parks. He recognized that 
the management policies, enabling legislation and natural area guidelines for the two 
parks were similar and a better theme reconciling the differences in snowmobile polices 
was neéded.^° The response of the regional office was the ineffective statement that “Each 
park is unique, and the pressures, use patterns, and suitability of such use must be 
considered only in the context of the individual park.”̂ * Or, in other words, the
Richard J. Munro to Superintendent, Yellowstone, Nov. 25, 1974, IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box,. GNP 
Archives, GNP, MT.
Phillip Iversen, “Superintendent’s Notes to the Files, Subject: Snowmobile Ban,” Feb. 4, 1976, IN “Snowmobile 
Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
C. Robert Morey (Wilderness SpeciaUst), Talk given to the Montana Snowmobile Association at Lewistown, 
Montana., Feb. 14, 1976, “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
“Snowmobile Use,” Regional Position Paper, 1976, IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, GNP Archives, GNP, MT.
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disparate policies were acceptable, even though Yellowstone had not performed an EA.
Incidentally, Haraden later became superintendent of Glacier National Park. In my 
interview with him, he stated that he was glad there were no snowmobiles there, but 
echoed the Regional Director in justifying the differences between the two parks’ 
policies. He also stated that when James Watt became the new Secretary of the Interior in 
1981, Montana snowmobile enthusiasts pressured Glacier to overturn its decision. 
Haraden told them that if they had new information to merit that overturn, he would 
consider it. Privately, he expected them to come forth with such, and to advocate 
opening the Park to snowmobiles one weekend per month. However, they never 
recontacted him, so the Park remains closed to snowmobiles.^"
In summary, the NPS in Glacier spent two years in a conscientious, unbiased effort 
to comply with N ixon’s executive order. Public pressure, despite snowmobiler 
complaints to the contrary, was clearly in favor of eliminating snowmachines from the 
Park. In making their decision. Glacier’s administrators directly contradicted 
Yellowstone’s by:
1) placing the burden of proof on Park administrators to prove that snowmobiles would 
not impact the individual Park;
2) holding public hearings, and following the will of the public;
3) valuing the Park’s silence enough to eliminate snowmobiles on that key point;
4) admitting that snowmobiles affected wildlife, pack the snow very hard on the roads 
(making plowing difficult), pollute the air, and create visitor conflicts, and using all of 
these as reasons to eliminate them; and
5) accepting, and promoting, the role of emotions in managing a park.
Bob Haraden (former Assistant Superintendent of Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Bozeman, 
MT, Nov. 11, 1997.
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Yellowstone, by contrast, was dominated by an individual clearly biased in favor of 
snowmobiles and unwilling to listen to the will of the general public, which may have 
been opposed to snowmobiles there as well (though we will never know, since Anderson 
held no formal public hearings at that time^^). The consequences of two park 
superintendents’ actions are fairly clear now that twenty years have passed. Glacier is a 
quiet, peaceful winter retreat from a noisy world while the large numbers of 
snowmobiles entering Yellowstone are accompanied by most of the problems that 
Glacier’s administrators cited in banning snowmobiles from their park.
O ther National Parks and Snowmobiles
At the same time that administrators in Glacier and Yellowstone were determining 
their snowmobile policies, many other national parks in the snowbelt states were 
wrestling with their snowmobile policies as well. Administrators in many other parks 
also eliminated snowmobiles by listening to the public input they received when they did 
environmental analyses or held public hearings. Examples detailed below include 
Yosemite, Sequoia/Kings Canyon, Lassen, Grand Canyon, and Rocky Mountain 
National Parks.
Yosemite National Park in California provides the first comparison to Yellowstone. 
While snowmobiles never were permitted in Yosemite, its administrators responded to 
N ixon’s Executive Order by retaining the prohibition. Shortly thereafter, they held
' None of Anderson’s associates that I interviewed could recall formal public meetings.
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public hearings on the proposed General Management Plan (GMP) for Yosemite. At 
some of those meetings, snowmobile enthusiasts challenged their decision to retain the 
ban on snowmobiles.^^ However, the administrators, after extensive public meetings and 
a thorough public review regarding the GMP, found that over 80% of the comments 
received from the public regarding the GMP were opposed to snowmobile use in the 
Park.^^ The Sierra Snowmobiling Club challenged Yosemite’s decision in court the next 
year,^^ but lost in U.S. District Court on November 25, 1975.^  ̂ Snowmobiles are still 
prohibited from the Park, which is used heavily by cross-country skiers.
To the south of Yosemite, Sequoia/Kings Canyon National Parks (managed as one 
park) proposed at some time in the mid-1970’s to open ten miles of the Mineral King area 
for snowmobiling. “This proposal went to public meetings for review and the consensus 
of the public was against establishing the routes by about two to one.” *̂ Consequently, 
the parks’ administrators retained the ban on snowmobiles in these two southern Sierra 
parks. Again, snowmobiling is still prohibited within these two southern Sierra parks.
To the north of Yosemite, administrators at Lassen Volcanic National Park made a 
similar decision in 1974. In 1981, snowmobile advocates made a strong push to overturn
John Good (former Assistant Superintendent of Yosemite), interview by author, telephone interview. Mammoth, 
WY, Nov. 13,1997.
“Demonstration Urges Reopening Parks to Snowmobiles,” National Parks 55(6): 23-24, June, 1981.
“Court Decision Expected In Yosemite Snowmobile Case,” The Fresno Bee, Fresno, CA, Nov. 9,1975.
’’ “Acreages—Snowmobile Area,” Snowmobile Briefing Book, Vol. I, unpublished black binder at YNP Research 
Library, YNP, WY, circa 1978.
Ibid.
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the decisions against snowmobiles in all four California national parks (as Chapter 3 
details, this was probably part of an effort by Interior Secretary James Watt to open 
other national parks to snowmobiles). The effort focused on Lassen, probably because it 
is not as well known as its cohorts to the south. So, Lassen’s administrators performed an 
EA on snowmobile use in Lassen in 1981. Additionally, they opened up a 19-mile stretch 
of the Park roads for the first week of each winter month from January to March, 1982- 
84, in order to evaluate the environmental and sociological impacts of establishing 
snowmobile routes in areas already heavily used by cross country skiers. Skiers 
outnumbered snowmobilers during the first winter by an 8-to-l ratio (667 to 84); a 12-to- 
1 ratio (744 to 62) the second winter; and an 82-to-l ratio (575 to 7) the last winter. 
Written comments opposed to snowmobiling in the park outnumbered those in favor of 
it by a 7-to-l ratio (2,810 to 391).^  ̂Needless to say, in 1985, the NPS upheld its ban on 
snowmobiles in Lassen.^°
Grand Canyon National Park saw a limited amount of snowmobiling on its north 
rim, and eliminated such use in 1974 based on Executive Order 11644.*  ̂ Whether its 
administrators held any public hearings or did an EA is unclear.
Finally, administrators at Rocky Mountain National Park also did an EA in
Acting Regional Director, Western Region, to Director, National Park Service, Sept. 13, 1985, IN Lassen National 
Park files. Mineral, CA.
“Finding of N o Significant Impact, Snowmobile Use, Lassen Volcanic National Park,” Sept. 30, 1985, IN Lassen 
National Park files, Mineral, CA.
Acting Regional Director, Western Region, to Director, National Park Service, Sept. 13, 1985, IN Lassen National 
Park files. Mineral, CA.
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response to the EO on snowmobiling, but concluded in the EA that snowmobiling on
the west side of the Park would continue to be acceptable.*^ Extensive snowmobiling has
developed in the last seven years, with the Park receiving around 24,000 snowmobiles per
season on the west side in the last four winter seasons.*  ̂No snowmobiling was, or is still,
allowed on the east side of the Park, which is much more accessible from the populous
Denver/Front Range area. The park’s administrators, like those of Glacier, again did an
EA, even though they did allow snowmobiles.
So, administrators in at least four other national parks adhered to the EO by
performing Environmental Assessments and/or holding public hearings on the topic of
snowmobiles in their parks, and adhering to the will of the public. These administrators,
then, and probably those in other national parks, adhered to the law as best they could.
Anderson expressed his opinion of these park superintendents who, in some cases,
went to extraordinary lengths to discern the public opinion and the impact of
snowmobiles on their parks (whatever the result), in the following:
I’m a little upset with some of my fellow superintendents. I sometimes think they are 
getting lazy when they want to ban snowmobiles simply because they are motor- 
powered vehicles. ...[TJhey just don’t want to get involved because it sets up a debate 
and ... creates work for land managers. He’d [sic] much prefer to sit back and rest in 
the traditionally quiet parts of the year.*'*
Roger Center (Superintendent ef Reeky Mountain National Park) to Honorable William S. Moorhead (U.S. House 
of Representatives), Feb. 19,1976, IN “Snowmobile Comments” Box, Glacier National Park Archives, GNP, WY.
Jim Richardson (West District Ranger), interview by author, telephone interview. Rocky Mountain National Park, 
CO, Oct. 31, 1997.
Jack Anderson, “Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Crandall,” interview by Derrick Crandall, 
April 1, 1977 IN “Current Stuff’ Section, Snowmobile Briefing Book Vol. I, YNP Research Library, pp. 5-7.
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W ho’s lazy here: the superintendents who held public meetings and performed 
environmental analyses, or the one that instead thrust his personal opinion on the Park 
without the meetings or analyses?
That is the extent to which Anderson considered the policies of other national parks 
toward snowmobiles. While he willingly sent other national parks, if they inquired, 
information about his snowmobile program,*^ there is no evidence that he ever consulted 
other national park managers regarding their views about and policies governing 
snowmobiles in the national parks.
It should be noted that Yellowstone today is not the only national park to allow 
significant numbers of snowmobiles. Table 6 lists the four parks with the highest 
numbers of visiting snowmobiles:
Three examples are Voyageurs National Park in Miimesota, (Alan Mebane to Project Manager, Voyageurs, Nov. 8, 
1974, IN Box L-36, File L30: “Land & River Use General”); Lassen Volcanic National Park in Cdifornia (Harold 
Estey to Superintendent, Lassen, Nov. 29, 1967, IN Box A-32, File A88: “Oversnow Vehicle Travel”); and Grand 
Canyon National Park in Arizona (Robert E. Sellers to Chief Park Ranger, Grand Canyon, Dec. 2, 1969, IN Box L- 
42, File L3427: “Recreation Activities 1969—Winter Sports (Oversnow Vehicle Use)”), ALL at YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY. There are at least three other national parks that Yellowstone administrators also sent information on their 
snowmobile program to.
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Table 6. The four national parks with highest numbers of snowmobile visitors.
National Park, State_________ Maximum # of Snowmobiles per winter
Yellowstone 91,000
Voyageurs, Minnesota 30,000*^
Rocky Mountain, Colorado 24,000
Grand Teton, Wyoming_____________________4,750^^______________
Note that Yellowstone allows as many as 32,000 more snowmobiles than the other 
three parks do, combined. In my survey of all U.S. national parks regarding snowmobile 
use, I found no other national parks that allow more than 500 snowmobiles per winter.** 
With such a large difference, it is safe to say that Yellowstone allows more snowmobiles 
than all other national parks combined. This incredibly high level of snowmobile use 
makes one wonder if Yellowstone ever gave any serious consideration to the potential 
for such visitation to reach this level of use.
Exploding Use & Projections of the Future 
With the advent of the private snowmobile and an administration willing to do 
almost anything to encourage its use in Yellowstone, snowmobile use of the Park 
boomed during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Table 7 illustrates the increase in
’ Personal communication with Barbara J. West, Jan. 17, 1997, Voyageurs National Park, MN. In a promotional 
brochure West enclosed with her letter to me, Voyageurs is advertised as the “undiscovered Yellowstone.”
 ̂Personal communication with Jack Neckels, Superintendent, Nov. 4,1997, Grand Teton National Park, WY.
* I conducted the survey in January, 1997, and received responses from the following national parks: North Cascades,
Olympic, Mt. Rainier, Crater Lake, Lassen, Yosemite, Sequoia/Kings Canyon, Zion, Bryce Canyon, Grand Canyon, 
Great Basin, Grand Teton, Glacier, Rocky Mountain, Denali, and Voyageurs.
visitation during this time period.
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Table 7. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1967-73^^
Year Visitation type Concess­
ioner
Snow-
coaches
Private
Machines
Total for 
Season
Percent
Increase
over
Previous
Year
1966-67 Machines 349 1,544 1,893 n/a
People 3,045 2,173 5,218 96.0%
1967-68 Machines 748 2,352 3,100 63.8%
People 4,359 3,425 7,784 49.2%
1968-69 Machines 728 4,726 5,454 75.9%
People 4,249 6,076 10,325 32.6%
1969-70 Machines 504 8,206 8,710 59.7%
People 4,238 10,978 15,216 47.4%
1970-71 Machines 625 11,614 12,239 40.5%
People 5,241 14,188 19,429 27.7%
1971-72 Machines 679 17,436 18,115 48.0%
People 5,529 20,271 25,800 32.8%
1972-73 Machines 602 26,826 27,428 51.4%
People 3,846 31,771 35,620 38.1% '
1973-74 Machines 698 30,513 31,211 13.8%
People 4,425 35,655 40,080 12.5%
1974-75 Machines 776 26,400 27,.176 -12.9%
People 5,537 30,763 36,300 -9.4%
It is possible to make several observations based on Table 7. Most obvious is the 
tremendous increase in both numbers of snowmachines and visitors during this time 
period, until the last year, when visitation dropped, probably due to the national energy
Summary Record of Snowmobile Use, Yellowstone National Park, 1966 through April, 1978, IN Box K-57, File
“Winter Activities,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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crisis in 1973-75. However, while the number of snowcoaches entering Yellowstone 
increased by “only” 222% over the six-year period, the number of snowmobiles entering 
Yellowstone multiplied by a factor of 19.8 o r a 1,976% increase (based on the difference 
between 1966-67 and the peak year of 1973-74). Note also that the increase in numbers of 
snowmobiles from 1971-73 was more than that of all the previous years combined—an 
increase largely facilitated by the decision of Yellowstone’s administrators to regularly 
groom their roads in 1971. In summary, visitor use of the Park in winter exploded 
during this time period, largely because private snowmobiles became available and 
because the park’s administrators began to groom the roads for the comfort of the 
visitor.
Yellowstone’s administrators paid careful attention to the growth in visitation, as 
Ranger James Fox said succinctly: “The key word in snowmobile use within the Park ... 
is g r o w t h . C h i e f  Park Ranger Harold Estey was more elaborate, but still clear, in 
stating “the interest, participation, and activities associated with snowmobiling continue 
to rapidly grow, and this tremendous growth continues to amaze nearly all persons ...one 
thing seems to be certain and that is the number of persons engaged in snowmobiling 
will continue to double each year for at least the next two years.”^̂  As Table 7 shows, 
Estey was not too far from the mark.
Jiimes E. Fox to West District Ranger, May 3, 1970, IN Box A-36, File L34: “Recreation Activities 1970,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
Chief Park Ranger Harold Estey to Superintendent, June 2, 1969, IN Box A-32, File A88: “Oversnow Vehicle
Travel,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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In response to the growth in visitation, Park administrators seemed to again feel 
helpless, evidenced by the comment in the Staff Meeting Minutes for November 23, 
1971: “We are unable to do much to counter these increased uses.” ‘̂ While they could 
not do much about events and trends outside of the Park, they did, and do, have 
exclusive control over the Park. Further, they did help facilitate this increase by 
beginning the grooming program. In fact, Anderson himself said it best, “The increase in 
use just came automatically almost simply because we had started grooming.”^̂  While 
they may have felt helpless to counter the galloping increases, they nevertheless did their 
part in facilitating them.
Yellowstone’s administrators, however, were only selectively helpless, as they did 
counter increased uses in other management areas. For example, to control exploding use 
of the Park’s backcountry, administrators restricted backcountry overnight use to about 
300 campsites per night in the same time period. Perhaps administrators felt helpless 
because their boss Anderson looked forward to snowmobiling to increase in the Park.^^ 
And perhaps Anderson’s enthusiasm for the machines explains the lack of long-range 
planning for the snowmobile program at this time. In fact, it was not until 1990 that park 
administrators began to do some long-range planning on their snowmobile program (see
Staff Meeting Minutes for Nov. 23, 1971, IN Box A-37, File A40: “Conferences & Meetings 1971,” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY.
”  Jack Anderson, “Interview with Jack Anderson, former Park Superintendent,” interview by Robert Haraden and 
Alan Mebane, June 12,1975, IN Drawer 3, Tape 75-3, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
Dale Nuss (former Park Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview. Bridger Canyon, MT, Nov. 
11, 1997.
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chapter 4).
Chapter Conclusion
Jack Anderson served as Yellowstone’s superintendent from 1967 to 1975. Once he 
formalized and instituted the snowmobile program, he adopted that as his personal 
mission. His zeal for the program blinded him to the environmental consequences of his 
actions, leading him to pass off t ’le concerns of his staff regarding the noise, wildlife and 
vegetation impacts, and air pollution of snowmobiles as baseless and emotional. 
Likewise, he neglected to perform any environmental analysis on his decision to groom 
the roads and open the Snowlodge, and did not respond to Nixon’s Executive Order as 
he should have. Finally, Anderson showed a careless disregard for the sincere concerns 
and actions of his fellow park superintendents.
Had Anderson taken the time to examine the concerns his employees raised and/or 
the actions of his fellow superintendents, he might have realized the environmental 
problems that existed at the time and/or grew to be very serious by the 1990’s. 
Moreover, an EA or EIS on his actions might have more clearly demonstrated the 
potential for growth that snowmobiling in Yellowstone had—and the increased problems 
resulting from that increased growth. Had he listened to the concerns of his employees 
and visitors, he might have realized how far out of line he was already, and how 
destructive his policies would prove themselves to be.
But as regards snowmobiles in Yellowstone, Anderson did no environmental
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review, did not listen to his staff or hold public hearings, and paid no attention to his 
fellow superintendents. He did open the Park, began grooming the trails, opened the 
Snowlodge, and publicized his new policy, because he “liked snowmobiling 
personally. For his efforts, the International Snowmobile Industry Association (ISIA) 
awarded him their First International Award of Merit in 1973, recognizing his 
“enlightened leadership and sincere dedication to the improvement and advancement of 
snowmobiling in the United States.”^̂  It is questionable whether his leadership as regards 
snowmobiles was “enlightened,” but otherwise, the ISIA could not have said it better.
In this way, one man started the world’s first, most respected national park on its 
way to allowing more snowmobiles than all other national parks combined. While his 
succeeding superintendent, John Townsley, would encourage snowmobiling in 
Yellowstone as well, recent park administrators have, for the most part, been left to deal 
with the problems of snowmobiling that Anderson would have discovered had he cared 
to do so. Anderson had numerous opportunities to evaluate his new policy, yet 
consistently failed to do so.
Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturalist, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Belgrade, MT, May 
29, 1997.; and author’s personal interviews Meagher, Nov, 3, 1997, Nuss, Nov. 11,1997, and Memin, Nov. 11,1997.
^ Michael Frome, Regreening the National Parks (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 197-98. The quote is 
taken directly from the award, which a park ranger recently rediscovered in a dusty closet at Mammoth Hot Springs, 
Yellowstone.
CH APTER 3; EX PANDING THE SNOWMOBILE POLICY: 1972-83
Our present [snowmobile] philosophy ts ... a non-working monster that is 
virtually unworkable without a great deal more money and manpower. The 
snowmobiling is snowballing faster than we can plan or fund for it.
Richard (Terry) Danforth, 1974/
Anderson’s successor, John Townsley, adopted the promotion of winter in 
Yellowstone with almost as much zeal as Anderson. From 1972-83, he (and Anderson) 
further developed Yellowstone’s new snowmobile policy in a serious of actions. By 1977, 
they had expanded the road-grooming program to cover all interior park roads and to 
mollify all local interests. The increasing traffic on the roads made warming huts and an 
information program necessary. Increasing traffic also led to expansion of the number of 
rooms offered for overnight accommodation at the Snowlodge, as well as the reopening 
of the Mammoth H ot Springs Hotel in 1982. The park’s winter program had become so 
popular that, by 1981, they and surrounding constituents were able to defend the winter 
program successfully from possible shutdown by Interior Secretary James Watt in 1981- 
82.
' Richard T. Danforth (West Yellowstone Sub-district Ranger) to Superintendent, Aug. 12, 1974, IN Box N-115, File 
L3427: “Winter Sports Oversnow Vehicle Use,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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John Townsley’s Snowmobile Policy Affirmation 
Jack Anderson retired from the Superintendency of Yellowstone in June, 1975 and 
died in Ashland, Oregon, in 1985 of a heart attack/ Replacing him in August, 1975 was 
John Townsley. Townsley was the son of a ranger in Yosemite National Park, and spent 
his career working his way up through the NPS. He transferred to Yellowstone from the 
National Capital Parks in Washington, D.C.^
Gary Everhardt, assistant superintendent under Anderson, had, by this time, been 
promoted to the Director of the National Park Service in Washington,, D C. Everhardt, 
fondly supporting Yellowstone’s snowmobile policy, directed Townsley to continue 
expanding the Park’s snowmobile program. Townsley internalized Everhardt’s directive 
as a personal conviction, believing that all people should see Yellowstone in winter.'^ In 
fact, by 1977, Townsley’s efforts to promote the snowmobile use of Yellowstone earned 
him the distinction of serving on a special task force of the NPS to develop a service-wide 
policy on public use of snowmobiles in national parks.^ The task force essentially
 ̂ “Former Yellowstone Superintendent Anderson Dies,” NPS Press Release dated Nov. 5, 1985, IN Box W-171, File 
K34: “Press Releases,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂“Yellowstone Park chief dies of cancer,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Sept. 21,1982.
 ̂ Author’s interviews with Halladay, May 29,1997., Meagher, Nov. 3,1997 and Memin, Nov. 11,1997.
* 1977 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, p. 37. The task force 
most likely convened in response to President Carter’s Executive Order 11989, which strengthened Executive Order 
11644, regulating the use of Off-Road Vehicles (ORV’s) on public lands. Widespread fear-mongering in the 
snowmobile industry before Carter issued his EO led many to believe he would eliminate snowmobiles from pubhc 
lands altogether. In response, the International Snowmobile Industry Association wrote him and organized a 
campaign to distinguish snowmobiles from other ORV’s, based on the fact that snowmobiles contacted snow, not 
ground, and therefore, to go easy on the snowmobiles (“Total ban on off-road vehicles not intended,” Billings Gazette, 
March 29, 1977). Carter’s EO, though, did not flatly eliminate them, and has been interpreted by the courts as 
lacking regulatory teeth (Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F. 2d 1276).
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affirmed what Yellowstone administrators already believed—that the snowmobile was as 
appropriate to national parks in winter as the automobile was in summer. Townsley 
himself said it best: “I see the snowmobile in Yellowstone as a way of traveling within 
the Park to see, to enjoy, to understand, and to appreciate, the extraordinary animal and 
thermal resources that are here[. This] is the essence of my feeling about snowmobiling in 
Yellowstone.”  ̂ This policy became the official position of the National Park Service in 
Yellowstone towards snowmobile use there.^
Like Anderson, Townsley too promoted the winter experience in Yellowstone. He 
advertised his snowmobile program by regularly offering and giving tours of the Park in 
winter via snowmobile to local, regional and national politicians.^ Such tours included 
the Montana congressional delegation to the U.S. Senate and House, the Senate and 
House budget committees, and the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Interior.^
While he promoted the snowmobile experience, Townsley did have the sense to 
deny a person permission to “jump a snowmobile over the geyser [Old Faithful] while it 
is emitting water and steam.” In more revealing instances of what Townsley and his
 ̂ John Townsley to Rosemary Johnston, Feb. 18, 1977, IN Box A-189, File A40: “Conferences & Meetings—1977 
General,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂ “The Oversnow Vehicle in Yellowstone National Park,” talk presented by John Townsley at the Montana 
Snowmobile Association Annual Meeting in Fairmont Hot Springs, Feb. 5, 1977. The same text is included as the 
“Position Statement” in Snowmobile Briefing Book Volume 1, black binder at the YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
* Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturahst, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Belgrade, MT, May 
29, 1997.
’ Secretary (of the Interior—James Watt) to John Townsley, Dec. 31, 1981, AND Under Secretary to John Townsley, 
Jan. 11,1982, IN Box A-1: Correspondence to and from John Townsley, YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Jerry R. Phillips (Acting Chief Park Ranger) to William M. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Attorney at Law), Jan. 24, 1977, IN Box 
W-129, File W46; “General Regulations 75, 76 , 77 ,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
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staff deemed to be appropriate in Yellowstone, they denied permission to parties wishing 
to take dog teams into the Park in winter." Clearly, motorized vehicles were the 
preferred means of travel within Yellowstone in winter, as long as they were not used for 
Evil Knieval-type stunts.
In 1975, snowmobile advocates sought greater access to the Park by advocating that 
the Park’s administrators lower the minimum age for snowmobile operation from 
sixteen years of age to twelve, or even eight, years. The park responded that “we are 
convinced that some modification of our existing regulation could be made that would 
enable responsible parents to provide the degree of supervision and direct control of their 
youngsters necessary for them to safely operate an oversnow vehicle within 
Yellowstone.”"  Attentive to the needs of the snowmobilers they welcomed, Yellowstone 
administrators had, by the end of that year, changed their regulations to allow 12-to-16- 
year-olds to operate snowmobiles in Yellowstone when under the direct supervision of a 
parent or guardian 21 years of age or older and always within 50 yards of the parent or 
guardian." With the exploding snowmobile numbers of the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
Yellowstone’s administrators would revoke this rule for safety reasons and as a small 
means of controlling the numbers of entering snowmobiles in the 1990’s.
** Robert E. Sellers (Acting Chief Park Ranger) to Randy Camper, Nov. 7, 1975, AND Harold J. Estey (Chief Park 
Ranger), to Cameron A. Daggett, March 4, 1976, IN Box W-129, File W46: “General Regulations 75, 76, 77 ,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
Robert E. Sellers (Acting Chief Park Ranger) to W. C. Shields (British Columbia Snow Vehicle Association), May 30, 
1975, IN  Box W-129, File W42: “Special Regulations 1973-75,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
1975 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY.
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By adopting Yellowstone’s snowmobile program as his personal passion and 
promoting it as he did, Townsley further cemented the Park’s novel program into place. 
While actions such as giving tours to persons of power and reducing the legal 
snowmobile driving age exemplified Townsley’s commitment, he took several larger 
actions that intensified snowmobile use from 1975 to 1982.
Expanding the W inter Involvement of the National Park Service in Yellowstone
As discussed earlier, Yellowstone administrators began the road grooming program 
in 1971 by grooming only the more heavily-traveled roads on the west side of the Park. 
Because fewer snowmobilers traveled the roads on the east side of the Park—from 
Canyon to Lake and on to West Thumb—administrators did not groom these roads as 
regularly. By 1973, however, they were grooming all roads on an as-needed basis.
The East Entrance route over 8,500-foot Sylvan Pass, however, presented a unique 
set of hazards. While the pass is not the highest road in the Park (Dunraven Pass is 300 
feet higher), it does have an area of steep, rocky, avalanche-prone slopes right at the pass. 
Avalanches occur so regularly that trees are unable to grow on the slopes. Despite its 
obvious hazards, though, commercial representatives in Cody, the nearest community to 
the East Entrance, were by 1971 urging the YPCo. to provide the East Entrance with 
regularly-scheduled snowcoach service similar to what the other entrances had, and by
Linda Pagaiielli, “The Historical Development of Winter Visitor Use at Yellowstone National Park,” 1980, YNP
Research Library Vertical Files, YNP, WY, p. 20. Note that Paganelli does not provide a source for this claim, and I
could not find a source to confirm her daim. Consequently, it should be used with some caution.
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implication, that the Park’s maintenance department put more work into maintaining 
the East Entrance route to make such a service possible/^ Park officials responded that 
keeping the road open would involve a great deal of planning, money and staffing/^ By 
1976, though, they were maintaining it on an as-needed basis, which mainly meant 
dislodging new snowfall with a 105 mm. gun, and then spending up to three days 
clearing the triggered avalanche and grooming the road. With such a schedule, and with 
the severe storms that happen periodically in winter, the road could be closed altogether 
for several days.^^ Further, between such storms the road was probably not groomed at 
all, due to its low level of use.
This casual method of grooming evidently was not satisfactory to the merchants of 
Cody, since they complained that the frequent closings meant it was impossible to plan 
an outing in Yellowstone more than one or two days in advance, making any business 
ventures dependent upon a road that was regularly open difficult or impossible to 
develop. Since the other entrances were all maintained regularly (the others have much 
less avalanche danger), the merchants in West Yellowstone, Montana, and Jackson, 
Wyoming had an “unfair advantage.” Hence, the Cody Country Snowmobile 
Association called upon the Park to maintain the East Entrance on the same regular
Henry J. Dais (Manager, Cody Country Chamber of Commerce) to John Amerman (General Manager, YPCo.), 
March 19, 1971, IN Box L-36, File L3427: “Recreation Activities, Winter Sports,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
John D. Amerman to Henry J. Dais, April 7, 1971, IN Box L-36, File L3427: “Recreation Activities, Winter Sports,” 
YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Jim Miller, “Are there snowmobiles in Cody’s economic future?,” Cody Enterprise, Cody, WY, Feb. 4,1976.
110
schedule that the other gates were maintained/^
The pressure worked, since the Park administrators soon purchased a new Thiokol- 
type grooming machine and stationed it at the East Entrance for the 1976-77 winter 
season. Additionally, they replaced the 105 mm. gun with a new 75 mm. snow-gun for 
shooting and dislodging avalanches at Sylvan Pass. The new, smaller gun’s shells cost 
only 5% of what the larger gun’s shells did, and were almost entirely biodegradable.^^ 
Hence, with a less expensive gun to use, and a grooming machine stationed at the gate. 
Park administrators began regular grooming of the East Entrance road, mollifying the 
commercial interests in Cody and further facilitating snowmobile visitation.
In addition to expanding the grooming program in the above manner, Townsley 
also expanded it by making it more efficient. He accomplished this by moving the four 
grooming machines stationed at Mammoth to the interior of the Park, where they could 
be used more efficiently, not spending as much time “deadheading” (traveling directly to 
a location in the park without grooming enroute) as they had before. Additionally, he 
moved the East Entrance machine to Lake (a year or two after it was stationed at the East 
Gate), where it could be used to regularly groom the Lake-area roads as well as the East 
Entrance.^® Eventually, the machines were located at the following places: two machines 
at Madison to serve the heavily traveled West Yellowstone to Old Faithful route; one at
Ibid.
Jim Miller, “Park buys equipment: Sylvan stays open for snowmobiles,” Cody Enterprise, Cody, WY, Sept. 29,1976. 
Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturalist, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Belgrade, MT, May
29, 1997.
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Mammoth to groom the road from there to Canyon; one at Lake to groom the roads in 
that area; and the last at Grant Village to groom the roads in the southern part of the 
Park/^ In addition to relocating the grooming machines, Townsley also improved the 
efficiency of the grooming program by altering the grooming schedule. By directing his 
staff to groom in the evening, they could use the falling evening temperatures to produce 
more durable snow roads, since the snow hardens, or “sets” as the temperature falls. 
Previously they had groomed by day, when the snow is softer, which produced a snow 
road more easily disturbed by snowmobilers.^'
With increased numbers of winter visitors, Yellowstone’s administrators found that 
they needed to provide for the physical needs of those visitors. Hence, in the winter of 
1976-77, the administrators installed warming huts at Canyon and at Madison. Warming 
huts were buildings that served as “welcome relief to the cold snowmobilers and cross­
country skiers,” as they contained wood stoves and, within a few years, fast food 
service.^^ Because the warming hut at Madison was initially a three-sided shelter open to 
the elements on the fourth side, the administrators replaced it in 1982 with a 12 X 60 
foot trailer similar to the one at Canyon. This trailer had a hot food-vending service 
included at one end.^^ These two warming huts are still in place today, and are
Lynn H. Thompson (Regional Director of the NPS) to Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey (U.S. Senator), April 8,
1976 (Draft), IN Box D-78, File D30: “Roads & Trails," YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturalist, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Belgrade, MT, May 
29, 1997.
1977 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, pp. 11 and 
16.
1983 Annual Report o f the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 13.
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complemented by additional warming huts at West Thumb Geyser Basin, Fishing 
Bridge, Old Faithful, Indian Creek, and Mammoth Hot Springs/Upper Terraces (these 
others lack food services).
Administrators also found that they needed to provide information to the expanding 
group of winter visitors. By 1971 (probably occasioned by the opening of the 
Snowlodge), the administrators had opened the visitor center at Old Faithful to assist 
those visiting that area with their questions."^ Furthermore, administrators found their 
new warming huts to be natural places to disseminate information. Hence, beginning in 
the first winter of the warming hut existence, the Division of Interpretation of the NPS 
stationed naturalists at the Canyon and Madison warming huts to talk to the 
snowmobilers and disperse information. This information program is still offered today, 
although the staffing levels have fluctuated, and the program has occasionally expanded 
to include the Fishing Bridge and West Thumb warming huts. Finally, Yellowstone’s 
administrators staffed an information center in West Yellowstone from 1977 to 1981 to 
provide information to winter visitors before they headed into the Park.^^ This 
information center was resurrected in 1995, albeit in a different building and on a year- 
round basis.
Yellowstone’s administrators instituted this winter information program, like much
Joe Halladay (former Ranger Naturalist, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview, Belgrade, MT, May 
29, 1997. Note that park administrators opened the new visitor center at Old Faithful for winter service before they 
formally dedicated it in summer, 1972.
1977Annual Report o f the Superintendenty Yellowstone National Parky pp. 11 and 16.
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of their winter operation, at the cost of their summer program. While Congress has 
occasionally allocated additional funds expressly for Yellowstone’s winter program, the 
administrators have more often “had to cut into [their] summer operation” to make the 
winter program possible.^^
Townsley, then, further cemented Yellowstone’s snowmobile program into place by 
expanding the grooming program and its efficiency, and by providing the warming hixts 
and visitor information services, sometimes to the detriment of the summer program. He 
further expanded Yellowstone’s winter operation by expanding the concessionaire’s 
involvement.
Expanding Concessionaire Involvement 
Along with expanding the involvement of the NPS in the winter operation, 
Townsley also directed the YPCo. to expand their involvement by enlarging the Old 
Faithful Snowlodge and by reopening the Mammoth Hot Springs Hotel.
When the Snowlodge first opened for winter visitation, the only rooms available 
were rooms that doubled as employee dorm rooms. The rooms were very simple and 
lacked private baths, making it necessary for the guest to walk down the hall to use 
communal showers and toilets. While these rooms, no matter how simple, were better 
than sleeping on the public restroom floor as people had been doing, the company must 
have felt the demand for rooms with a private bath. Accordingly, in 1973, the company
’ Annual Report o f the Superintendent, 1978, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 13.
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winterized twenty cabins with private bathrooms behind the Snowlodge and opened 
them for use in the 1973-74 winter season/^
Six years later the company again expanded its operation at Old Faithful Snowlodge. 
In the winter of 1979-80, TWA Services, which took over the main park concession from 
YPCo. in 1979, opened the Obsidian Employee Dorm as “Snowshoe Lodge,” 
immediately behind the Snowlodge. Snowshoe Lodge had rooms with bath, and was 
partly inhabited by employees during the first few years of its operation.^^ With the 
opening of Snowshoe Lodge and the cabins, the company now had approximately 100 
rooms for rent per night. The current Snowlodge is still the same size.
The commitment begun by Anderson and expanded by Townsley continues today 
with the Snowlodge and its 20 cabins and Snowshoe Lodge. AmPac Parks & Resorts, the 
current park concessionaire (since 1979, the main park concessionaire has traded hands 
four times; AmPac is the most recent owner of that concessionaire) is, however, 
currently constructing a new Snowlodge to replace the existing one. After 25 years of 
operating a building that was never intended for its existing use, and was architecturally 
out of place in the Old Faithful historic district, the company is constructing the new 
Snowlodge, per NPS directive, at the cost of about $8 million. The new building will be 
completely winterized, and will complement the other largely wooden buildings at Old
1973 Annual Report o f the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, p. 2; AND “Snowtime 
in Yellowstone and Yellowstone Country, Winter Season 1973-74,” brochure advertising the winter season, AmFac 
Parks & Resorts Executive Offices, YNP, WY.
Personal communication with Jean McCreight, Executive Secretary for AmFac Parks & Resorts, Nov. 3, 1997, 
Mammoth Hot Springs, WY.
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Faithful.
Efforts to provide accommodations for winter visitors did not stop at Old Faithful, 
however. In 1982, Townsley directed that TWA Services reopen the Mammoth Hot 
Springs Hotel for winter use due to the increased popularity of winter activities, despite 
the company’s reluctance to do so based on its unsuccessful record in the 1960’s. °̂ The 
hotel opened with guest rooms in Aspen Lodge (another summer employee dorm) and 
the hotel itself, as well as the dining room. The hotel offered snowcoach tours, 
snowmobile rentals, cross-country ski rentals, and sleigh rides.^  ̂ The company dropped 
the sleigh rides a few years later when the horses pulling the sleigh escaped control and 
crashed into a parked Porsche, “totaling” it.^‘ The Mammoth Hotel, unlike the 
Snowlodge, and reminiscent of its 1960’s performance, was not an instant success, 
attesting to the validity of the concessionaire’s reluctance. However, by its third season 
in the 19S0’s, the hotel managed to become marginally profitable.^^ AmFac Parks and 
Resorts continues to operate the hotel and its snowcoach, snowmobile, and skier services 
today, even though it continues to be only marginally profitable (at best).
According to Mary Meagher, “Townsley wouldn’t have been about to do an EA” on
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3, 
1997.
1982 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, pp. 6-7.
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3, 
1997.
Ibid., A N D  1984 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY,
p. 6.
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the environmental effects of opening the Mammoth Hot Springs Hotel, because, by the 
time he and TWA Services decided to open it, Townsley was ill with cancer, making it 
difficult to get ideas through to him/^ Confirming Meagher, I can find no record of any 
environmental analysis done on the effects of opening the Mammoth Hotel.
By expanding the Snowlodge and opening the Mammoth Hotel, Yellowstone’s 
administrators and Park concessionaire directors became ever more committed to the 
winter program. Townsley’s efforts to expand the winter program “paid off” through 
increased visitation during most of this time period. By 1981, the program was so 
popular that over 100,000 people were visiting the Park in the winter (see Table 8)— 
popular enough, in fact, to stave off a major threat to it from the new Secretary of the 
Interior.
Playland Threatened by Watt 
Table 8 illustrates the growing visitation during the 1974-83 period.
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3,
1997.
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Table 8. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1974-83.^^
Winter (Dec. 1-March 31) Total Number of Visitors
1974-75 69,729
1975-76 63,807
1976-77 56,432
1977-78 93,548
1978-79 93,649
1979-80 111,926
1980-81 94,413
1981-82 104,915
1982-83 71,563
Note: Total numbers of visitors are greatly increased over previous years because these 
numbers include automobile passengers touring the road from Mammoth to Cooke 
City, while Tables 2, 3, and 7 include only visitors entering via snowmachine.
Clearly, the program initiated by Anderson and affirmed by Townsley was “bearing 
fruit,” as thousands of Americans began to visit and spend money in and around 
Yellowstone during its once-closed period.
In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States. Pursuing an 
agenda that favored big business over environmental protection, Reagan appointed his 
friend James Watt to the position of Secretary of the Interior. Once he assumed his 
position. Watt did his best to gut the funding and protections of the national park 
system. He sliced Yellowstone’s budget, and proposed closing the Park in winter, as a 
means of saving money
The public revolted against Watt’s idea by writing numerous letters to Yellowstone
Source is "Seasonal Visitation Statistics,” flyer available from the Visitor Services Office, NFS, YNP, 'K'Y.
Pat Williams (former U.S. Representative of Montana), interview by author, personal interview, Missoula, MT, April
22,1997.
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administrators urging them to keep the Park open in winter. Administrators received at 
least eighty letters from individuals, ten letters from snowmobile organizations, and one 
petition with 41 signatures, all urging Townsley to keep the Park open in winter. 
Townsley responded by deciding to keep the Park open in winter, but with some 
reductions in road grooming services on the east side of the Park and reductions in the 
numbers of seasonal rangers and naturalists available.^*
The Wyoming and Montana congressional delegations responded to the public 
revolt as well, urging Watt to keep the Park open in winter. They even arranged a visit 
for Secretary Watt and his family to Yellowstone that winter. From Dec. 19-21, 1981, 
Watt, his wife, one of his sons; Under Secretary Donald Hodel, his wife and son; Senator 
Malcolm Wallop (R-WY); Congressman Dick Cheney (R-WY); Congressman Larry 
Craig (R-ID); Senator Steve Symms (R-ID) and wife; and Governors Ed Hierschler and 
Ted Schwinden of Wyoming and Montana, respectively, all took a red-carpet tour of 
Yellowstone courtesy of the NPS. The group began with dinner at Superintendent 
Townsley’s house on the evening of Dec. 19, then toured most of the Park’s roads by 
snowmobile the next day, spending the night at Old Faithful. They finished at the South 
Entrance on Dec. 21.^  ̂According to former U.S. Representative Pat Williams, Watt was
Compiled from Box A-112, File A36: “Protest letters re: Winter Closing of 1981,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
“Winter Opening Scheduled for Yellowstone National Park,” Press Release dated Aug. 18, 1981, IN Box A412, File 
À36: “Protest letters re: Winter Closing of 1981,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
1981 Annual Report o f the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 69.
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convinced by his trip to keep Yellowstone open/° There is no further record of any 
closure challenge to the winter program in the 1980’s/*
It is clear that Townsley did his best to keep the Park open. In light of the problems 
that snowmobiles have since been found to present to park management, today’s park 
managers would probably have viewed Watt’s challenge as a golden opportunity to get 
rid of a problem without being the scapegoats: by using Watt’s initiative, they could 
have eliminated snowmobiles from Yellowstone and diverted the criticism from local 
affected interests onto him. But Townsley, being fond of snowmobiling in Yellowstone, 
did not avail himself of that opportunity.'*"
Chapter Conclusion
Townsley demonstrated through his actions and personal statements that his views 
regarding snowmobiles in Yellowstone were similar to Anderson’s. He, like Anderson, 
personally adopted the snowmobile program of Yellowstone as his pet crusade. He 
expanded the commitment of the NPS to snowmobiling by expanding the grooming 
program, opening several warming huts, and expanding the winter naturalist program. 
Furthermore, he expanded the concessionaire involvement by expanding the Old
Pat Williams (former U.S. Representative of Montana), interview by author, personal interview, Missoula, MT, April
22,1997.
Evidently, though. Watt foimd his snowmobile tour of Yellowstone so enjoyable that he next direaed his energies to 
opening other national parks to snowmobiles, such as Lassen Volcanic National Park in California (“Watt Gets 
Snowmobiles into Lassen Volcanic,” National Parks 56(3/4): 34).
Mary Meagher (research biologist, Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Gardiner, MT, Nov. 3,
1997.
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Faithful Snowlodge and reopening the Mammoth Hot Springs Hotel. Finally, Townsley
piloted his snowmobile program through its only major challenge to date, an effort by
James Watt to shut it down.
For his efforts, the International Snowmobile Industry Association (ISIA) awarded
its International Award of Merit in 1981 to Townsley—the same award that Anderson
won. In presenting Townsley with his award, ISIA Chairman M. B. Doyle stated that
while others believe parks should go into hibernation in winter, John Townsley 
operates under a management philosophy which actively seeks to welcome people to 
this special season. ... Snowmobilers, local tourism industry leaders and other 
governmental officials ...recognize his personal commitment to bringing persons 
enjoying a variety of outdoor winter activities into harmony with each other and the 
Park resource they are experiencing.^^
The Director of the NPS, Russell Dickenson (who replaced Everhardt), commended 
Townsley for his efforts “to see ... that the resources of Yellowstone National Park are 
able to be enjoyed by visitors at all times of the year. The award you are to receive ... 
demonstrates the international importance of America’s first national park and of the 
work in which you are engaged. Townsley had indeed succeeded in following 
Everhart’s directive to bring Yellowstone out of hibernation.
Townsley was not able to gloat in his success for long. On September 19, 1982, he 
lost a year long battle with cancer, dying at age 55."*̂  Within a year Robert (Bob) Barbee
“National Park Service Official Receives International Award,” ISIA Press Release dated May 3, 1981, IN Box A-1, 
File: “Correspondence to 8: from John Townsley,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Director to John Townsley, April 7, 1981, IN Box A-1, File: “Correspondence to & from John Townsley,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
“Yellowstone Park chief dies of cancer,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle  ̂Sept. 21,1982.
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would take over as superintendent of Yellowstone. He would see snowmobile use 
dramatically escalate again, and would initiate the first investigation into the 
environmental effects of snowmobiling in Yellowstone. However inadequate that look 
was, it was long overdue.
CH APTER 4: A PERIOD OF TRANSITION: 1983-92
Generally, the Park Service has promoted non-mechanized and contemplative 
forms of park use. ... Snowmobiles certainly have some negative impacts on 
wintering wildlife, although we feel the effects are minimal.
Bob Barbee, 1987^
In 1983, Robert Barbee arrived from Redwood National Park in California to 
assume the superintendency of Yellowstone. Responding to the continuously increasing 
winter visitation, Barbee embarked upon the first comprehensive examination of 
Yellowstone’s winter policy. He began by questioning the merits of the Park’s winter 
program but retreated to the status quo by affirming it in the Winter Use Plan for 
Yellowstone issued in 1990. However, he inserted two key caveats within the Plan that 
would compel park managers to take a more comprehensive look at winter visitation. 
Hence, because Barbee echoed his two previous superintendents in affirming the Park’s 
snowmobile policy but began tentatively to question that policy, he became a transition 
superintendent, eventually ushering in the first attempt to examine comprehensively 
winter use in Yellowstone.
’ Robert D. Barbee to David Bates, March 16, 1987, IN Box W-173, File A36: “Complaints,” YNP Archives, YNP, 
WY.
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Business as Usual, 1983-92 
While the development of the first Winter Use Plan for Yellowstone dominated 
snowmobile policy development during Barbee’s tenure in Yellowstone (as the rest of 
this chapter details), business as usual was occurring. For example, visitation was 
increasing as it had since the late 1960’s, as Table 9 illustrates.
Table 9. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1983-92.'
Winter Season Visitation
1983-84 70,385
1984-85 77,679
1985-86 93,971
1986-87 89,615
1987-88 100,105
1988-89 96,304
1989-90 118,017
1990-91 103,539
1991-92 117,410
1992-93 140,617
Clearly, by the end of Barbee’s tenure in Yellowstone (1993), visitation regularly 
exceeded 100,000 visitors per winter.
By this time the community of West Yellowstone was alive all winter with the 
buzzing noise and malodor of the financially lucrative snowmobile. Numerous 
snowmobile rentals existed in West Yellowstone, dependent not only on the attraction of
 ̂ Source is “Seasonal Visitation Statistics,” flyer available from Visitor Services Office, National Park Service, YNP, 
WY.
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snowmobiling through the Park but also on the availability of snowmobile trails and 
“play areas” on the national forests that abut the town to the west, north, and south. For 
West Yellowstone, “the winter economy is the snowmobile” (emphasis in original), as 
stated by Dean Nelson, president of the First Security Bank of West Yellowstone in 
1966. Nelson’s statement, true in 1966, was even more true by the 1980’s, at which time a 
total of 71 snowmobile-related businesses were open in West Yellowstone in winter.^
By the 1980’s, the “Snowmobile Roundup” was a major event in West Yellowstone, 
drawing snowmobile enthusiasts from all over the U.S. and Canada for a week of 
snowmobile races and fun. To enable the enthusiasts to visit Yellowstone Park, the West 
Yellowstone Chamber of Commerce asked Superintendent Barbee in 1985 to keep the 
snowmobile road from West to Old Faithful open for an additional week in March. 
Extending the season of lucrative winter earnings had obvious financial benefits for the 
snowmobile-dependent businesses in West Yellowstone. By then the merchants in West 
Yellowstone had gained considerable political influence, convincing Montana 
Representative Pat Williams to send a note to Yellowstone supporting their request.^ 
Barbee, under obvious pressure, accommodated them, stating “we are pleased to inform 
you that we will delay plowing for one week,” but that “we will not undertake a snow 
hauling effort of any substantial degree to maintain a snowmobiling surface.”  ̂Evidently,
 ̂Darcy L. Fawcett, “Colonial Status: The Search for Independence in West Yellowstone, Montana” (Professional Paper 
submitted to Montana State University), Dec. 17, 1993, p. 27.
" Robert D. Barbee to Honorable Pat Williams, Nov. 8, 1985, IN Box W-169, File A38: “Public Relations,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂Robert D. Barbee to Marge Wanner (President, West Yellowstone Chamber of Commerce), Nov. 8, 1985, IN Box W-
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the Chamber had asked him to battle nature for their financial profit by covering the 
spots on the roads that melted out earliest in spring with snow hauled in from elsewhere. 
Clearly, snowmobiling was big money and hence, big power, by this time, and Barbee 
accommodated them as best he could, supporting the existing policy. Nevertheless, 
Barbee also began the first comprehensive look at winter visitation shortly after he 
arrived.
Planning for the First Winter Use Plan 
Visitation of 100,000 was not unusual during Barbee’s tenure; in fact, the Park had 
seen that many visitors per winter twice before he arrived in 1983. Coming from 
Redwood National Park in California, Barbee accepted the snowmobile use of 
Yellowstone as a given, even though he personally did not like the use of snowmobiles in 
a national park. However, due to the promotion of winter use in Yellowstone by the 
press, the snowmobile industry, the previous park superintendents, and the park 
concessionaire, snowmobile use of Yellowstone again began to escalate sharply. The 
improvements in snowmobile reliability made by manufacturers in the 1980’s certainly 
contributed to the increase as well.^
Because Barbee and the other park administrators became alarmed over this increase 
in visitation, they began the first effort to deal with the ever-increasing numbers of
169, File A38: “Public Relations,” YNP Archives, YNP, W Y.
 ̂Robert Barbee, interview by author, telephone interview. Anchorage, AK, Jan. 14, 1998.
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snowmobiles and winter use in general by initiating the preparation of the first Winter 
Use Plan for Yellowstone in 1983/ He stated his reasons as follows: “the winter use 
study ... was in recognition of the growing use of Yellowstone National Park in the 
winter, and for an approach to use by environmental concerns.”* Exactly what the 
“approach to use by environmental concerns” meant is unclear, but it was probably 
intended to motivate a closer look at the environmental impact of snowmobiles and 
winter use upon the Park. Basically, then the purpose of the Winter Use Plan was to 
address the growth in visitation in an orderly and comprehensive manner,^ including a 
look at the environmental effects of snowmobiling. A subtle admonishment of the 
random, haphazard-type growth in winter visitation and policy by his predecessors is 
present in his statements and actions.
Barbee and his staff met on January 26, 1984, to initiate discussion about, and 
planning for, the Winter Use Plan. At that meeting, he and his staff debated the 
following questions:
1) Is the purpose of Yellowstone only to provide the visitor an opportunity to 
experience and appreciate the natural and historic values present here, or should we 
also provide some purely recreational activities?
2) In what areas of the Park can visitor use be permitted without adverse impact on 
wildlife?
3) In what areas of the Park should facilities be opened in winter?
4) What types of access can and should be provided to developed areas that are open in
’ 1983 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 56.
* Minutes of 1984 Spring Meeting between YNP Concessionaires and the NPS, IN Box W-169, File A40; “Conferences 
and Meetings,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
 ̂ Robert Barbee to Sherry Funke, March 20, 1985, IN Box W-169, File A3615: “Complaints (NPS),” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY.
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winter?
5) What staffing levels will be needed as winter use expands?^^
It is clear that park managers accepted the current level of visitor use as well as future 
increases, which is understandable in light of the fact that increasing winter use in the 
Park was by this time well established. In the first draft of the winter use plan, this 
assumption is clear:
The use of snowmobiles and other oversnow vehicles is considered to be the only 
feasible and safe method of travel in the interior of the Park during the winter season. 
Frequent severe storms, heavy snows, and bitter temperatures preclude the possibility 
of safely operating wheeled vehicles within the Park from approximately Nov. 1 
until April 1. Snowmobiling, however, is not to be considered as a recreational 
activity in itself, but rather as a means of transportation in the winter.
It is amazing that the Park administrators still used the winter severity argument as a
justification to refrain from plowing, when plowing equipment was well-developed by
this time and in use in many areas around the west during similarly severe winter
weather. It is additionally surprising because snowmobile accidents occur regularly—
probably as regularly as automobile accidents occur in summer (and would occur in
winter). Nevertheless, park managers stuck to the winter severity argument and
embarked upon the creation of the Winter Use Plan with the “overriding theme that a
winter visit to Yellowstone should be unique” (probably meaning that it would be made
Addendum to: Superintendent to Division chiefs, District Rangers, Area Rangers, District Naturalists, Maintenance 
Area Foreman, Feb. 6, 1984, IN Box N-150, File N4615: “Social and Economic Sciences 1984,” YNP Archives, 
YNP, WY.
“Draft Winter Use Plan,” Sept. 16, 1984, IN Box N-150, File N4615: “Social and Economic Sciences 1984,” YNP 
Archives, YNP, WY.
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possible by oversnow vehicles) '  while at the same time preserving park resources for the 
enjoyment of future generations. The Plan was to address
1) zoning the Park to address sensitive wildlife areas
2) appropriate levels of use, including limits on and types of overnight accommodations
3) user fees
4) recreational and commercial activities appropriate in the winter
5) visitor protection, safety and information
6) “shoulder season” operation (spring and fall operation).
In March 1986, park staff reviewed the first rough draft of the plan, and many found 
it to be too detailed and restrictive. Hence, the staff gave the Plan “a major rewrite,” an 
action that is not surprising given the plan’s groundbreaking nature (though the Plan 
would later be criticized for being too vague^^). Not only was the Plan the first of its 
kind for Yellowstone, but it had “national significance since ‘all eyes are on Yellowstone’ 
to see how we deal with winter use.”*̂
Progress on the Plan stalled at this point for over a year, as the administrators found 
their hands full with the controversy regarding their efforts to close the Fishing Bridge 
area.*^ Being shelved for more than a year gave them time to reconsider their plans. By 
the end of 1987, they had decided to break their planning efforts down into two phases:
Superintendent’s Annual Report 1985—Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 36
Ibid. These priorities are also reflected in “Winter Use Plan Underway for Yellowstone,” Press Release dated March 
6, 1985, IN Box W-171, File K34: “Press Releases,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
United States Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Winter Use Plan/Environmental Assessment 
C'm jPEA”),p .  109.
Superintendent’s Annual Report 1985—Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 36.
1986 Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, NPi, p. 37. This 
report contains information about the Fishing Bridge controversy, as do many other documents at the archives.
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Phase 1) A report summarizing existing management policies and needs that “will 
prescribe the perpetuation of the current levels of winter use for the next few years as 
traditional and appropriate;” and Phase 2) The Winter Use Plan and Environmental 
Assessment, “a comprehensive design level document that proposes alternative solutions 
for everything from Snowlodge improvements to research and monitoring efforts to 
improvements in circulation.”'^
The park administrators essentially adhered to their plan, issuing the Existing Winter 
Use Management Guidelines, Inventory, and Needs in March, 1989 (Phase 1), and the 
Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment (“WUPEA”) in November, 1990 (Phase 2). 
There was one major change, however—they expanded the Winter Use Plan to include 
winter use in Grand Teton National Park and the John D Rockefeller Memorial 
Parkway to the south of Yellowstone because the state of Wyoming proposed the 
Continental Divide Snowmobile Trail (“CDST”), a 370-mile long-distance snowmobile 
trail that would connect Yellowstone and Grand Teton to the town of Lander, 
Wyoming. If constructed, the trail would involve a new off-road snowmobile trail in 
Grand Teton National Park, an action that was a major departure from normal NPS 
policy. To address concerns regarding this departure, and because winter use in 
Yellowstone was integrally related to that in its neighboring areas to the south, the NPS 
Regional Director expanded the scope of the Winter Use Plan to include those two
1987Annual Report o f the Superintendent^ Yellowstone National Park, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 22.
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parks/^
Phase 1: Existing Winter Use Management Guidelines, Inventory, and Needs 
As promised, the Existing Winter Use report summarized the Park’s existing, 
scattered policies regarding winter visitation into one document, 85 pages long. It was 
intended to provide “the necessary foundation for the Park’s systematic planning 
approach toward winter use.” The document summarized the following:
1) NPS Legislation and policy regarding visitor use of Yellowstone and national parks 
in general (three pages);
2) Existing management goals for the NPS in Yellowstone (six pages);
3) Existing NPS management policies as regards winter in Yellowstone (eight pages);
4) Current winter operation, deficiencies and potential needs (eight pages); and
5) The purpose and need for a winter use plan (four pages).
This document is significant for several reasons. First, it was the first 
acknowledgment by the Park administrators that their predecessors developed the 
snowmobile program without examining its known or potential environmental impacts. 
This is evident in the following statements: “Most importantly, as winter use increased, 
environmental impacts of increasing winter use were not being adequately assessed;” °̂ 
“Prior to the start of the winter use planning effort, Yellowstone had no ongoing 
research projects aimed specifically at identifying the current and potential impacts of 
winter use;”^̂  and “the wildlife and other resources do not receive the high level of
Annual Report of the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, 1989, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 55. 
National Park Service, Existing Winter Use Management Guidelines, Inventory, and Needs, Yellowstone National Park,
March, 1989 ([n.p.]: [n.p.], 1989), 3-6, 12-45. 
'°Ibid., p. 1.
Ibid., p. 36.
2̂protection and management they need.” " The Yellowstone administrators very clearly 
affirmed here that previous superintendents developed the snowmobile policy without 
examining it as critically as they should have.
Second, as discussed already, the Winter Use Plan was the first compendium of NPS 
regulations and policies regarding winter in Yellowstone: “This document is a
compilation of existing winter use policies and plans that are currently providing 
direction to Yellowstone’s managers.”'^ In other words, the administrators here 
admitted that the previous management of the Park in winter was rather haphazard.
Third, it was the first time that Yellowstone’s administrators publicly admitted that 
the only way that the winter program existed was by depriving the much larger summer 
program of already needed funds: “Because funding has never been received for carrying 
out necessary winter operations, the current program must be financed by diverting 
money from the Park’s summer operation.
Finally, even though the administrators had just admitted that their predecessors 
were negligent in developing the winter program thus far, inherent within the document 
was an assumption that the status quo in winter in Yellowstone was acceptable. For 
example, the document exhaustively lists the equipment, staffing, and supplies necessary 
for a complete, well-rounded program that would adequately serve the number of people
Ibid., p. 35. 
Ibid., p. 1. 
Ibid., p. 34.
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visiting Yellowstone at the time. Never does it make the suggestion that, given the 
chronic difficulty of obtaining necessary funding from the government and the lack of 
information of the environmental impacts of snowmobiles, they should perhaps limit 
visitation. While the document does state that “no future development will be permitted 
for winter use until adequate research has been completed to determine levels of use that 
could be sustained without adverse environmental impacts,”"̂  the document does not 
suggest that visitation should be curtailed—or even held at then-current levels—until 
proper funding and services become available.
In summary, the Existing Winter Use takes the first look at winter visitation, the 
policies, goals, and needs of the NPS regarding it, and the environmental impacts of 
winter visitation. It was not a hard look, but rather a soft glance—a hesitant affirmation 
of the current program. Most importantly, it was a confession by park administrators 
that they had ignored their financial and environmental responsibilities in developing the 
winter program. Given this confession, one would expect that the winter use plan issued 
the following year would address the concerns raised in the Existing Winter Use 
document. Unfortunately, that was not to be the case.
Phase 2: Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment 
Once the Existing Winter Use report was issued, Yellowstone administrators began 
concerted efforts to issue the Winter Use Plan. Throughout 1989, they actively sought
Ibid., p. 12.
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public comment on the proposed Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment. In the first 
public comment period, they received 250 public comments on the issues that 
respondents felt the WUPEA should summarize. In addition to these responses, 
administrators held six public meetings in the Yellowstone area to identify concerns. In 
the second public comment period they sought input regarding the proposed alternatives, 
and received another 675 responses from the public regarding them."^ This is the first 
time that the Park administrators formally sought public input regarding winter use— 
input that was arguably long overdue (especially as compared to other national parks 
such as Glacier, which had sought public input in the 1970’s).
In June 1990, the Park administrators released the Draft Winter Use Plan 
Environmental Assessment. They distributed an estimated 1,800 copies to interested 
persons and interest groups. After receiving about 450 letters with comments regarding 
the plan, they issued the final Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment in November 
1990. Superintendent Barbee recommended the Winter Use Plan for approval, and Acting 
Regional Director Richard A. Strait approved it on Nov. 9, 1990.^  ̂ Strait also issued a 
Finding of N o Significant Impact (“FONSI”) on that date, making the WUPEA 
official/^
Annual Report of the Superintendentj Yellowstone National Parky 1989y YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 56.
United States Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment , 
frontispiece.
“Finding of N o Significant Impact, Winter Use Plan, Yellowstone National Park, Grand Teton National Park, and 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Memorial Parkway,” Nov. 9, 1990, Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, WY.
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Stating that the “intent of The Plan was to preserve and emphasize the national park 
experience of viewing scenery, geothermal features, and wildlife during the winter 
season,” the Winter Use Plan offered “a spectrum of visitor activities, including 
snowmobiling, cross-country skiing, and snow coach tours,” as well as “a range of 
opportunities for experiencing quiet and solitude.”"̂  The document analyzed four 
different alternatives:
1) “The Plan,” essentially an affirmation of current use with more of an effort on the 
behalf of the NPS to minimize the environmental effects of winter use;
2) Alternative A: Decreased use of the Parks with greater emphasis on restoring and 
maintaining natural quiet;
3) Alternative B: Increased use of the Parks with greater emphasis on social visitor 
experiences; and
4) Alternative C: No action, which in this case meant a continuation of the status quo, 
with no effort taken to implement new park policies or develop new facilities/^
Barbee and Strait chose “The Plan,” which was a collection of nineteen different
management objectives that would provide general guidance in managing the Parks in
winter. The most significant of the 19 objectives are:
1) Preserve and emphasize the national park experience, as stated above. This objective 
divided the Parks into three zones: A) The wilderness zone, which was the 
wilderness or proposed wilderness of the Parks; B) the developed zone, which was 
the road and hotel areas; and C) the natural zone, a buffer between the developed 
zone and the wilderness zone.
2) Accommodate modest levels of use forecast for the next ten years, and establish a 
process for managing future increases in winter use.
3) Protect wildlife from unacceptable impacts cause by winter visitor use.
4) Allow persons using the proposed Continental Divide Snowmobile Trail (“CDST”) 
to travel through the Parks on a trail that is consistent with NPS management 
policies. (This is probably the most significant of all the objectives, as it was
United States Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment, p. iii. 
Ibid., pp. 32-83.
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considered by some to be a major departure from normal NPS policies, and was quite 
controversial.^*)
5) Provide opportunities for snowmachine uses that promote the desired visitor 
experience, protect park resources, and comply with the NPS snowmobile policy.
6) Provide snow coach service to visitors as an alternative to snowmobile and ski access 
to the interior.
7) Reduce noise levels while allowing snowmachine access to park features and 
developed areas.
8) Encourage nonmechanized forms of travel, such as ski touring, snowshoeing, and 
hiking, that allow visitors to leave the plowed roads, snow roads, and developed areas 
and to experience the extensive opportunities for quiet and solitude.^"
With the exception of the CDST objective, most of these objectives simply 
formalized the existing program, while stating its limits. In summary, “The Plan” merely 
took the existing situation, acknowledged that as acceptable, and prescribed very loose 
boundaries for it.
The Winter Use Plan is significant in that Park administrators finally formalized 
their winter program. Importantly, “The Plan” prescribed that administrators would 
initiate the “Visitor Use Management” (“YUM”) process if either of the following events 
occurred: 1) The forecasted use levels were reached; or 2) the CDST was opened. The 
YUM Process is a formalized process to manage “visitor use to protect park resources 
and the quality of the visitor experience”̂  ̂ (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation
Despite its precedent-setting nature, the NPS in Grand Teton went along with Wyoming’s plans and built the CDST 
through their land, without doing a specific EA or EIS on this action. Evidently, the NPS considered the 
environmental analysis on the CDST in the WUPEA as sufficient, even though it measured up to only about one full 
^age (p. 60), and sporadic mention between pages 61 and 70. The lack of extensive discussion regarding the CDST 
was mentioned by many different people, as recorded in the WUPEA (pp. 86, 99-103). Their failure to examine the 
CDST more comprehensively may result in a lawsuit against them by the Fund for Animals (personal 
commimication with D. J. Schubert of Meyer & Clitzenstein, July 11,1997, Washington, D.C.).
WUPEA, pp. 32-48.
Ibid., p. 34.
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of the VUM Process). Hence, “The Plan” was the first significant attempt by Park 
administrators to control and eventually limit winter visitation in Yellowstone.
While park managers deserve commendation for finally attempting to formalize 
their winter program, they deserve criticism for several aspects of “The Plan,” some quite 
serious. These criticisms follow.
First, visitation reached “The Plan’s” forecasted use levels in only a third of the time 
that the authors expected, drawing into question the accuracy of their predictions. They 
derived their predictions of future use by examining visitation trends for all three parks 
for the past eight years. While they noted that visitor use levels for all three parks 
increased 22% between 1982 and 1990, they predicted that visitor use over the next ten 
years would increase no more than 17% (their maximum prediction) over 1989-90 levels. 
Their average projection of increase for the next ten years was only + 9%, while their 
lowest projection of visitation increase for the next ten years was only +2%. The authors 
justified such lowered projections by assuming “that winter use growth rates will level off 
somewhat over the next ten years. General experience in other parks indicates that rapid 
growth is usually followed by periods of leveling” (emphasis added) Given the long 
history of large increases in winter use in Yellowstone^^-as opposed to “other parks”-it 
seems that the authors were foolishly chiding themselves into believing—or hoping—that 
visitation would soon level off.
Ibid.. p. 20-21.
“Seasonal Visitation Statistics,” flyer available from the Visitor Services Office, NPS, YNP, WY.
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Second, the authors of “The Plan” seemed to use the VUM Process as a scapegoat, 
allowing them to avoid committing themselves to serious decisions or predictions. For 
example, they stated that “in the future, specific management strategies for sensitive 
[wildlife] areas will be determined through ... the visitor use management process.”^̂  
Yellowstone’s administrators had already delayed such important actions long enough; 
delaying them further was not responsible. In another example, the authors stated that 
“winter use levels ... will not significantly exceed those prescribed in this plan until the 
visitor use management process is implemented and verifies that additional management 
actions will not adversely affect park resources.”^̂  In reality, winter use levels exceeded 
those in “The Plan” in only three years, before park managers even thought to begin the 
VUM process, contradicting the planners’ statement that the VUM Process would ensure 
that such increases would not adversely affect park resources.
Third, the plan’s consideration of the environmental impacts associated with 
motorized use of Yellowstone in winter was as limited as that of Anderson and 
Townsley. This acceptance of the status quo was in obvious conflict with the NPS 
mission to leave its resources unimpaired. For example, while the authors stated that 
“snowmachine exhaust emissions would continue and potentially increase,” they also 
knew that “air quality would remain within the class 1 standards” for national parks
Ibid., p. 39. 
Ibid., p. 39.
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(emphasis added). Park managers had no reliable air quality data at this point, so their 
statement here was completely unfounded. Indeed, research in only five years would 
demonstrate violations of Class 1 standards in the Park, at the West Entrance.^^
Fourth, the authors of “The Plan” also glossed over the potential effects of winter 
use on wildlife, particularly bison. While they noted that “many animals travel on snow 
roads because it is easier than moving through deep snow,” an action that “frequently 
causes conflicts with snowmachine traffic on park roads,” °̂ they felt confident that “no 
substantial adverse effects on wildlife would be expected under “The Plan” or any of the 
alternatives.” *̂ The authors, to their credit, did make an effort to examine existing 
research on the effects of snowmobiles and skiers on wildlife. They noted that some 
research has indicated effects, while other research has not indicated any adverse effects 
on wildlife from snowmobiles, and chose to believe the latter group of research, rather 
than embarking on specific research to determine what the truth was for Yellowstone.^^ 
Hence, the authors were both selective in the research they cited, ignoring that which 
demonstrated adverse effects of both snowmobilers and skiers (including Aune’s research 
done in Yellowstone^^), and also deficient in promoting research to study the effects of
Ibid., p. 61.
“Ambient Air Quality Study Results,” flyer available from the Planning Office, NPS, YNP, WY.
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid. p. iv.
Ibid., p. 63.
Keith Aune, “Impact of Winter Recreationists on Wildlife in a Portion of Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming,” 
Master’s Thesis, Montana State University, 1981, p. ix.
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snowmobiles and skiers on the Park’s wildlife. The slaughter of 1,084 bison in 1997 (see 
Chapter 5) would demonstrate that such research would have been timely, and that 
recreational use by snowmobiles could result in large ungulate mortality. The authors, in 
fact, noted that bison populations are “generally increasing,”'*'̂  and that they traveled on 
the snow roads—two clues that the bison population may have been increasing 
unnaturally, that it was vulnerable to crashing, and that some research was certainly 
needed.
Fifth, the authors stated that “outstanding and abundant opportunities for quiet and 
solitude will be preserved in th[e wilderness] zone,” and that “greater opportunities for 
quiet and solitude will exist in winter than exist in summer in the natural zone.”'*̂ 
Evidently, these authors had no idea how far snowmobile noise could travel into the 
wilderness zone, let alone the natural zone. The data in Table 10 makes one wonder if 
they did any skiing in the zones in question near snowmobile areas, or talked to staff 
members who did, to see how far snowmobile noise traveled.
"  Ibid., p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 33.
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Table 10. Locations and distances in Yellowstone at which snowmobile noise has been 
heard.^̂
Year Place Distance from Road Distance inside
“wilderness zone”
1995 Indian Creek 
Ski Trail
4 Miles 2 Miles
1997 Fir Ridge 6 Miles 4 Miles
1994 Summit Lake 7 Miles 6 Miles
1994 Mallard Lake 3 Miles 2 Miles
1994 Cowan Meadows 7 Miles 5 Miles
1994 Shoshone Geyser Basin 9 Miles 8 Miles
1994 Heart Lake 6 Miles 5 Miles
1996 Mt. Washburn 4 Miles 3 Miles
1980’s South of the South 
-east Arm of 
Yellowstone Lake
15-20 Miles 8 Miles
Note; Distances are approximate straight-line distances.
Clearly, snowmobile noise easily travels into the “Wilderness” zone. Furthermore, 
there seem to be no areas within the natural zones as depicted in “The Plan” that are free 
of snowmobile noise, other than those in the northern part of Yellowstone, where 
snowmobiles are not allowed. Additionally, my experience of ten years in Yellowstone 
contradicts their statement that silence is easier to find in the natural zone in winter than 
it is in summer, since snowmobile noise generally travels further than that of 
automobiles, despite the greater numbers of cars than snowmobiles. Finally, the authors 
did not recognize that few skiers have the physical stamina to ski the necessary distances
Compiled from my personal experiences in Yellowstone from 1994-97.
Les Inafuku (Subdistrict Ranger, Yellowstone), interview by author, personal interview. Old Faithful, WY, July 15,
1997.
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beyond the natural zone into the wilderness zone to find true quiet. As illustrated above, 
even skiing twenty miles is not always adequate to escape the pervasive noise of 
snowmobiles. Clearly, as my recent experiences and Inafuku’s experience of the invasive 
sound of snowmobiles during the winter in Yellowstone indicate, Yellowstone 
administrators did not make “a range of opportunities for experiencing quiet ... 
available,”"** as they stated they would do in The Plan.
Finally, and most seriously, Yellowstone administrators, in choosing The Plan, 
apparently ignored the will of the public. As noted in the WUPEA, the administrators 
received the following letters:
1) A total of 450 letters: 70 from agencies and organizations and 380 from individuals.
2) O f the 450, about 80 identical or very similar letters were generated by flyers sent out 
by interested organizations. These letters supported elements of Alternative A 
(Reduced Use), such as opposing the roadway proposal for the CDST and instead 
supported hauling snowmobiles traveling the CDST by trailer through Grand Teton. 
This group of letters went beyond simply supporting Alternative A, though, by 
requesting additional environmental analysis of the following: a) the entire 370-mile 
CDST; b) the VUM process; and c) the Snowlodge, and other structural 
improvements proposed by The Plan. In general this group of commentors felt that 
even Alternative A was too environmentally destructive, calling for more 
environmental protection.
3) About 20 form letters supporting Alternative B (Increased use); and
4) “O f the remaining letters, 21 percent supported the proposal, 44 percent supported 
alternative A [reduce use], 35 percent supported alternative B [increased use], and 
none supported alternative C [no action]. These percentages do not include the 100 
letters summarized above.”"*̂
Notice that, as broken down in the WUPEA, the leading plurality was in favor of
48 WUPEA, iii. 
Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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reducing use, not in favor of “The Plan.” In fact, “The Plan” was supported by the 
smallest plurality (other than the “no action” alternative). In spite of the fact that the 
largest plurality favored reduced use, and an additional 80 persons favored more stringent 
environmental analysis and/or reduced use. Park administrators chose to go with the 
status quo in the form of “The Plan.”
Examining the figures presented in the WUPEA more carefully. Table 11 presents 
the figures in a different light:
Table 11. Summary of comments. Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment.50
Description of Comments Number of Percentage of
Comment Total
s Comments
Letters favoring more environmental 80 (see note) 17.8
analysis; Even Alt. A is not good
enough
Individuals in favor of Alternative A 154 34.2
TOTAL in favor of Alt. A or better 234 52.0%
Form Letters in favor of Alt. B. 20 4.4
Individuals in favor of Alt. B. 123 27.3
TOTAL in favor of Alt. B. 153 31.7%
TOTAL in favor of “The Plan” 73 16.3%
TOTAL in favor of either “The Plan” or 226 48.0%
increased use (Alt. B)
Note: One can probably assume that if the group of 80 commentors were not satisfied 
with the environmental protections of the most environmentally benign choice- 
Alternative A (reducing use), that these same people would probably not be in favor 
of “The Plan” or Alternative B (increased use).
50 Ibid., as reanalyzed by the author.
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From examining the figures more closely as above, it is clear that a simple majority 
(52%) of the respondents were in favor of Alternative A, reducing the winter use of the 
three parks, or going beyond that to take an even more detailed look at the consequences 
of winter use on the Park. In contrast, only a minority of respondents were in favor of 
Alternative B, increasing visitor use, or “The Plan.” Yet, Park administrators chose to go 
with the minority, evidently ignoring the majority’s call to reduce use and more 
comprehensively examine its environmental impacts. In my interview with him, 
Superintendent Barbee could not explain this discrepancy.^^
Thus, for the first time in history, twenty-two years after Jack Anderson formalized 
snowmobile policy in Yellowstone, the public in 1990 had a chance to tell Park 
administrators what they thought was appropriate for the Park(s) in winter. A full fifteen 
years after the public told the NPS elsewhere to eliminate the snowmobile from other 
parks like Yosemite, Glacier, and Sequoia, the public gave the NPS in Yellowstone a 
similar message: restrict snowmobile use, and study the environmental impacts more 
intensively. Yet, Yellowstone’s administrators evidently ignored the will of the public, 
instead twisting the figures to maintain the ever-expanding winter use of the 
Yellowstone-area parks. Giving no justification for their decision to go with the 
minority, administrators went back to their safety blanket of keeping the snowmobile in 
Yellowstone. While NEPA gives public officials the latitude to choose options that the
Robert Barbee, interview with author, telephone interview. Anchorage, AK, Jan. 14,1998.
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public does not favor, doing so can arguably be viewed by the public as a violation of 
their trust. It appears that administrators in Yellowstone, after ignoring the will of the 
public for at least 20 years, violated the public trust and ignored the will of the public.^^
In summary, the Winter Use Plan was no revolution in the winter management of 
Yellowstone. Although the Park administrators began with high goals of finally 
examining the adverse environmental impacts of winter use in Yellowstone, they instead 
failed to examine the known environmental impacts, failed to do the research to find out 
what the unknown impacts were, failed to listen to the public, and failed to realistically 
predict future use. With “all eyes on Yellowstone” to see how they dealt with winter use, 
they instead hid their heads in the sand—or snow, as the case was.
Chapter Conclusion
In condoning Yellowstone’s long-standing policy of allowing snowmobile use of the 
Park without examining its environmental consequences. Superintendent Barbee gave 
himself the same reputation as his two predecessors—that of a superintendent willing to 
allow snowmobiles into the Park despite their known and unknown effects. Despite the 
fact that he acknowledged that his predecessors had fallen short in their responsibility to 
examine the environmental impacts of snowmachines on the Park before they allowed
In my discussions with some of the persons involved with the writing of the WUPEA, I got the sense that there was 
considerable political maneuvering occurring behind the scene while the authors were writing the WUPEA. Those 
person(s), however, requested anonymity. Consequently, I do not feel as though I have recorded the full history of 
the WUPEA and its writing, although I have written the best account of its history from the information available to
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them in, Barbee failed to fulfill his responsibility as well. He did, however, begin to 
question the snowmobile policy, and inserted two key conditions that would trigger the 
VUM Process if they came to pass. Consequently, Barbee became a transition 
superintendent. He continued to condone the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone, but 
did set the Park on the road to questioning its snowmobile policy and the policy’s effects 
on the Park.
Since he left Yellowstone, Barbee has evidently had time to reflect on the 
appropriateness of snowmobiles in national parks. In my telephone interview with him 
on January 14, 1998, he stated that, as regional director of the National Park Service in 
Alaska, he is now in the process of publishing regulations to ban snowmobiles from 
Denali National Park. As one of his reasons for this decision, he stated “we don’t want 
Denali to become a Yellowstone.”^̂  Clearly, although he allowed winter use to continue, 
he left Yellowstone with the knowledge that the Park’s winter situation was less than 
desirable.
By issuing the Winter Use Plan, Barbee lost another golden opportunity to slow the 
growth of the snowmobile snowball. Soon it would come time to “pay the piper,” 
though. In just three years, more increases in visitation would force Yellowstone 
administrators to begin the VUM process. And, in just seven years, the citizens of 
American would, via a lawsuit, finally force Yellowstone administrators to do what they
‘ibid.
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should have done in the early 1970’s: take a long, hard look at winter use in the Park. 
The next chapter will chronicle these events.
CH A PTER 5: HARD QUESTIONS AND SMALL CHANGES; 1993-97
We have begun -  something is happening -  there is reason for hope.
Winter Visitor Use Management Work Plan, 1993.^
Snowmobiling is a wondrous, spiritual experience... WE WANT OUR FAIR 
SHARE!!
Terri Willsen, 1997.^
Shortly before he left Yellowstone in 1994 to go to the NPS Alaska Regional Office, 
Superintendent Barbee initiated the Visitor Use Management Process—the first serious 
look at Yellowstone’s winter program. When he left Yellowstone, Mike Finley from 
Yosemite National Park replaced him. Having already taken a hard look at Yosemite’s 
exploding visitation and having instituted the first daily visitation limits in Yosemite 
Valley,^ Finley embarked upon the same hard look and possible visitation restrictions on 
winter use in Yellowstone. Even though he may have been dragged into such actions by 
some key events in the late 1990’s, Finley may be instigating a revolution in the Park’s 
snowmobile policy—a revolution arguably long overdue. Although Finley may give his
' “Winter Visitor Use Management Work Plan, Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks, Jolin D. Rockefeller Jr., 
Memorial Parkway, Nov., 1993,” Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, WY, p. 20.
 ̂Terri Willsen to Deborah Austin (Chair, GYCC), no date, one of over 20 form letters received by the Planning Office 
in response to the publication of the Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi-Agency Assessment, in April, 1997.
 ̂ Todd Wükinson, “Snowed Under: the roar of snowmobiles in many national parks has replaced the solitude and 
quiet that once defined the winter landscape,” National Parks 69(1-2): pp. 32-36, Jan./Feb. 1995.
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employees reason for hope, he has yet to undertake any significant changes in the Park’s 
winter use policy.
The Visitor Use Management Process: How It Began and What It Is 
During the winter of 1992-93, just before Barbee left Yellowstone, visitation left the 
100,000-person level to levels, that Park administrators had never before seen nor 
expected to see prior to the year 2000 (though their earlier predictions were suspect, as 
Chapter 4 detailed). Table 12 lists these large increases.
Table 12. Winter Visitation to Yellowstone National Park, 1991-97.^
Winter Season Visitation
1991-92 117,410
1992-93 140,617
1993-94 143,523
1994-95 139,810
1995-96 119,539
1996-97 114,000
The 1990 Winter Use Plan stipulated that, should visitation to all three parks 
(Yellowstone, Grand Teton, and the Rockefeller Parkway) exceed its maximum 
prediction of 143,500 before the year 2000, then the administrators of these three parks 
would be compelled to initiate the VUM process.^ Clearly, with visitation in
' “Seasonal Visitation Statistics,” flyer available from the Visitor Services Office, NPS, YNP, WY. 
’ W U P E A ,p .2 \ .
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Yellowstone alone closely approaching that mark in the winter of 1992-93, park 
managers realized that the first trigger for the VUM Process had been tripped.^
The Winter Use Plan also stipulated that if the Continental Divide Snowmobile Trail 
(CDST) became operational, park managers would have to begin the VUM process as 
w ell/ In the winter of 1992-93, the CDST became operational, with snowmobilers 
hauling their snowmobiles via trailer through Grand Teton National Park to access the 
trail at either end of that park. Hence, the other VUM trigger was tripped in the same 
winter as well.* By the winter of 1994-95, Grand Teton administrators had opened the 
CDST itself through Grand Teton National Park, enabling snowmobilers to travel 
directly from the Togwotee Pass area through Teton Park to Yellowstone without ever 
leaving a groomed snowmobile trail.^
So, the NPS began the Visitor Use Management Process in 1993. Visitor Use 
Management is
a process of identifying goals (or desired futures), looking at existing conditions, 
identifying discrepancies between the two, and laying out a plan of action to bring 
. the two closer together. [It] is a way to ensure that a high quality visitor experience is 
maintained, park resources are protected, and the necessary infrastructure and staff 
are in place to support acceptable levels of winter use.'°
 ̂Superintendent's Annual Report, Yellowstone National Park, 79S3, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 66.
 ̂ WUPEA, p. 21.
* “Frequently Received Comments and Questions,” Winter Visitor Use Management (A newsletter published irregularly 
by the NPS, YNP, as part of the VUM process), January, 1996, p. 3.
’ Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management; A Multi- 
Agency Assessment ([n.p.]: Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee, Greater Yellowstone Area, April, 1997), 6.
“Winter Visitor Use Management Overview,” Unpublished Paper IN “VUM Speech” File, Planning Office Files, 
NPS, YNP, WY, January, 1995.
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The VUM Process is based on the “Visitor Experience and Resource Protection 
(“VERP”) Process,“  developed by National Park Service planners, managers, and 
researchers to identify and manage carrying capacity in areas of the national park system. 
The NPS developed the VERP process to comply with the 1978 General Authorities 
Act, which required park managers to identify carrying capacities for national park areas, 
and implement means of adhering to those carrying capacities. As developed by the NPS, 
the VERP Process is a nine-step process of segregating the Park into various zones of 
front- or back-country experience, discerning what park managers and visitors expect to 
experience in each zone, and modifying the management of the Park to adhere to the 
desired experience for each zone. For example, administrators in Arches National Park 
in Utah used the VERP Process in the early 1990’s to manage visitation while protecting 
park resources and values. Using advanced computer technology, they created a set of 
pictures of the same park feature, such as Landscape Arch, with varying numbers of 
visitors inserted in the picture—from none to over 150. By asking park visitors to rate 
each of the 16 pictures of Landscape Arch on a sliding scale of acceptability, managers 
could discern that visitors found up to 30 people in the scene acceptable. Based on that 
finding, they reduced the size of the parking lot for Landscape Arch to accommodate the
appropriate number of vehicles to restrict the visitation there to 30 people or less at any
12given time.
" Ibid.
Robert E. Manning, at al, “The Visitor Experience and Resource Protection (VERP) Process: The Application of 
Carrying Capacity to Arches National Park,” The George Wright Forum, A Journal of Cultural and Natural Park and
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Park Managers in Yellowstone and Grand Teton Parks state that they took the 
VERP Process and modified it to suit their needs.Based on their record of activities and 
decisions in the next four years, there were few significant differences between the VERP 
Process and the VUM Process.
VUM in Action in the Yellowstone Area
In 1993, NPS staff from Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks “began 
working together to apply the concept of visitor use management to winter use.” "̂* By 
November 1993, they had produced a work plan listing the tasks that they needed to do 
in order to “fully implement the Winter Use Plan.”’̂  In this statement, the NPS staff 
clearly admitted that they had never fully implemented the WUP. This statement further 
illustrates that even the NPS administrators, who authored the WUP, were not satisfied 
with it or (at least initially) committed to its implementation.
It appears as though Park administrators are now more committed to the VUM 
Process, as exemplified by the extensive list of both short- and long-term tasks identified 
in the work plan. The long list of tasks is based on the Winter Use Plan of 1990, with the 
evident intent of actually enforcing or implementing it. For each task, NPS staff
Reserves 12(3): 1995, pp. 45-54.
“Winter Visitor Use Management Overview,” Unpublished Paper IN “VUM Speech” File, Planning Office Files, 
NPS, YNP, WY, January 1995.
Ibid.
Winter Visitor Use Management Work Plan  ̂ approved by Robert Barbee and Neckels, Jack (Superintendents of 
Yellowstone and Grand Teton, respectively), unpublished document in the Planning Office Files, YNP, WY, Nov., 
1993, p. 1.
152
identified the person responsible for its implementation. For example, Table 13 lists 
some of the short- and long-term tasks identified by the work plan, and persons 
responsible for their implementation:
Table 13. Selected tasks of the VUM team, November 1993. 16
TASK PERSON(S)
____________________________________________________RESPONSIBLE___________
Establish baseline data on impacts of winter use to Chief Resource Managers
wildlife, geothermal areas and air and water quality 
Take necessary actions to avoid impacts to resources. Superintendents
including air-quality monitoring 
Identify resource and visitor conflict areas where use Chief Resource Managers
restrictions are needed 
Establish long-term monitoring strategy for impacts on Chief Resource Managers
resources
Implement measures to ensure resources are not adversely Chief Maintenance & 
affected Resource Managers
Reduce noise from snowmachines Chief Ranger
Close Potholes area in Tetons Superintendent, GTNP
Investigate feasibility of restricting snowmobile operators Chief Rangers of GTNP and 
to those with valid drivers’ licenses Yellowstone
Notice that the majority of these tasks involve resource protection and monitoring 
tasks that the Winter Use Plan had called for back in 1990. Yet, here they are, three years 
later and still not implemented. The presence of these important tasks in the VUM work 
plan confirms that the Winter Use Plan had not been fully followed or implemented.
Ibid., pp. 4, 10-12.
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Shortly after the November Work Plan was issued, the Greater Yellowstone 
Coordinating Committee (an already existing consortium of superintendents of 
Yellowstone and Teton Parks and supervisors of national forests surrounding 
Yellowstone) “agreed that the national forests in the Greater Yellowstone Area should 
also participate in the winter visitor use management planning,”'  ̂ recognizing that the 
problems being experienced by the Parks were also common to the surrounding national 
forests/* From 1994 onward, staff from six of the national forests surrounding 
Yellowstone have cooperated in the VUM process: Gallatin, Targhee, Custer, Shoshone, 
Bridger-Teton, and Beaverhead-Deerlodge/^
The VUM team (the group of over 20 persons from all three parks and all six 
national forests responsible for coordination the VUM Process) had a better record of 
success in implementing these tasks than NPS administrators did in following the 1990 
WUPEA. By 1995, the VUM team had accomplished or begun work on most of its tasks, 
including those listed in Tablé 13.
The first accomplishment came in 1993, when Yellowstone administrators 
announced that all persons driving a snowmobile must possess a valid driver’s license or 
learning permit, a reversal of the 1975 decision to permit 12- to 16-year-olds to drive a
Superintendent's Annual Report, Yellowstone National Park, 1994, YNP Research Library, YNP, WY, p. 56.
“Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management: Summary of the Visitor Use Management Process,”
unpubhshed paper IN “VUM Speech” File, Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, WY, August/Sept., 1995.
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi- 
Agency Assessment, p. 1.
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snowmobile when supervised by a parent or guardian. Administrators cited their own 
data showing that 12- to 16-year-old drivers constituted only 5% of the Park’s 
snowmobile operators, yet were involved in 16% of the snowmobile accidents in the 
Park.^° Although they had good reason for this restriction, the fact that they did it all 
illustrates how much the snowmobile situation and associated management had changed 
since Anderson’s days. Now, instead of welcoming snowmobiles with open arms, as 
Anderson did, the administrators began searching for ways to begin getting a handle on 
the nearly uncontrolled winter situation.
Between 1994 and 1997, administrators in Grand Teton National Park closed the 
Potholes area to off-road snowmobiling,^* although they have yet to formalize this 
closure by publicizing it in the Federal Register}^ Thus ended the only off-trail use of 
snowmobiles allowed anywhere in the entire national park system. Also that year, 
Yellowstone managers met with snowmobile manufacturers to discuss noise and air 
quality concerns, and placed decibel meters at the Park entrances, using them to turn 
away machines that were too loud. Finally, twenty years after Park administrators put 
the first noise restrictions in place, they began to make a more serious effort at enforcing 
them.
“Yellowstone National Park to Require Driver’s License for Snowmobile Operators,” Press Release dated Nov. 9, 
1993, IN Box W-182, File L3427; “Winter Sports, 1992,” YNP Archives, YNP, WY.
Personal communication with Jack Neckels, Superintendent of Grand Teton National Park, Nov. 4, 1997, Grand 
Teton National Park, WY.
Personal communication with John Sacklin, Chief Park Planner, NPS, Nov. 14,1997, Mammoth Hot Springs, WY.
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The VUM team staff initiated searches for literature detailing the impacts of winter 
use on wildlife and other resources in 1994.^  ̂This literature search culminated in a 141- 
page report listing 575 citations about wildlife and the effects of humans and off road 
vehicles on them; many of the citations were annotated.*'* Two years later James and E. 
Gaslick selected the citations most relevant to Yellowstone’s situation and added more 
citations (again often annotated) that they themselves had found to produce a 586-citation 
bibliography for the NPS.^^ At long last, Park administrators put effort into researching 
the environmental effects of snowmobiles. In so doing, they received a lot to consider. 
Caslick began by reprimanding Yellowstone’s managers: “Snowmobile-polluted snow
and its effects on wildlife, fish, and other aquatic organisms have not been investigated in 
Yellowstone, although published accounts elsewhere began at least 24 years ago ...This 
seems to be another topic that should have been researched here long ago, particularly 
since we probably experience a higher intensity of snowmobile use than anywhere 
else.” "̂
Caslick went on to state:
“Winter Visitor Use Management Accomplishments,” Unpublished Paper IN “VUM Speech” File, Planning Office 
Files, NPS, YNP, WY, Jan. 27, 1995.
Larry E. Bennett, “A Review of Potential Effects of Winter Recreation on Wildlife in Grand Teton and Yellowstone 
National Parks; A Bibliographic Data Base” (Final Report to the NPS, Planning Office Files, YNP, WY), 1995, 141
pp.
J. and E. Caslick, “Selected Literature Citations from Bennett 1995 and New Citations from Caslick 1997 on Winter 
Recreation Effects on Wildlife,” Appendix H (73 pp.) of James Caslick, “Impacts of Winter Recreation on Wildlife in 
Yellowstone National Park; A Literature Review and Recommendations” (unpublished report submitted to the 
Branches of Planning and Compliance, Natural Resources, and Resources Management and Visitor Protection), 
Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, WY, 1997.
Ibid., p. 3.
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In regard to wildlife in Yellowstone, I conclude from my literature review that the 
most pressing VUM issue is snowmobiling -  not snowmobiling in general, but 
snowmobiling in and near thermally-affected wildlife habitats that are known to be 
unique and of critical value to wildlife in winter. This value to Yellowstone wildlife is 
not conjecture; it has been widely recognized and published about for many years ... 
From my literature review, I conclude that there is now ample documentation to 
administratively close these thermally-influenced winter habitats, prohibiting winter 
use by private and commercial snowmachines, skiers, snowshoers, and hikers.^^
Caslick concluded by recommending that the Park administrators “promptly initiate
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on Winter Visitor Use in
Yellowstone. In the EIS, include alternatives of ‘no snowmobiling’ as well as ...
consideration of alternative modes of transport for winter visitor enjoyment of park 
»28resources.
At long last, Yellowstone’s administrators searched the literature for information on 
the effects of snowmobiles on natural resources, and received both an admonishment 
from the responsible independent researcher and many pages of recommendations. 
Unfortunately, they would not commit to the EIS recommended by Caslick until a 
wildlife group filed a lawsuit against them in 1997, as detailed at the end of this chapter. 
N or have they yet closed any of the thermally-influenced wildlife habitats or instituted 
any restrictions on the numbers of snowmobiles entering the Park.
While the VUM team was accomplishing its immediate tasks and acquiring much 
data, it was also making progress on the four main elements of VUM Planning
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 9.
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(identifying goals and concerns, looking at existing conditions, identifying discrepancies
between the two, and laying out a plan of action to bring the two closer together). By
1996, the VUM team came up with the following goals for winter in the Yellowstone
area, all once again generally supportive of existing winter recreation in that area:
1) Visitors have a full range of winter use experiences and settings, from highly 
developed to primitive, appropriately distributed across the greater Yellowstone area;
2) The NPS and U.S. Forest Service (“USES”) must protect areas of cultural and natural 
significance from winter visitor use impacts;
3) Visitors have enough information to choose the experience they desire;
4) All public and private agencies and businesses concerned be partners in contributing 
and supporting these goals;
5) The NPS and USES provide high-quality facilities;
6) The NPS and USES minimize conflicts among user groups;
7) Agencies share a coordinated data base with which to make decisions;
8) Visitors know how to participate safely in winter use activities without damaging 
resources or themselves;
9) Reduce snowmobile noise and emissions;
10) Agencies manage winter use with ecosystem-wide implications in mind and work 
cooperatively."
At the same time, the VUM team identified the existing concerns or issues:
1) Overcrowding: Existing facilities are often crowded, especially in stormy weather;
2) Visitor Conflicts: Some visitors want silence and solitude, while others want a social 
experience;
3) Safety: Heavy use and warm weather make groomed trails rough and unsafe to 
travel;
4) Gasoline: Supplies in Yellowstone are limited and unable to satisfy demand;
5) Community Expectations: Communities assume unlimited growth in winter 
visitation, despite problems with existing levels of use;
6) Resource Damage: Winter use may be damaging wildlife, geothermal, air and 
silence resources;
7) Decreased Access: Snowplowing to private property is displacing skiers and 
snowmobilers in areas outside of the Park;
8) Visitor Behavior: Some visitors trespass into wilderness areas, act inappropriately
Winter Use Goals,” Winter Visitor use Management, January, 1996, p. 2.
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toward others and wildlife, and risk their safety; and
9) Operational Concerns: Sewage and solid waste facilities are overwhelmed in the 
Park interior; funding for the NPS winter program is inadequate/^
In the next two years, the NPS would hear the public largely echo these concerns
through written and verbal comments. Table 14 illustrates this by summarizing the
public’s concerns:
Compiled from “Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management—Winter Use Issues,” unpublished paper IN 
“VUM Speech” File, Planning Office Files, NPS, YNP, WY, Jan., 1995, AND “Winter Use Concerns,” Winter 
Visitor Use Management, ]?ücm2irŶ  1996, p. 1-2.
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Table 14. Summary of selected comments regarding winter use of Yellowstone, 1993- 
96.̂ ^
1993-
94
letters
1994-
95
letters
1995-
96
letters
Public
Mtgs.
National
Parks
letters
TW
Survey
1995
Visitor
Survey
Total
Comments
300 total comments 
during these three 
years
114
letters -f 
1,250
comments
691 598 1,132
Crowding 60 23 14 ”50 93 several 43
Noise
pollution
81 104 14 72 461 several 43
Air pollu­
tion from 
snow­
mobiles
67 63 19 77 294 several 65
Wildlife 
im­
pacts from 
snowmo’s
23 117 13 71 498 several 15
Lack of 
solitude
61 32 271 several
Ban or 
limit snow­
mobiles
63 123
Keep snow­
mobiles 
in parks
42 13 61
Conflicts
between
users
37 several
^'Compiled from the following sources: 1993-94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 letters were all sent by individuals independently 
to the NPS at Mammoth and are summarized in Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi-Agency Assessment  ̂as were 
the National Parks comments (sent by readers of that magazine in response to an article by Todd Wilkinson entitled 
“Snowed Under,” {National Parks Jan./Feb. 1995) and the TW Survey comments, compiled from questionnaires 
mailed by TW to guests of the winter of 1993/94. The Public Meeting comments were recorded by the NPS at a 
series of public meetings from Feb. 29, 1996 to May 9,1996 in the following places: West Yellowstone, MT, Jackson, 
WY; Bozeman, MT; Dubois, WY; Cody, WY; Billings, MT; Gardiner, MT; and Rexburg, ID, and are summarized in 
“Summary of Comments, February through May, 1996,” Winter Visitor Use Management ,̂ Fall, 1996. The 1995 
Visitor Survey Comments were recorded by Margaret Littlejohn in Visitor Services Project, Yellowstone National Park 
Visitor Study, Report 73 (University of Idaho, Moscow, ID), January, 1996.
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Notice that when the surveys asked visitors whether they felt snowmobiles were 
appropriate in the two national parks, at least twice as many said “N o” as said “Yes,” 
echoing what the public had told the Park administrators when they prepared the Winter 
Use Plan/EA in 1990.
With both goals and issues identified, the VUM team turned its attention to existing 
conditions. They published their findings on these in 1997 as the Winter Visitor Use 
Management: A Multi-Agency Assessment. The team summarized the goals, issues and 
concerns, and public comments as listed above, and comprehensively listed the Existing 
Conditions in Yellowstone and the surrounding area. These reflected and detailed, in 
large part, the issues and concerns identified earlier; the reader is referred to the report 
for the detailed listing of existing conditions.^'
Next, the report identified discrepancies between the goals and the existing 
conditions by mapping Yellowstone and the surrounding area into twelve different 
“potential opportunity areas.” These are zones in which visitors typically pursue one 
type of activity, such as snowmobiling on groomed roads or skiing in the backcountry.^^ 
By examining the current activity within each zone and comparing that with the desired 
activity in them, report authors found numerous inconsistencies and conflicts in
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi- 
Agency Assessment ([n.p.]: Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee, April, 1997).
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Group, Winter Visitor Use Management: A Multi- 
Agency Assessment, pp. 24-25.
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Yellowstone. For example, they stated that there were “multiple conflicts” and a “high
level of conflict” in the road corridor from West Yellowstone to Old Faithful, at the
West Entrance, and at Old Faithful, and a “moderate level of conflict” in the Canyon
area. Conflicts and impacts include wildlife harassment, overwhelming numbers of
snowmobiles during peak periods, snowmobile/skier conflicts, snowcoach/snowmobile
conflicts; excessive noise and exhaust fumes, long lines at the entrance station and
elsewhere, and possible geothermal impacts. "̂* These findings probably surprised few
experienced Yellowstone personnel.
Finally, the report recommended a brief plan of action. The report stated “a careful
analysis is needed for each of the oversnow, motorized road segments in the Park to
evaluate such considerations as the visitor experiences being offered; resource concerns
(for example, the relationship of the winter roads to bison movement); safety, including
avalanche danger; adjacent land issues ...; facility capacity and operational concerns;
budget limitations; and conflict minimization.”^̂
In so stating, the authors “backed off” from any major decision or analysis.
However, they were correct in stating that a careful analysis is long overdue and needed
for the Yellowstone areas of conflict. Additionally, they listed a spectrum of options for
their analyses that Yellowstone administrators would consider, including:
1) Continue the current mix of snowmobiles and snowcoaches, with implementation of 
carrying capacities;
Ibid., p. 62.
Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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2) Increase facilities to encourage visitors to use other areas of the Park;
3) Attempt to disperse use through advertising other areas;
4) Plow the road from West Yellowstone to Old Faithful;
5) “Require all snowmachines to meet strict, but reasonable emissions and noise 
standards;”
6) Require all winter users to be part of a guided tour to help provide better 
information and interpretation;
7) “Allow snowcoaches only to use park roads in the winter to address air quality and 
noise concerns, provide a mode of transportation that does not overwhelm the Park 
setting, and increase the level of information and interpretation about the resources;”
8) “Close certain road segments to oversnow vehicle traffic to protect bison or address 
safety issues;” and
9) “Close all park roads to oversnow vehicle traffic to protect bison.”^̂
Note that all of these options would institute significant changes in the winter
situation, some of them practically revolutionary. Administrators are finally considering 
real reform in Yellowstone—but have yet to make any revolutions.
Evidently such consideration is more than just talk, as the following piece of a
memorandum from Chief Park Planner John Sacklin to Superintendent Finley 
illustrates:
Most of the [VUM] group believes that the following three alternatives represent a 
good range of solutions to the winter visitor use management issues in Yellowstone 
National Park.
* Limit motorized winter oversnow access to snowcoaches only. Restrict private 
snowcoaches. We would return to the fundamental reasons why people come to 
Yellowstone in the winter: to enjoy and experience the spectacular scenery, wildlife, 
thermal features, and solitude. The means of accessing these features would no longer 
overwhelm the experience.... Nearly all conflicts between users would be eliminated.
* Limit motorized winter oversnow access to guided tours (both snowcoach and 
snowmobile) only. Private snowmobiles would be allowed, but only as part of tours. 
Use would be limited by the number of tours permitted to enter the Park ...Most 
conflicts between users would remain. ...
Limit overall winter use and establish a reservation system (combined with first come-
36 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
163
first serve) for all winter users. All current winter uses would be allowed; however, the 
numbers of visitors per day would be limited/^
While these three options will not all result in the elimination of snowmobiles, all of 
them will indeed limit visitation, arguably a major accomplishment—if enacted.
Yellowstone administrators are also embarking on research into the effects of 
snowmobile trails on the Park’s bison in particular, having recently approved at least 
thirteen different research projects involving bison and/or their use of groomed 
snowmobile trails.^*
Clearly, the VUM team has made substantial progress on its list of tasks and on the 
four main steps of the VUM Process. After more than twenty years of unlimited 
snowmobiling in Yellowstone, unlimited resource impacts, very limited knowledge of 
snowmobile impacts, and limited control over the winter situation, the Park 
administrators are evidently finally considering true reform. They are considering 
limitations to the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone, some of them quite restrictive 
limitations. They are recognizing that snowmobiles do impact the Park’s treasured 
resources. They are embarking on research to discern some of those resource impacts. In 
effect, they are attempting to exert some real control over the Park that they manage. 
However, they have yet to make any significant changes or decisions regarding winter 
use of Yellowstone.
John A. Sacklin to Superintendent, Sept. 19, 1995, IN Planning Office Files, File: “Yellowstone Alternatives,” NPS, 
YNP,W Y.
Tami Blackford, “Research and Researchers in Yellowstone,” The Buffalo Chip (A Resource Management newsletter 
published by the Yellowstone Center for Resources, YNP, WY), August/Sept. 1997, pp. 19-20.
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Additionally, the VUM authors acknowledge that the Winter Use Plan really only 
affirmed the status quo, making no major changes. Consequently,, the VUM process is 
the first significant attempt to examine the environmental and social consequences of 
unlimited snowmobile use of Yellowstone. Moreover, it is the first acknowledgment that 
such concerns, long raised by the public, are indeed valid. Again, though, park managers 
have yet to institute any such changes.
While park managers deserve commendation for these long-overdue actions, their 
work on proper winter visitor use management has only begun. Frustrated with 
persistent foot-dragging by Yellowstone administrators, and their earlier policy of 
ignoring the environmental effects of snowmobiling, a pair of wildlife groups filed suit 
against the NPS in Yellowstone regarding their lax snowmobile policy in 1997.
The W inter of 1996-97 and Public Backlash
In the winter of 1996-97, almost half of Yellowstone’s bison perished. N ot only did 
that winter bring much heavier-than-normal snow levels (as much as twice normal 
levels), but it also brought a week of rain to Yellowstone, even at its higher elevations— 
an unusual winter event. The rain fell around New Year’s Day. Later in January, colder 
temperatures returned, freezing the rain in the snowpack into a layer of ice as much as a 
foot thick. Subsequent snowfall buried the ice within the snowpack, where it remained 
for the rest of the winter
' Doug Peacock, “The Yellowstone Massacre,” Audubon 99(3) 42.
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Bison are ordinarily capable of moving as much as three feet of snow aside to access 
the buried grass for their sustenance. They are especially well adapted for this, using their 
massive heads as snowplows to move the snow to the side. Yet, even the largest bulls, 
which can weigh over 2,000 pounds, could not cope with the ice layer in the snowpack 
that winter. Consequently, bison began leaving the park (some via the snowmobile trails) 
searching for lower pastures lacking that layer of ice. In January and February of 1997, 
the only such places that existed were outside of Yellowstone Park, in the West 
Yellowstone and Gardiner, Montana areas. So, bison began leaving the Park in record 
numbers.^°
Bison in Yellowstone carry brucellosis, a disease that causes them no harm, but 
causes cattle to abort fetuses. Montana and Wyoming ranchers in the past twenty or 
thirty years have collectively spent millions of dollars eradicating this disease from their 
herds. Because their efforts at eradication were successful, the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) of the U.S. Government has awarded both states a special 
“brucellosis-free” status, which allows ranchers in these states to ship cattle out of state 
without quarantining them for brucellosis verification, a time-consuming and expensive 
process. APHIS carefully supervises the brucellosis status of each state, and the states 
zealously guard their brucellosis-free status. When bison leave the Park in winter, they 
sometimes range onto private land used to ranch cattle in the summer. However, most of
Ibid.
166
the landowners remove their cattle in winter. With the cattle gone while bison are there, 
and with the very low survivability of the Brucella organism (the cause of brucellosis) in 
the cold winter weather, the possibility of bison transmitting this disease to cattle is 
extremely small, and has never been documented. Nevertheless, with bison leaving the 
Park, APHIS has threatened to revoke Montana’s brucellosis-free status. Consequently, 
representatives of the state of Montana, APHIS, and Yellowstone developed an interim 
bison management plan to cope with the bison that leave the Park. The plan is rather 
simple, calling for the state of Montana and Yellowstone administrators to capture and 
kill most departing bison. The state then shoots and kills, or captures and sends to 
slaughter, any bison that leave the park, with some exceptions in certain areas.^^
During the winter of 1996-97, the state of Montana shot and killed most bison that 
left Yellowstone, or captured and sent them to slaughterhouses. By winter’s end, the state 
had killed 1,084 bison. This may have been the largest such slaughter of bison since they 
were eliminated from the Great Plains in southeastern Montana in 1884. Additionally, 
about another 400 bison died of natural causes (starvation, mainly) inside Yellowstone, 
due to the severe winter. In total, almost half of Yellowstone’s bison perished that
• 42Winter.
To save the lives of bison that winter, the NPS attempted to haze bison back into
" Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 41.
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the Park, an effort that was largely unsuccessful, since bison are very difficult to herd/^ 
What was successful was capturing the bison, holding them in corrals, and feeding them 
there until the spring thaw enabled bison to go back into Yellowstone. Such holding and 
feeding efforts were a major departure from NFS policy, and were implemented 
exclusively to limit Montana’s brutality.^^
The controversy regarding the situation last winter was long and bitter, reaching the 
highest levels of the NFS, Department of the Interior, Montana state government, and 
AFHIS/Department of Agriculture. At the date of this writing, the agencies have still 
not agreed on a plan that would limit the deaths of bison.**̂  There is considerable public 
frustration with the inability of the agencies to craft a humane solution to this problem. 
For example, the National Wildlife Federation sponsored an information booth for two 
months in summer, 1997, to inform the public about the situation and to advocate for 
their solution, which is to capture exiting bison and ship them, alive, to Native 
Americans who desire them on their reservation—over forty tribes from all over the U.S. 
would like Yellowstone bison sent to them.**̂  Another expression of citizen 
dissatisfaction occurred at a public meeting in Gardiner on March 23, 1997. Bison rights 
advocate Delyla Wilson of Bozeman threw a bucketful of bison guts salvaged from the
Attesting to the veracity of the local saying: “You can herd a bison anywhere it wants to go.”
** Peacock, “The Yellowstone Massacre,” p. 48.
Jeanne-Marie Souvigney, “Yellowstone Park: Speedway or Sanctuary?” Greater Yellowstone Report (Fall, 1997), p. 7.
National Wildlife Federation, “National Wildlife Federation & Native Americans Join Forces,” Time for You to Speak 
Out: Stop the Destruction of Your Bujfalo (Flyer distributed by NWF at its booth in Yellowstone in summer, 1997, 
available from NWF, Northern Rocldes Resource Center, 240 N. Higgins, Missoula, MT 59802), p. 1.
168
Gardiner killing field at the officials of the above-mentioned agencies, including Montana 
Governor Marc Racicot, Senator Max Baucus, Senator Conrad Burns, and Secretary of 
Agriculture Dan Glickman/^
Yellowstone administrators certainly share a small portion of the responsibility for 
the bison slaughter by grooming snowmobile trails, which facilitate the higher numbers 
of bison and their exit from the Park. Hence, Meyer and Glitzenstein, a law firm in 
Washington, D C. representing the Fund for Animals and Biodiversity Legal Foundation 
(“BLF”) (two national wildlife advocacy organizations) notified Yellowstone on January 
24, 1997, of its intent to sue the NFS regarding its violations of NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act in connection with winter use activities in Yellowstone.^^ The 
BLF had originally given the NPS a letter of intent to sue in May 1996,"*̂  but had not 
followed up on it, until the January letter to Yellowstone. Most likely, the appalling 
bison killings reinvigorated BLF’s desire to file its suit, for Meyer and Glitzenstein, in 
their letter, noted that “bison are now being killed by NPS employees and other 
government officials in record numbers,” and consequently, “we request that the NPS 
commit to a schedule for compliance with NEPA.” °̂
The heart of Meyer’s and Glitzenstein’s letter was their demand that the NPS
Jim Angell, “Racicot, ag chief talk bison,” Missoulian, March 24,1997.
Howard B. Crystal and Eric R. Glitzenstein (both of Meyer & Glitzenstein), to Bruce Babbitt, Roger Kennedy, Jack 
Neckels, Michael Finley, and John Rogers (all of the Dept, of the Interior or NPS), Jan. 24, 1997, Yellowstone 
National Park files, YNP, WY.
Michael Milstein, “Environmentalists want snowmobiles barred from Park,” Billings Gazette, May 11,1996.
Crystal and Glitzenstein to Babbitt et al., Jan. 24,1997, Yellowstone National Park files, YNP, WY.
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prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the effects of winter use, 
specifically snowmobile trail grooming, on the resources of Yellowstone and Grand 
Teton National Parks. They specifically alleged that winter use in Yellowstone and 
Grand Teton
has a number of adverse environmental impacts which have never been properly 
addressed [recall Caslick’s similar statement]...:
1) the extent to which animals and plants ... and their habitats are adversely affected 
by winter use activities, and in particular, by snowmobiles and groomed 
snowmobile trails;
2) the extent to which species’ population dynamics, distribution, and movements 
are artificially altered due to the mobility afforded through use of groomed 
snowmobile trails, and the effects these altered populations have on Park 
vegetation, wildlife, and ecological processes;
3) the impact of winter use activities on the Parks’ air and water quality, and 
compliance with the Clean Air A c t... and Clean Water A c t...; and
4) the impact of winter use activities on the winter visitor experience in these Parks 
... One particularly salient example of these impacts is bison use of the groomed 
snowmobile trails.^^
Meyer and Glitzenstein requested that the EIS address all of these issues. They went 
on to allege that “the 1990 EA did not adequately address any of these issues. However, 
even if it had, supplemental NEPA analysis would nonetheless be required” because 
substantial changes in winter use have occurred (the large increases in visitation since 
1990) and substantial new information regarding winter use has come to light (the 
information on bison used of groomed snowmobile roads).
In addition to demanding examination of the above impacts, Meyer and Glitzenstein
Ibid. 
" Ibid.
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also demanded that the EIS comply with the National Park Service Organic Act, the Act 
which established Yellowstone National Park, the NPS’s own regulations and guidance, 
and Executive Orders 11644 and 11989. Finally, they asked that the NPS comply with 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act by formally consulting with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service regarding the effects of winter use activities on the Park’s grizzly bears 
and gray wolves, both of which are threatened species residing in the Park.
Meyer and Glitzenstein concluded their letter (“the January letter”) by stating 
“unless the NPS will commit to these measures within the next 30 days, we will have no 
choice but to pursue compliance with legal requirements in federal court.”^̂
Meyer and Glitzenstein followed up their intent to sue with another letter on 
February 12, 1997, to all potential defendants. The letter included a 49-page report they 
wrote summarizing the impacts of winter use on park wildlife, air quality, and park 
users, and the alleged violations of the NPS in regards to the laws listed above.^^ The 
evident intent of this report was to explain these things in greater detail than the January 
letter did.
Superintendent Finley never responded to the January letter,^^ so Meyer and
"Ibid.
D. J. Schubert to Glickman, Dombeck, Salwasser, and Estill (all high-ranking U.S.F.S or Dept, of Ag. Personnel), and 
Schubert to Babbitt, Kennedy, Finley, Neckels, and Rogers (all high-ranking NPS, Dept, of Interior, or USFWS 
personnel), both dated Feb. 12, 1997. The 49-page report is: D. J. Schubert, “Adverse Effects of Trail Grooming and 
Snowmobile Use on Winter Use Management in the Greater Yellowstone Area with a Special Emphasis on 
Yellowstone National Park” (Unpublished report submitted to NPS), February, 1997. All of these are available from 
the NPS, YNP, WY, or Meyer & Glitzenstein, 1601 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 450, Washington, D.C. 20009- 
1035.
55 Personal communication with John Sacklin, Chief Park Planner, NPS, Nov. 14, 1997, Mammoth Hot Springs, WY.
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Glitzenstein filed suit on May 20, 1997 in U.S. District Court in the District of 
Columbia. By this time the Predator Project of Bozeman, Montana, the Ecology Center 
of Missoula, Montana, and five different individuals had joined the suit as plaintiffs. In 
their complaint, the plaintiffs prayed for the same relief that Meyer and Glitzenstein had 
in their January letter to the NPS in Yellowstone.^^
Over the summer, a snowmobile advocacy group formed in Dubois, Wyoming to 
fight the lawsuit against Meyer and Glitzenstein, hoping to keep the treasured 
snowmobile trails open.^^ By October, both this group and the Blue Ribbon Coalition of 
Pocatello, Idaho (another snowmobile group) had filed motions to intervene, hoping to 
join the side of the NPS in defending the status quo in Yellowstone. However, in late 
October, Judge Emmett Sullivan ruled that these two groups would not be allowed to
• • 58join.
On September 23, 1997, Meyer and Glitzenstein settled its suit with the NPS out of 
court. In the settlement, the NPS agreed to do the following:
1) Prepare a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement addressing a full range of 
alternatives for all types of winter use, including snowmobiling and trail grooming, 
in Yellowstone and considering the effects of those alternatives on the Park’s 
environments. The NPS shall begin the EIS process by scoping for relevant concerns 
by April 1, 1998, shall have the draft EIS issued on or before August 1,1999, and 
shall have the final EIS completed by Sept. 1, 2000;
2) Request the U.S.F.S. to participate in preparation of the EIS as a cooperating agency;
Case Number 1:97CV01126, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Emmett Sullivan, Deck Type 
Civil General, May 20, 1997.
Angus M. Thuermer, Jr., “Charges fly as more join park lawsuit,” Hole News, Jackson, WY, August 27,1997.
Scott McMillion, “Judge upholds Yellowstone winter-use settlement,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Bozeman, MT, Oct. 
28, 1997.
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3) Continue existing winter activities;
4) Refrain from building any winter use facilities other than a warming hut at Norris, 
replacement warming huts at Madison and Canyon, and replacement underground 
fuel storage tanks at Old Faithful;
5) Prepare a Biological Assessment and request formal consultation with the USFWS 
regarding the impacts of winter use activities on grizzly bears and wolves;
6) Prepare an EA with the proposed action of closing one or more road segments to 
winter visitor use in order to study the effects of groomed snowmobile trails on 
bison; the preferred alternative must be closing the road from Fishing Bridge to 
Canyon on January 10, 1998 and possibly for the next two winters as well; and
7) Pay the plaintiffs $11,000 for attorney fees and other expenses.^^
On October 27, 1997, Judge Sullivan approved the settlement, and denied the 
snowmobile groups permission to join the suit.^°
O n January 16, 1998, Yellowstone administrators completed the most immediate of 
the settlement points, number six. In their Environmental Assessment on the closure of 
fourteen miles of snowmobile trail in Yellowstone, Yellowstone administrators decided 
against closing any snowmobile trails for the next three winters. Instead of the closures, 
administrators “will instead expand ‘research and monitoring’ of bison movements and 
their use of the roads for three winters,” and decide after three winters whether any 
closures are necessary to protect the park’s bison.^* Perhaps the visits of Wyoming 
Congressman Craig Thomas and Montana Congressman Conrad Burns just the week 
before influenced the park to refrain from any closures. After his visit, Thomas stated
Settlement Agreement, The Fund for Animals, et at., v. Bruce Babbitt et at.. Civil No. 97-1126 (EGS), Sept. 23, 1997, 
U.S. District Court, District of Columbia; Planning Office files, NPS, YNP, WY.
Scott McMillion, “Judge upholds Yellowstone winter-use settlement,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Bozeman, MT, Oct. 
28, 1997.
Scott McMillion, “Road closure put on hold,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Jan. 17, 1998.
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“We don’t think there is justification for the closure and, frankly, my trip reinforced 
that.”^̂  As Andrea Lococo and D J. Schubert of the Fund for Animals said, 
(respectively) the NPS’s “decision demonstrates that the Park Service is far more 
interested in pacifying politicians and in continuing to keep the public visitation 
turnstiles spinning,” and “the Park Service has decided that managing Yellowstone like it 
were Disneyland is more important than complying with federal law.”^̂
Thus, twenty-six years after Yellowstone’s administrators began grooming 
snowmobile trails, a lawsuit from the public at last compelled them to take a hard look at 
the environmental effects of snowmobiles, as well as other forms of winter recreation, on 
the Park. However, the first actions of Yellowstone administrators to comply with the 
lawsuit settlement leave much to be desired, raising the question as to whether that hard 
look will accomplish any significant changes.
Chapter Conclusion
When Mike Finley arrived, many of the NPS staff felt that at last Yellowstone had a 
superintendent who might change things, especially uncontrolled winter visitation.^”* 
Beginning with the VUM Process, and culminating in the commitment to do an EIS, 
Finley is now beginning to take a hard look at the adverse effects of snowmobiles, and 
winter recreation in general, on the Park.
“Sen. Thomas: Snowmobile trail closures not justified,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1998. 
"  Ibid.
Personal experience, Yellowstone National Park, 1994.
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While Yellowstone’s administrators have committed to the EIS, only time will tell if 
they decide to make any major changes. The recent decision to refrain from closing a 
snowmobile trail indicates that Yellowstone administrators may not have the will to 
attempt major reform in the Park. The citizens shall have to continue to be vigilant in 
holding Yellowstone’s administrators responsible for their actions as they go about the 
EIS.
Time will also tell whether local and national politicians will allow them to make 
that decision, whatever it may be. The economic and political powers of the snowmobile 
advocates are extremely strong and able to overcome significant public opposition to 
snowmobiles in Yellowstone (such as recorded in the 1990 Winter Use Plan). For 
example, less than two weeks after Judge Emmett approved the settlement. Senator 
Conrad Burns of Montana, a staunch defender of motorized use of national parks at all 
expense, introduced a bill in Congress that would compel the NPS to remain open to 
snowmobiles for winter, expand the length of the season, and require Park managers to 
work with gateway communities on issues that affect their pocketbook.^^ It will be 
interesting to see if Burns’ bill goes anywhere.
One of the lessons learned from the 1990 Winter Use Plan is that; in order to 
significantly change the winter situation, Yellowstone’s administrators will need to have 
exhaustive amounts of data to prove that change is necessary, and to overcome the
’ Scott McMillion, “Burns has plan for park,” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Bozeman, MT, Nov. 8,1997.
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political pressure to continue allowing unlimited numbers of snowmobile into the 
Park.^^ Many concerned individuals hope that the Park’s administrators use the EIS and 
the VUM Process to provide that data and to make the right decision, one that will stick.
“  Bill Shreier (Former Assistant Planner for Yellowstone), interview by author, telephone interview, Bryce Canyon
National Park, Utah, Nov. 17,1997.
CONCLUSION
Yellowstone’s snowmobile policy owes its existence to five different superintendents 
from the 1960’s to today.
Beginning in the early 1960’s, John McLaughlin encouraged snowmobile use as a 
way of dispersing visitation throughout the year, in accordance with the MISSION 66 
program. Additionally, McLaughlin followed the dominant theme throughout the 
national parks in this period of national park history; encouraging visitation.
Jack Anderson arrived in Yellowstone in 1967 and served through 1975. During his 
tenure,-he formally adopted the snowmobile policy of Yellowstone National Park as a 
way of satisfying local pressure to plow Yellowstone’s roads in winter. Anderson also 
encouraged snowmobile use as a means of enabling visitors to see and experience 
Yellowstone at that spectacular time of year. Finally, Anderson eventually adopted a 
personal agenda of promoting snowmobiles in the Park because he loved the machines 
and the activities that they enabled him to do. Even though Anderson would probably 
be appalled at the modern situation in Yellowstone, he remains the person most 
responsible for opening Yellowstone to snowmobiles.
John Townsley, Anderson’s successor, continued Anderson’s policy of promoting 
snowmobile visitation because he, too, personally liked the machines, to the point of 
being a crusader for their use. Townsley wanted all people to experience the Park in
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winter, and the snowmobile was the means to that end. Pressure from his superiors and 
from local interests drove Townsley to expand services, as it had driven his predecessor 
to open the Park in the first place.
Bob Barbee arrived in Yellowstone in 1983 to find winter use again increasing 
exponentially, and reacted by taking the first steps toward regulating the machines and 
their impact on the Park. Nevertheless, he both tolerated the use of snowmobiles in the 
Park, and also promoted their use, as Townsley and Anderson had, though not as 
zealously. By accepting snowmobile use in the park, yet beginning to regulate it and 
examine its impacts upon the Park, Barbee’s was a superintendency of transition to a 
more critical and possibly protective superintendent.
Mike Finley, reacting to yet more increases in visitation and a lawsuit, has taken a 
more critical look at the effects of snowmobiles upon the Park. He has admitted that 
many of the concerns regarding winter visitation are valid—that there are problems with 
winter use in Yellowstone. Having begun some serious research into those problems, he 
has yet to make any significant changes.
Except for Mr. Finley, these Yellowstone administrators gave no serious attention to 
the potential environmental impacts of snowmobile/winter visitor use until the Visitor 
Use Management Process began in 1993, nor did they comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act until 1990—and even then, only marginally so. Generally they 
adhered to their personal feelings and anecdotal evidence that snowmobiles had fewer 
environmental impacts than the automobile did. Not until long after information about
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the negative effects of snowmobiles became widely known did Yellowstone 
administrators even begin to take the hard look that they were required to take. 
Likewise, when Yellowstone’s administrators gave consideration to the potential for 
tremendous increase in snowmobile visitation, they either felt helpless to control it or 
relied upon misleading figures to support their decisions. Finally, Yellowstone 
administrators did not consider the policies of other national parks toward snowmobiles, 
until recently. Rather than investigating the motives of the other parks in eliminating 
snowmobiles, and doing the same in Yellowstone, Yellowstone’s administrators instead 
wanted other parks to come in line with their pro-snowmobile policy. NPS 
administrators in Yellowstone also never sought public opinion regarding snowmobile 
use in the Park, and ignored it when they did seek it, in contrast to the efforts made by 
other park superintendents to discern public opinion and adhere to it.
In conclusion, Yellowstone National Park had several superintendents from the 
1960’s to the 1980’s who allowed snowmobiles into the Park to satisfy their own desires, 
to allow the public to view the spectacular scenery of the Park in winter, and to mollify 
local politicians and citizens. In their zealous rush to allow snowmobiles, however, the 
superintendents neglected to examine their environmental effects, potential for increased 
numbers, and treatment in other national parks. By neglecting their important 
responsibilities, the superintendents have allowed snowmobiles to dominate and 
adversely affect the Park as they do today.
APPENDIX
National Parks have meant different things to Americans at different times in their 
history. Originally they were seen as pleasuring grounds, often for the wealthy only. By 
the middle of this century, Americans viewed them not only as pleasuring grounds, but 
also as a form of Disney World, where they could feed bears and manipulate nature to 
their desired end. By the 1960’s the meaning of national parks had begun to change to be 
that of a natural sanctuary in which we could allow nature to run its course as much as 
possible.
Since then, America has become much more urbanized. With that urbanization, 
Americans have lost much of their former free time, as well as quiet, relaxing places to 
spend time in. As well, the country has acquired more and more control over nature, 
gradually losing ever more of its truly wild places.
It is for these reasons that Joseph Sax, in Mountains Without Handrails, argues that 
the highest purpose of national parks today is as places to escape the noise and pervasive 
influence of our society. They are places to contemplate, to meditate, and to be inspired 
by nature:
Save some places explicitly for what has been called ... reflective or contemplative 
recreation. Indeed, try to encourage more of such recreation, and for that reason try 
to accommodate conventional demands ... at other places. Moreover, make some 
effort to discourage the use of public lands for those forms of recreation that are the 
most consumptive of the resources, and that rest principally on the inclination 
toward power and dominion.^
' Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 105.
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I would add to Sax’s brilliant call to park managers and Americans another reason to 
save them: that they are places to touch the wildness present in nature, and thereby learn 
who we are. For example, by realizing that there is an animal out there that can kill us 
(grizzly bears), we learn humility, and learn our place in the world.
Sax may have been thinking directly of snowmobiles when he wrote his book, for 
they are a form of recreation that is consumptive of natural resources and they do rest on 
the inclination toward power and dominion over nature. As such, snowmobiles do not 
belong in our national parks. And so, I join Sax in calling on the NPS to get rid of them 
entirely; eliminate them from our national parks. Return to the Parks their natural, 
awesome quiet. Make the Parks even better places to reflect and contemplate, to touch 
wildness and find out who we are.
My Specific Recommendations for Yellowstone
I first recommend that Park administrators complete the studies on bison use of the 
groomed roadways in the Park. If the studies confirm that bison do use the groomed 
roadways to a significant degree, then I recommend that Park administrators:
1) Close the roads on the east side of the Park to all motorized use: from Canyon to
West Thumb and to the East Entrance; and
2) Restrict visitation on all other roads within Yellowstone to snowcoaches only.
If the studies conclude that bison use of groomed roadways is not significant, then:
181
1) Restrict the roads on the east and south sides of the Park, from Canyon to the East 
Entrance, Fishing Bridge to the South Entrance, and Old Faithful to the South 
Entrance, to snowcoaches only; and
2) Plow the roads on the west side of the Park, from Mammoth Hot Springs to Old 
Faithful and West Yellowstone to Canyon, and open them to public transportation 
only—twelve-passenger vans or buses.
As reasons for these recommendations I list the following set of advantages they both
offer:
1) Snowcoaches and buses are both much cleaner than snowmobiles.
2) Both are much quieter than snowmobiles.
3) Continuing use of snowcoaches in some part of the Park preserves a unique, but 
relatively benign experience for visitors.
4) Both options promote public transportation over private transportation, conserving 
fossil fuels and setting a good example to the public.
5) With a captive audience on the snowcoaches and/or buses, the NPS can force the 
public to listen to its educational message, which typically emphasizes preservation.
6) With either snowcoaches or buses, the NPS could limit overall park visitation to the 
number of seats available on the vehicles.
7) Likewise, the NPS could protect its precious resources better, because the 
professional drivers of such vehicles would generally respect the Park resources more 
than some snowmobilers do.
8) With drivers trained to drive on Yellowstone’s winter roads, the public would 
generally be safer than they are now with the hundreds of snowmobilers on the 
roads.
9) Because the NPS would not have to groom as many roads or patrol them as much, 
they would save a considerable amount of money.
10) Buses and, to a lesser extent, snowcoaches, would be more affordable to more park 
visitors.
11) Through scheduling, the NPS could both stagger the entering times of the buses or 
coaches, reducing crowding impacts, and could offer improved skier/hiker shuttles.
Either option would have some drawbacks. Following I list these drawbacks, and
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offer responses to them:
1) Probably the single greatest drawback is that under either option, bison would 
probably continue to use the groomed roads or plowed roads. However, bison will 
continue to leave the Park near Gardiner on their own natural trails; hence, even 
closing the entire park will not fully solve this problem. Furthermore, with the 
strident snowmobile advocates present in the surrounding communities, closing the 
entire park is politically impossible. Hence, it will be difficult enough to implement 
either of the above options. However, since either option above is a significant 
improvement over the current situation, let us advocate for them and recognize that 
we will always have bison exiting the Park, and shall have to develop means of 
coping with this regardless of what we do in the winter. This is not meant to divert 
attention from the current problems; rather, it is a way of saying that, given the 
current situation, let us take what steps we can to improve it.
2) Purchasing many new snowcoaches and/or buses will be expensive, with the costs 
most likely borne by AmPac Parks & Resorts, the current park concessionaire. By 
waiting until the bison research is done, we will wait long enough to begin a new 
contract with the company, and can then require them to purchase the equipment 
under that new contract. The company will more easily be persuaded to buy buses, 
since they can use them in summer and thereby realize income on them nearly year- 
round.
3) West Yellowstone is undoubtedly going to loudly criticize these proposals, since they 
stand to lose large amounts of money, or so they think. In her 1995 study, however, 
Littlejohn discovered that snowcoach passengers spend an average of $100 more than 
snowmobilers on their stay in the Yellowstone area.^ Clearly, then. West merchants 
could make more money under this proposal. Furthermore, merchants in West 
Yellowstone will someday have to understand that the Park is not here for their 
economic benefit.
4) Some argue that eliminating snowmobiles from the Park will displace them to 
surrounding areas, and that snowmobile use on the National Forest will 
correspondingly increase. This argument is spurious, because if the activity of 
snowmobiling is all that draws such persons to the Yellowstone area, then they do 
not belong in Yellowstone in the first place.
5) Some will argue that restricting visitors to public transportation will reduce their 
freedom of choice. While this reduction can be minimized through flexible or 
staggered schedules, it is time to recognize that some individual sacrifices for the 
common good will be necessary.
' Margaret Littlejohn, Visitor Services Project: Yellowstone National Park Visitor Study y Report 73 (University of Idaho, 
Moscow), 1996, p. A-5.
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It is time—it is past due—to eliminate the snowmobile from Yellowstone, and to 
allow all citizens to experience the awesome beauty, silence, and wildlife of Yellowstone 
more completely. In that way, we will find a place worthy of its name. Wonderland: a 
place to reflect, contemplate, touch wildness, and learn who we are.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARCHIVAL MATERIALS
Yellowstone National Park Archives and Library, Mammoth Hot Springs, Wyoming. 
Annual Reports of the Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park.
Glacier National Park Archives, West Glacier, Montana.
Lassen National Park files, Mineral, CA.
Monthly Reports of the Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park.
Planning Office Files, National Park Service, Yellowstone National Park, WY.
Regional Archive Depository of the National Archives, Kansas City, MO.
BOOKS
Baldwin, Malcolm F. The Off-Road Vehicle and Environmental Quality- Washington, The 
Conservation Foundation, 1970.
Bryan, T. Scott. The Geysers of Yellowstone. Niwot, University Press of Colorado, 1991.
Chapman, W. Scott. Yellowstone Back Country. Yellowstone, Yellowstone Library and 
Museum Association, 1971.
Cowl Industries Limited. A Study of the Feasibility of Reducing Snowmobile Noise. Ottawa, 
Information Canada, 1973-
Everhart, William C. The National Park Service. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972.
Frome, Michael. Regreening the National Parks. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 
1992.
Hampton, Duane. How the U.S. Cavalry Saved the National Parks. Bloomington, 
University of Indiana Press, 1971.
184
185
Milstein, Michael. Yellowstone: 125 Years of America’s Best Idea. Billings, The Billings 
Gazette, 1996.
Reese, Rick. Greater Yellowstone: The National Park & Adjacent Wildlands. Helena, 
American & World Geographic Publishing, 1991.
Robbins, Jim. Last Refuge: The Environmental Showdown in the American West. New 
York, Harper Collins West, 1994.
Runte, Alfred. National Parks: The American Experience. Lincoln, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1979.
Sax, Joseph. Mountains Without Handrails. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press. 1980.
Schullery, Paul. Searching for Yellowstone: Ecology and Wonder in the Last Wilderness. 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1997.
-------------- . Yellowstone’s Ski Pioneers: Peril & Heroism on the Winter Trail. Worland,
WY, High Plains Publishing Company, 1995.
Sellars, Richard West. Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History. New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1997.
Texas Agricultural Experiment Station. Off-Road Recreation Vehicles, A Research 
Summary 1969-1975. College Station, Texas A7M University System, 1976.
Tuite, James J. Snowmobiles and Snowmobiling. New York, Cowles Book Company, 
Inc., 1969.
Wright, Dan. The Road-Ripper’s Guide to Off-Road Vehicles. Missoula, Wildlands CPR, 
1995.
GOVERNM ENT DOCUMENTS
Greater Yellowstone Winter Visitor Use Management Working Croup. Winter Visitor 
Use Management: A Multi-Agency Assessment. [N.p.J, Greater Yellowstone 
Coordinating Committee, April, 1997.
Harrison, Robin. Snowmobile Noise. U.S. Dept, of Agriculture, 1974.
186
Littlejohn, Margaret. Visitor Services Project, Yellowstone National Park Visitor Study, 
Report 75. Moscow, University of Idaho, 1996.
National Park Service. Environmental Assessment: Temporary Closure of a Winter Road, 
Yellowstone National Park. Yellowstone, NPS, 1997.
-. Existing Winter Use Management Guidelines, Inventory, and Needs,
Yellowstone National Park, March, 1989. Yellowstone National Park, 1989.
-. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate, on Winter Operation of Roads in Yellowstone National Park. 
Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, 1968.
------------------. Management Policies. Washington, NPS, 1988.
National Park Service Administrative History: A Guide. Washington,
D C., National Park Service, 1991.
-. National Park Service Strategic Plan, Final Drafi. Denver, Denver
Service Center, 1996.
-. Overview of Maintenance Trends, Yellowstone National Park, 1997.
Maintenance Office, Yellowstone National Park, 1997.
------------------. Proposed Oversnow Vehicle Use at Glacier National Park, Montana.
Glacier National Park, MT, 1975.
------------------. Winter Use Plan Environmental Assessment. Denver, Denver Service
Center, 1990.
Shelton, Napier, and Lissa Fox. An Introduction to Selected Laws Important for Resources Managem 
in the National Park Service. Washington, U.S. Dept, of the Interior, 1994.
THESES AND UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS
Aune, Keith. “Impact of Winter Recreationists on Wildlife in a Portion of Yellowstone 
National Park, Wyoming.” Master’s Thesis, Montana State University, 1981.
Bennett, Larry E. “A Review of Potential Effects of Winter Recreation on Wildlife in 
Grand Teton and Yellowstone National Parks: A Bibliographic Data Base.”
187
Planning Office Files, Yellowstone, WY.
Caslick, James. “Impacts of Winter Recreation on Wildlife in Yellowstone National 
Park: A Literature Review and Recommendations.” Planning Office Files, 
Yellowstone, WY.
Catton, Theodore. “Wonderland: An Administrative History of Mount Rainier 
National Park.” Seattle, NPS Cultural Resources Program, 1996.
Fawcett, Darcy L. “Colonial Status: The Search for Independence in West Yellowstone, 
Montana.” Undergraduate thesis, Montana State University, 1993.
International Snowmobile Industry Association. “Comments on the California Air 
Resources Board Mail Out # 90-70 ‘A Proposal to Establish Exhaust Emission 
Standards and Test Procedures for Off-Highway Light-Duty Vehicles and 
Recreational Vehicles.’” Report available from ISIA, 3975 University Drive, Suite 
310, Fairfax, VA 22030.
Jonkel, Charles J. “Winter Disturbance and Grizzly Bears.” Special Report, University of 
Montana, Missoula, 1980.
Jurale, James A. “History of Winter Use in Yellowstone National Park.” Master’s thesis. 
University of Wyoming, 1986.
Meagher, Mary. “Winter Recreation-induced Changes in Bison Numbers and
Distribution in Yellowstone National Park.” Submitted to NPS, YNP, WY. 1993.
Paganelli, Linda. “The Historical Development of Winter Visitor Use at Yellowstone 
National Park.” Report submitted to NPS, Yellowstone National Park, 1980.
Schubert, D. J. “Adverse Effects of Trail Grooming and Snowmobile Use on Winter Use 
Management in the Greater Yellowstone Area with a Special Emphasis on 
Yellowstone National Park.” Meyer & Glitzenstein, 1601 Connecticut Avenue, 
N.W ., Suite 450, Washington, D.C. 20009.
“Snowmobile Briefing Book, Volumes 1 and 2.” Black binders at the Yellowstone 
National Park Library.
ARTICLES
Adams, E. S. “Effects of lead and hydrocarbons from snowmobile exhaust on brook
188
trout.” Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 2 (1975).
Barnes, James. “The Legal Status of Snowmobiles and their Effects on Bison in
Yellowstone National Park.” The Road-RIPorter 2 (a publication of Wildlands CPR, 
Missoula, MT) (March/April, 1997).
Behme, Bob. “Snowmobiling in Yellowstone.” Field & Stream 76 (Dec., 1971).
Blackford, Tami. “Research and Researchers in Yellowstone.” The Bujfalo Chip (a 
quarterly publication of the National Park Service, Yellowstone) (August/Sept.
1997).
Cassirer, E. Frances, David J. Freddy, and Ernest D. Abies. “Elk Responses to
Disturbance by Cross-Country Skiers in Yellowstone National Park. Wildlife Society 
Bulletin 20 (1992).
Cole, Glen F. “A Naturally Regulated Elk Population.” Proceedings of the Symposium on 
Natural Regulation of Wildlife Populations (1983).
Cottrell, Chuck. “Executive Orders & ORVs.” The Road-RIPorter 2 (July/August, 1997).
“Demonstration Urges Reopening Parks to Snowmobiles.” National Parks 55 (June, 
1981).
“Frequently Received Comments and Questions.” Winter Visitor Use Management (an 
occasional publication by the NPS in Yellowstone) (Jan., 1996).
Halliday, Robert S. “Yellowstone in Winter.” Parade (March 13, 1955).
Hughes, Dan. “Crashing through the snow.” National Park Service Newsletter 12 
(January, 1977).
Manning, Robert E., et al. “The Visitor Experience and Resource Protection (VERP) 
Process: The Application of Carrying Capacity to Arches National Park.” The 
George Wright Forum, A Journal of Cultural and Natural Parks and Reserves 12 (1995).
Peacock, Doug. “The Yellowstone Massacre.” Audubon 99 (May/June, 1997).
Polzin, Paul E., and Tat P. Fong. “Snowmobiling in Montana: An Economic Study.” 
Montana Business Quarterly (Winter, 1988).
“Random Regulations.” National Parks & Conservation Magazine 50 (June, 1976).
189
Sellegren, Arthur. “Blue Haze: Multi-use Issues Come to a Head in the Land of the 
Buffalo.” Backcountry (January, 1996).
“Snowmobiles and the National Parks.” American Forests 78 (April, 1972).
Souvigney, Jeanne-Marie. “Bison Stuck with Status Quo.” Greater Yellowstone Report 
(Fall, 1997).
“Summary of Comments.” Winter Visitor Use Management (Fall, 1996).
Sylvester, James T., and Marlene Nesary. “Snowmobiling in Montana, An Update.” 
Montana Business Quarterly (Winter, 1994).
“Watt Gets Snowmobiles into Lassen Volcanic.” National Parks 56 (March/April, 1982).
Wilkinson, Todd. “Snowed Under: the roar of snowmobiles in many national parks has 
replaced the solitude and quiet that once defined the winter landscape.” National 
Parks 69 (Jan./Feb. 1995).
“Winter Use Goals.” Winter Visitor Use Management (January, 1996).
Woodbury, Richard. “Arctic Cats and Buffalo.” Time (March 17, 1997).
“Yellowstone Buffalo Slaughtered in Record Numbers.” National Parks 71 (March/April, 
1997).
“The Yellowstone Tourists Never See.” Collier's 125 (May 20,1950).
NEWSPAPERS
Billings Gazette. Jan. 25, 1967. “Snowriders to Tour Yellowstone’s Loop.” 
March 29, 1977. “Total ban on off-road vehicles not intended.”
May 11, 1996. “Environmentalists want snowmobiles barred from Park.”
Bozeman Daily Chronicle. Jan. 9,1994. “Snowmobiles ‘extremely dirty’.” 
Jan. 9, 1994. “Yellowstone in Winter.”
Sept. 21, 1982. “Yellowstone Park chief dies of cancer.”
Oct. 28, 1997. “Judge upholds Yellowstone winter use settlement.”
Nov. 8, 1997. “Burns has plan for park.”
Jan. 15, 1998. “Sen. Thomas: Snowmobile trail closures not justified.”
190
Jan. 17, 1998. “Road closure put on hold.”
Cody Enterprise. March 17, 1948. “Seek Year-Round Opening of Yellowstone Hiways.” 
March 16, 1949. “Charge Park Service costs Padded.”
Feb. 4, 1976. “Are there snowmobiles in Cody’s economic future?”
Sept. 29, 1976. “Park buys equipment: Sylvan stays open for snowmobiles.”
Denver Post. March 12, 1949. “Yellowstone Plan Gains; Contractor Backs Year-Round 
Idea.”
Fresno Bee. Nov. 9, 1975. “Court Decision Expected in Yosemite Snowmobile Case.”
Great Falls Tribune. March 12, 1957. “Wyoming urges All Entrances to Park Open 
Simultaneously.”
Hungry Horse News. Aug. 5, 1976. “Iversen Sends Recommendation on Snowmobile 
Policy to Denver.”
Jackson Hole News. Aug. 27, 1997. “Charges fly as more join park lawsuit.”
The Missoulian. March 20, 1997. “Latest Yellowstone bison count much lower than fall.” 
March 24, 1997. “Racicot, ag chief talk bison.”
Park County New. Feb. 6, 1964. “Why not open park for winter activity for all the 
people?”
PAMPHLETS
“Ambient Air Quality Study Results, West Entrance Station, Yellowstone National 
Park, Winter, 1995.” National Park Service, Yellowstone National Park, WY.
Haines, Howard. “Snowmobiles in Yellowstone.” Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality, 1995.
National Park Service. “Ambient Air Quality Study Results.” Yellowstone, WY, 1995.
----------------------. “Seasonal Visitation Statistics.” Yellowstone, WY.
----------------------, “Snowmobiling in Glacier National Park.” Glacier National Park, MT,
1985.
 . “Yellowstone National Park Travel Table.” Yellowstone, WY.
191
National Wildlife Federation. “Time for You to Speak Out: Stop the Destruction of 
Your Buffalo.” Pamphlet distributed by the National Wildlife Federation, 240 N. 
Fîiggins, Missoula, MT 59802.
“Yellowstone Snowtime Adventures.” AmFac Parks & Resorts, Yellowstone, WY.
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Barbee, Robert. Anchorage, AK. Jan. 14, 1998.
Cole, Glen. International Falls, MN. Nov. 15, 1997.
Danforth, Terry. Bozeman, MT. Nov. 20, 1997.
Estey, Bud. Norfolk, NE. Nov. 12, 1997.
Good, John. Mammoth, WY. Nov. 13, 1997.
Halladay, Joe. Belgrade, MT. May 29, 1997.
Hape, Bill. Gardiner, MT. Nov. 13, 1997.
Flaraden, Bob. Bozeman, MT. Nov. 11, 1997.
Inafuku, Les. Old Faithful, WY. July 15,1997.
Jones, Bob. Moab, Utah. Nov. 17,1997.
McGreight, Jean. Mammoth Plot Springs, WY. Nov. 3, 1997.
Meagher, Mary. Gardiner, MT. Nov. 3,1997.
Mernin, Jerry. Bozeman, MT. Nov. 11,1997.
Neckels, Jack. Grand Teton National Park, WY. Nov. 4,1997.
Nuss, Dale. Bridger Canyon, MT. Nov. 11, 1997.
Richardson, Jim. Rocky Mountain National Park, CO Oct. 31, 1997.
Sacklin, John. Mammoth H ot Springs, WY. Nov. 14, 1997.
Shreier, Bill. Bryce Canyon National Park, Utah. Nov. 17, 1997.
192
Varley, Anita. Mammoth Hot Springs, WY. Summer, 1991.
West, Barbara}. Voyageurs National Park, MN. Jan. 17, 1997.
Williams, Pat. Missoula, MT. April 22, 1997.
LEGAL CITATIONS
Fund for Animals et at., v. Bruce Babbitt et at. Case Number 1:97CV01126, May 20, 1997. 
36 CFR Chapter 1, §2.18 (d)(1).
36 CFR Chapter 7 §7.2 et seq.
40 CFR Chapter V, §1500 et seq.
39 FR 11882, April 1, 1974.
39 FR 16151, May 7, 1974.
42 FR 26959, May 25,1977.
44 FR 47412, Aug. 13,1979.
756 F. 2d 686 (1985).
864 F. 2d 954 ( f  Cir. 1989).
393 F. Supp. 1286 (1975).
590 F. Supp. 1467 (1984).
16 U.S.C.A. §1: National Park Service: Service Created.
16 U.S.C.A. §21-22: Establishment, Yellowstone National Park.
42 U.S.C.A. §4321 et seq.. Public Law 91-190 (1970).
